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Foreword 
Innovation networks are a complex organisation form of industrial R&D which plays a 
prominent role in the generation and diffusion of new knowledge. Economists widely 
ignored innovation networks and claimed that the phenomenon must be transitory 
only, a consequence of disruptive technical change that will disappear. Instead of 
trying to understand the dynamics of knowledge development, the whole phenomenon 
was reduced to the discussion of spillover effects which are likely to distort the 
incentives of firm actors to invest costly resources in research and development 
activities.  
Because of the sheer existence of this cooperative form of industrial research, 
innovation networks are considered an expression of exceptional circumstances. 
Innovation networks might allow established firms to get access to relevant but distant 
knowledge introduced by innovative start-ups. After the creation of own competences 
in the respective fields, the innovation networks disappear and with them the small 
start-up companies. If this is not the case and the established companies are not able to 
integrate the new competences, the start-ups will become the established firms of the 
future, replacing the old establishment.  
Economic development has shown that traditional economists were barking up the 
wrong tree: In many industries, innovation networks are not a transitory but a 
permanent phenomenon which connect heterogeneous firms in their attempts to 
improve the knowledge base. It is the merit of Tobias Buchmann that he addresses this 
important topic not only from a new theoretical perspective embedded in Neo-
Schumpeterian economics but also complementing his theoretical reasoning with an 
important and so far rare empirical study.  
In his thesis, he has outlined a conceptual framework for capturing network evolution 
patterns of interfirm innovation networks and analysed the dynamic evolution of an 
R&D network in the German automotive industry. In particular, he tested a number of 
hypotheses with respect to the drivers of evolutionary change processes of a network 
that are based on subsidised R&D projects in a recent period encompassing ten years.  
 
 
 
IV    
For this purpose, he employed a stochastic actor-based model in order to estimate the 
impact of network change drivers. In his analysis, which can be characterized as a pilot 
study in understanding network dynamics he is able to derive interesting results. For 
example, he showed that structural positions of firms as well as actor covariates and 
dyadic covariates are determinants of the evolution process. 
Tobias Buchmann’s result are likely to meet a large interest in the field of modern 
innovation research. The results are relevant to support the strategic considerations of 
firms involved in networks as well as of policy makers in the field of innovation 
policies. 
          
Prof. Dr. Andreas Pyka 
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1. Introduction 1 
 
“Model building 
 is the art of selecting those aspects of a process 
 that are relevant to the question being asked. 
 As with any art, this selection is guided by the 
 taste, elegance, and metaphor; 
 it is a matter of induction, 
 rather than deduction.” 
 (Holland, 1995, p. 146). 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Complexity – Holistic and Reductionist Views in Economics and Cuisine 
Intellectual nourishment is a typical and well-accepted diet for doctoral students. 
However, the growling of the stomach is often an unambiguous signal that food of a 
more solid variety is called for. Following this call, you may pass by a supermarket on 
your way home from the office. Myself, always appreciative of la cucina italiana, I 
often decide to grab some spaghetti, a string bag of garlic and onions, a cup of cream 
and some ham. If you have olive oil and basil at home, all ingredients are kept at hand 
to prepare a simple but nice spaghetti dish with a ham-cream sauce. As you would 
expect, this dish is delicious and can be well complemented by a glass of a characterful 
Chianti Classico wine. Now you can simply enjoy the delicious food and wine, or you 
may be in the mood for scientific inquiry and ask the following question: How do 
these simple clear-cut ingredients transform into a delicious dish with a complex and 
multifaceted flavor?  
To answer this question, we may start with the analysis of the dish. A cooked dish can 
be regarded as a typical example of a complex system. Simon (1995, p. 26) considers 
“a system as complex if it can be analyzed into many components having relatively 
many relations among them, so that the behavior of each component depends on the 
behavior of others”. To understand the functioning and outcome of an entire system 
(the dish), it is not sufficient to only analyze the constituent parts (the ingredients, the 
molecules, etc.) in isolation, i.e. separated from each other. In fact, cooking essentially 
means that we mix the ingredients according to a (mental) recipe and heat them up. 
When we mix the garlic, onions, cream and ham, and when we add some olive oil, 
basil, salt and pepper, then we hope that the resulting sauce will not taste like a bit of 
ham, a bit of garlic, a bit of basil and so on, but we hope that something new, tasty and 
maybe surprising emerges from the cooked mix of well specified ingredients. Indeed, 
2  1. Introduction 
the described sauce develops a specific character with a flavor and taste that can hardly 
be anticipated from tasting the ingredients separately. In other words, from degusting 
the ingredients separately we can hardly predict the exact taste of the prepared dish. 
Furthermore, while it is nowadays easy for natural scientists to study the constituent 
parts of a dish down to its smallest components, it is much more challenging to re-
engineer food based on its components and understand the interaction patterns of 
components. Ahn et al. (2011) give it a try in attempting to understand food 
preferences as a function of the ingredient mix. They study a large number (56498) of 
recipes to find general patterns which explain ingredient combinations in food. Based 
on a network approach which links ingredients if they share at least one flavor 
compound, they develop a flavor network. Their hypothesis states that our food is 
more frequently based on ingredient pairs that are strongly linked in the flavor 
network. The results in fact indicate that the hypothesis holds for North American and 
Western European cuisines, but that East Asian and Southern European cuisines do not 
show a preference for recipes whose ingredients share flavor compounds.  
Two lessons can be learned from this little excursion into the culinary world: First, a 
doctoral student can hardly escape from thinking of his dissertation project even when 
he is cooking. Second, as Aristotle already pointed out: “In the case of all things which 
have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the 
whole is something beside the parts […]” (Aristotle and Ross, 1953, p. 129). More 
recently, Chen (2008, p. 91) puts this phenomenon in similar words: “Both atomism 
and reductionism assume that the whole is the sum of all the parts. When complex 
interactions exist between different elements, the whole is more than the sum of parts, 
especially in living organism and social organization.” 
Complex interaction between the constituent parts plays a crucial role for the 
emergence of a greater whole. This holds for the ingredients of a dish as well as for 
individuals or organizations in socio-economic systems. Based on this understanding 
more specific questions can be asked: In which way are the parts tied together?  How 
do they interact in that they create the observed (or rather tasted) result? Besides food, 
the lessons learned and the questions asked can be transferred to less sensory-oriented 
contexts. For example, people acting in a social context are embedded in complex 
structures and – as analyzed in this dissertation – firms cooperating with the aim to 
become more innovative are the ingredients of innovation networks or innovation 
systems. How do these firms interact and what determines their preference for specific 
cooperation partners? Capturing interaction between heterogeneous agents is a vital 
step on the path to understanding the emergence and evolution of complex structures. 
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Networks are evolving and adapting structures steered by the motives, behaviors and 
objectives of actors (Kash and Rycroft, 2002). Chen (2008, p. 82) argues that “the 
many-body problem (such as social behavior) is essentially different from the one-
body (in a representative agent) and two-body (in bilateral bargaining) problems”. The 
emergence and evolution of social structures resulting from motives of interaction is 
particularly interesting to study (Arrow, 1994). 
For the case of interfirm networks, Powell (1990) suggests in his influential paper with 
the title “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization” that 
collaborative ensembles are characterized by lateral or horizontal patterns of exchange, 
independent flows of resources and reciprocal lines of communication. Moreover, 
group phenomena are said to influence decisions taken by individual actors, 
constituting a repercussion effect on micro actors. In networks, actors react and adapt 
their behavior to the decisions taken by individuals or subgroups of other actors – for 
instance their neighbors – in the past (social influence). Firms follow strategic 
objectives aiming at the creation of novelties, the generation of profits, etc. By 
modeling heterogeneity, social behavior and bounded rationality, individual action 
turns into complex aggregation processes. Firms are heterogeneous as they have their 
own specific history, personnel, knowledge-base etc. These firm characteristics 
(variety) serve as the basis for the development of differentiated industries (Pyka and 
Fagiolo, 2005). Interfirm networks constitute a specific type of social network which 
can be defined as „a specific set of linkages among a defined set of actors, with the 
additional property that the characteristics of these linkages as a whole may be used to 
interpret the social behavior of the actors involved” (Mitchell, 1969, p.2). 
Going back to food, it cannot only stop the growling of our stomach and serve as an 
example for a complex system, but also inspire economists to defining an important 
concept related to innovation and production processes of firms, namely technology. 
Dosi and Nelson (2010) define technologies by the notion of a recipe which contains 
the design and the necessary procedures for the creation of a product together with the 
specification of actions, tools and ingredients (input factors) that have to be combined 
in a specific manner. However, only parts of a production process can be codified and 
substantial parts consist of tacit knowledge. Tacit are those knowledge elements which 
are embodied in individuals but differ from individual to individual and cannot be fully 
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codified in words or writing.
1
 “Tacitness is a measure of the degree to which we know 
more than we can tell” (Dosi and Grazzi, 2010, p.176). In addition, tacit knowledge 
elements can, to a relatively high degree, be shared by people that experience the 
matter in a similar way (Polanyi, 1967). By conferring the characteristic of tacitness to 
technological knowledge, it cannot be treated as a pure public good anymore since the 
replication and development of the necessary capabilities to access and make use of 
knowledge and technology involve considerable costs and require considerable 
learning efforts (Dosi and Nelson, 2010). Grant (1996) concludes that explicit 
knowledge becomes ubiquitous through its communication while the disclosure of 
tacit knowledge requires its application. Furthermore, relevant knowledge is typically 
distributed among a greater variety of actors and successful innovation processes are 
related to timely and locally bound combinations of knowledge. Accordingly, 
technologies inherently contain social elements linking organizations and their 
constituent parts. In this perspective, technology has to be analyzed in connection with 
organizations, social structure and the division of labor. The notion of social 
technologies is applied to point out that technologies are shaped by norms, beliefs and 
social practices (Nelson and Sampat, 2001). Therefore, “a technology can be seen as a 
human designed means for achieving a particular end“ (Dosi and Nelson, 2010, p. 55).  
To answer the previously raised questions about the interaction of constituent parts of 
complex systems, plenty of approaches can be considered. The orthodox 
microfoundational framework, which represents the established “gold standard” in 
various scientific disciplines, suggests that we need to understand the ever smaller 
units aggregates are formed of, and that we ought to find uniform laws derived from 
the micro entities which explain the behavior of the aggregate. A more system-oriented 
scientist would contrarily assert that it is more promising to understand micro 
mechanisms of parts and their behavior in an environment which is shaped by an 
interconnected micro-macro level architecture. The principles of strong reductionism, 
represented by the former approach, have been prevailing for a long time in many 
                                            
1 A historic example for the relevance of tacit knowledge for innovation is the attempt of the Prussian king 
Frederick the Great to copy Watt’s atmospheric engine. When the king sent two men to England to spy out Watt’s 
invention, they “made notes and drawings of the engine” (Redlich, 1944, p. 122). Based on the stolen 
information, in August 1785 the Prussian technicians were able to construct a machine which was employed to 
drain a copper mine. However, due to technical deficiencies, they were not able to keep the machine in operation 
for long. Consequently, a second “expedition” was undertaken to gain more information on the functioning of 
the machine. This time, rather than making more notes and drawings, a special cylinder which was a key element 
of the machine was brought back to Prussia together with and English artisan (skilled labor), which was illegal at 
that time. Now the king’s engineers were able to build a machine which was more reliable and efficient (Redlich, 
1944). Possessing the exact plan of a product or process is not sufficient to create a product or to design a 
process exactly as it was intended. Instead, parts of the knowledge embodied in products and processes can only 
be acquired through practical experience (Freeman, 1994). 
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scientific fields, including economics and management science. However, from 
understanding the molecules, atoms, protons, electrons, neutrons, quarks etc. of basil, 
we can hardly guess the taste which emerges when the basil is combined and cooked 
with the cream and the olive oil. Similarly, we can hardly understand economic 
aggregates such as innovation networks by analyzing representative firms and research 
organizations separated from each other. Equilibrium economic models are typically 
based on the assumption of representative agents. However, the character of the 
aggregate is often not obvious but emerges from a complex interaction process.
2
 
Comparable to the example of the ingredient mix which turns into a delicious dish, it is 
not sufficient to understand the functioning of firms in isolation to explain, for 
instance, the innovative performance or the emerging structure of an innovation 
network. Rather, we need tools that enable us to investigate the interaction of 
heterogeneous firms (Teece and Pisano, 1994) and other relevant actors, because it is 
the interaction process that shapes the aggregate and in turn, it is the aggregate that 
influences the behavior of its parts. Consequently, it is indispensable to study 
interaction in order to understand the functioning of aggregates comprised of 
ingredients or firms. In particular, “equilibrium assumptions mostly are unwarranted 
for observations on network processes, and making such assumptions could lead to 
biased conclusions” (Snijders, 2005, p. 215). 
Once we have prepared a dish, i.e. mixed and cooked the ingredients, we cannot 
restore the garlic, the ham etc. into their original shape. What we have done, that is the 
cooking, is irreversible. By no means can we extract the ingredients from the dish to 
have them in their original state. They have been gradually deteriorated and something 
new has emerged out of them. The Nobel Prize winner Ilya Prigogine called this 
phenomenon the irreversibility of time (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). It means for a 
socio-economic system that interaction creates new states and there is no way to reach 
the exact old state again. Once a (contractual) partnership is formed between two 
actors, it cannot be dissolved (for a certain period of time). Moreover, the initiated 
cooperation between two firms changes the network structure but also the actors’ 
characteristics, a process which makes it impossible to reach the previous state again. 
Economic systems do not show frictionless interaction but are characterized by 
fluctuations and growth or decline. In this sense, an economic system is more like a 
                                            
2 According to theories of nonlinear dynamics, every complex system is just an evolving part of an even greater 
system. Such systems are interleaved with different levels of hierarchy up to the highest level which is the 
universe as such. “Komplexe Systeme – sowohl chaotische als auch geordnete – sind letzten Endes nicht 
analysierbar, nicht auf Teile reduzierbar, weil die Teile durch Iteration und Rückkopplung ständig aufeinander 
zurückwirken” (Briggs and Peat, 1990, p. 221). 
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biological system than a mechanical system, since economic and biological systems 
are dissipative in nature and an important characteristic of dissipative systems is 
irreversibility (Chen, 2008). 
1.2 Modeling Frameworks 
The complexity of systemic structures makes the analysis of evolutionary change often 
a probabilistic science. Stochastic models are appropriate for this kind of analysis. In 
this dissertation, the stochastic actor-based model for network dynamics (Snijders, 
1996; Snijders, 2001; Snijders, 2005) is applied to test hypotheses about the drivers of 
network evolution of a German automotive innovation network. Studying network 
evolution refers to understanding the dynamics of the network via some captured 
mechanisms. In other words, it is about understanding the rules governing the 
sequence of change through time (Stokman and Doreian, 1997). The applied model 
cannot definitely prove that a certain driver of network evolution is causal in reality. 
This can only be shown by collecting and analyzing very detailed observations (e.g. by 
conducting detailed case studies), which is often impossible for large populations, or 
by randomized experimental designs. However, agent-based models, such as the 
applied one, can indeed demonstrate that a certain mechanism is sufficient to explain 
the observed outcome and to establish plausibility in terms of statistical significance 
(Holland, 1995). 
Mainstream economic theory postulates that aggregate phenomena can be explained 
by microfoundational theory. But many macro models are based on idealized and 
rather simplified assumptions with regard to the micro actors, their operational motives 
and strategies. The usual way to conduct this idealization is by introducing a 
representative agent (single or categorical agent). An important deficiency of this 
concept is that individual behavior is scaled up to form the aggregate in a way which 
assumes homogeneity, homotheticity and identical preferences among all actors (of a 
category) (Hoover, 2010). Such microfoundational reasoning constitutes an essential 
building block of neoclassical thinking. Hodgson (1998, p. 169) defines the 
neoclassical school as follows: “Neoclassical economics […] may be conveniently 
defined as an approach which (1) assumes rational, maximizing behavior by agents 
with given and stable preference functions, (2) focuses on attained, or movements 
toward, equilibrium states, and (3) excludes chronic information problems (such as 
uncertainty of the type explored by Frank Knight and John Maynard Keynes).” Such 
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models exclude many aspects which are highly relevant for studying innovation 
processes as well as innovation network evolution and its drivers. 
Approaches for studying microfoundations to understand aggregate outcomes are in 
general based on the concept of methodological individualism as opposed to 
methodological collectivism. The concept of methodological individualism was first 
delineated in the preface of Menger’s (1871) book Grundsätze der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre. The two concepts are described clearly by Samuels (1972, p. 
249): “By methodological individualism I mean the view which holds that the 
meaningful social science knowledge is best or more appropriately derived through the 
study of individuals; and by methodological collectivism I mean the view which holds 
that meaningful social science knowledge is best or more appropriately derived 
through the study of group organizations, forces, processes and/or problems.”  
Social interaction is in its essential meaning interaction between individuals (Arrow, 
1994). To better understand emerging and evolving processes in groups, the strict 
microfoundational idea needs to be complemented by (i) the study of interaction 
between actors and (ii) a multi-level perspective considering the influence of 
aggregates on individuals as a collectivist force. Thereby, the analysis gains a more 
holistic perspective which helps to better grasp phenomena in social sciences from 
which we know that individual behavior not only triggers the emergence of group 
characteristics but the group also influences the individual behavior in a co-
evolutionary manner. Clearly, the development of a model always implies that some 
sort of simplification and thus idealization takes place. However, the developed model 
must capture essential relationships and mechanisms which are at work in reality and 
which are relevant for answering the research question at hand. While the neoclassical 
school stresses generality and precision in conclusions, evolutionary economics, in 
contrast, emphasizes realism and precision in processes (Van Den Bergh and Gowdy, 
2003). By striving for a rather realistic model to study network evolution, I agree with 
Hoover (2010) that representative agent models do not provide adequate 
microfoundations for aggregation. Note, that strengthening precision of economic 
models is rarely a trivial operation. Van Den Bergh and Gowdy (2003) argue that 
modeling more micro details in parts of a system might go at the expense of losing 
accuracy in another part of it. Thus, there seems to be a trade-off between realism, 
precision and generality in economic models (Costanza et al., 1993).  
For a long time, there was no real impetus for rocking the foundation of established 
neoclassical thinking. Despite the weakness in precision and realism, the established 
theories seemed to explain satisfactorily well important economic phenomena and 
8  1. Introduction 
stylized facts, notably economic growth. Yet, a number of severe problems could not 
be solved within the established framework. For instance, technological progress as an 
approved cause for increasing per capita income could not be explained endogenously 
and not be linked to the variety of innovation strategies of micro actors. Instead, 
technological progress hit the firms exogenously “like manna from heaven”. A 
contemporary deficiency is related to the global financial and economic crisis which 
cannot be satisfactorily explained, even though it became a severe threat when the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers infected the global banking system. Such drastic 
events in a system are not foreseen in models which oversimplify the 
microfoundations and neglect deviance from rational behavior. In a different context, 
collaborative innovation projects have become an effective tool for exchanging 
knowledge and improving innovative performance of firms in various respects (e.g. 
time to market, quality, degree of innovativeness), thereby challenging the public good 
character of knowledge which is a key assumption in many established models. While 
the collaborative mode of product and process development was barely applied until 
the early 1980s, the number of collaborative projects sharply increased since then 
(Hergert and Morris, 1988).   
By drawing on the ideas of Schumpeter and on the foundations of the economics of 
technology and innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988), Neo-
Schumpeterian scholars (e.g. Hanusch and Pyka, 2007a) have attempted to shine more 
light into the black box of technological progress, evolutionary change and collective 
innovation. In this school of thought, innovation processes are regarded as the main 
drivers of economic change and growth. Instead of implementing them as exogenous 
shocks in models, the Neo-Schumpeterian school explains innovation processes by 
analyzing their causes, mechanisms and effects. Firms are no longer seen as 
homogenous entities that maximize their profits by choosing from a set of well-defined 
alternatives. Rather, firms act within an environment of true uncertainty (Knight, 
1921). Moreover, ideas from disciplines outside of economics or management science 
are welcome in that they provide valuable contributions to the broad repertoire of ideas 
in Neo-Schumpeterian thinking. In particular, the detailed modeling of micro actors 
(so called agent-based or actor-based modeling) (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005) and their 
interaction patterns requires well defined theories of behavior, connecting economic 
ideas with psychology and sociology. Not surprisingly, sociological concepts have 
become a vital cornerstone for the analysis of innovation networks (Burt, 1982; 
Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988). Smelser and Swedberg (1994) nicely summarize 
essential differences between so-called mainstream economics (classical and 
neoclassical economics) and economic sociology: First, the principle of 
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methodological individualism in orthodox microeconomics suggests that actors are not 
influenced by other actors in a group or society. In contrast, economic sociology 
explicitly considers actor-interaction relations. Second, economic action is assumed to 
be virtually always rational in microeconomic theories while rationality is one possible 
variable value among other forms of action in the latter theory. Third, social structures 
constrain individual behavior only in economic sociology. For instance, Gulati and 
Gargiulo (1999) find that sharing a common cooperation partner increases the 
probability that two firms start to cooperate. In fact, looking beyond the narrow 
limitations of established economic paradigms of thought is a fruitful way to improve 
the understanding in many economic fields. The need for scientific openness was 
already phrased by John Stuart Mill (1865, 2008, p. 62) as: “The only security against 
[this] narrowness is a liberal mental cultivation, and all it proves is that a person is not 
likely to be a good political economist who is nothing else.” 
The development and application of a micro-based network model in this thesis 
focuses on the study of micro mechanisms of firm interaction. It can be regarded as a 
possible synthesis of the enduring struggle between individualist and collectivist 
theories. While in a network perspective it is individual actors making decisions about 
their collaboration partners (full control about (outgoing) ties), the micro and the 
aggregate level are not independent from each other but they influence each other, i.e. 
groups influence individual decisions. A key advantage of a multi-level approach “is 
that it can incorporate theories that so far have presented opposite, partial and 
incomplete perspectives on the functioning of macroeconomic systems” (Van Den 
Bergh and Gowdy, 2003, p. 79). One example is the discussion about selection and 
social influence. While individual preferences on the one side steer the selection of 
cooperation partners, it is on the other side the networks which may influence 
preferences and actor characteristics. The envisaged model should be able to 
disentangle such effects. Consequently, it becomes increasingly difficult to deliver 
answers about one-way causalities. We observe instead co-evolutionary processes with 
complicated interaction patterns. The analysis of firm interaction through the lenses of 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) (e.g. Wasserman and Faust, 1994) enables us to capture 
actor heterogeneity, e.g. differences in endowments, behavior, learning and absorptive 
capacities. However, only longitudinal network data can help us to understand the 
forces and mechanisms of network change over time. 
In order to theorize firms, I draw on the resource- and knowledge-based view of the 
firm (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Grant, 1996; Pyka and Hanusch, 
2006). Knowledge constitutes a key firm resource which is a prerequisite for the 
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development of new products and processes. Early proponents of this concept are 
Marshall (1920, p. 115) who recognizes knowledge as the decisive factor in production 
processes (“Knowledge is our most powerful engine of production”) and Penrose 
(1959) from whom we can derive the conceptualization of knowledge as an important 
resource. A firm’s knowledge-base is defined as “the set of information inputs, 
knowledge and capabilities that inventors draw on when looking for innovative 
solutions” (Dosi, 1988, p. 1126). Saviotti (2009, p. 27) defines the knowledge-base 
from a production system perspective as “the collective knowledge that can be used to 
achieve the firm’s productive objectives”. In the early 1980s, this approach is taken up 
by Neo-Schumpeterian scholars (Hodgson, Samuels and Tool, 1994; Dopfer, 2005; 
Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005; Hanusch and Pyka, 2007a). Here, the role of knowledge for 
economic development and the success of firms is explicitly recognized and 
constitutes the cornerstone of economic analysis. Moreover, in the Neo-Schumpeterian 
perspective networks are seen as a central determinant in the industrial creation of 
novelty and they are therefore a decisive coordination mechanism. In networks, new 
technological opportunities are created via technological complementarities and 
synergies, bringing together a wide spectrum of technological and managerial 
competencies. Knowledge is no longer considered to be purely a pure public good, but 
instead as partly local, tacit, firm-specific and complex. These characteristics hamper 
technological knowledge from being easily exchanged on markets like commodities 
(Dosi, 1988). Instead, networks serve as an instrument for the exchange and diffusion 
of knowledge (Valente, 1996; Deroian, 2002).  
“The study of networks is part of the general area of science known as complexity 
theory” (Buchanan, 2003, p. 18). However, Barabási (2005, p. 70) argues that given 
the current state of network understanding, “network theory is not a proxy for a theory 
of complexity”. While – it is further argued – network theory explains the emergence 
and evolution of the overall structure representing the “skeleton of a complex system”, 
a more complete understanding requires more knowledge about “the nature of 
dynamical processes”. In the same vein, Newman, Barabási and Watts (2006, p. 7) 
criticize that “traditional approaches to networks have tended to overlook or 
oversimplify the relationship between the structural properties of a networked system 
and its behavior”. Learning about such processes implies that we must go beyond the 
analysis of static structural network characteristics. This means that we need to 
understand the (generic) micro mechanisms governing the evolutionary change 
process. With the analysis conducted for this doctoral thesis, I intend to contribute to 
the understanding of evolutionary network dynamics which can bring us a step closer 
towards a more complete theory of complexity. Based on a broad set of theories, I 
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derive a number of hypotheses to test the relevance of different mechanisms for 
innovation network evolution. In particular, I test these hypotheses with empirical data 
of a publicly subsidized innovation network composed of a sample of German 
automotive firms. 
1.3 Research Questions and Outline  
A core objective of this dissertation is the development of a model for analyzing the 
complex evolution of innovation networks and the driving mechanisms underlying 
network evolution derived from theoretical and empirical findings in economics and 
related fields. Researchers in economics and management science have devoted 
considerable effort to investigating the causes, motivations and advantages for the 
emergence of interfirm networks and strategic alliances (e.g. Powell, Koput and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996; Ahuja, 2000b; Hagedoorn, 2002). A number of studies focus on 
motives of cooperative behavior (cf. chapter 4); or they relate structural characteristics 
of the network, networks subgroups or single actors (e.g. centrality) to outcome 
measures like innovativeness or performance (Gulati, 1998). However, studies linking 
the cooperation partner selection strategies with the evolution of a network are rare. 
Only a small number of empirical studies have analyzed network formation, 
dissolution and evolution (Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997; Orsenigo, Pammolli and 
Riccaboni, 2001; Gay and Dousset, 2005; Giuliani, 2010; Balland, De Vaan and 
Boschma, 2012).  
This brings me to the following research questions: 
 What are the mechanisms and forces that determine the evolution of networks over 
time?  
 What influence do knowledge related factors have in a German automotive 
innovation network? 
 How do firm characteristics affect the propensity to collaborate? 
 To what extent do dyadic characteristics influence the preference for cooperation?  
 To what extent do endogenous forces drive the evolution of innovation networks? 
The analysis is focused on a sample of German automotive firms, taking industry and 
firm characteristics, such as their collaborative ties and knowledge-bases, into account. 
I use archival information from a public German database called “Förderkatalog” to 
learn about interorganizational relations in the German automotive industry based on 
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(subsidized) collaborative research projects. Marsden (1990, p. 444) points out that 
“only a limited methodological literature exists on archival network data”. 
Accordingly, I also contribute to this literature by exploring the possibilities for 
applying such data. Furthermore, while the breadth and the depth of firm knowledge-
bases have been the subject of previous studies, the structure of the knowledge-base 
and also the methods of analysis for studying such structures are largely unexplored 
(Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008). Therefore, I apply the method of network analysis to 
investigate the structure of the sample knowledge-base (Saviotti, 2009) which is 
created out of the patent portfolios of the firms which form the investigated 
automotive innovation network. I further test a theory derived from Granovetter’s 
(1973) idea about the strength of week ties, stipulating that the strength of a tie 
between two nodes correlates with degree of overlapping ego networks. Moreover, I 
expect that the current shift in the automotive power train from the internal 
combustion engine towards e-mobility becomes visible in the centrality measures of 
respective knowledge elements (approximated by patents). 
This brings me to further research questions: 
 Do e-mobility related International Patent Classification (IPC) sub-classes become 
more central in the knowledge-base network over time? 
 Does the tie strength among knowledge-base elements (IPC sub-classes) explain 
the overlap of the elements’ ego networks? 
To answer these research questions, I use established social network analysis (SNA) 
techniques and combine them with recent methodological developments in the analysis 
of network evolution. In particular, I apply the stochastic actor-based model for 
network dynamics (Snijders, 1996; Snijders, 2001; Snijders, 2005). Thereby, I follow 
the suggestions of the Neo-Schumpeterian school (Hanusch and Pyka, 2007b) and 
integrate ideas from different disciplines, namely economics, economic geography, 
management science, sociology, biology and physics (complexity science). Some of 
the analytical work is done with the help of the network analysis software Ucinet 6 
(Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002), but most of it is conducted with software 
packages that are implemented in the R environment. R provides a large variety of 
statistical and graphical analysis techniques. It is an Open Source
3
 project and is highly 
extensible and versatile. Specific packages for network analysis are available. R is 
especially convenient for the analysis of longitudinal network data as it allows for the 
                                            
3 GNU general public license.  
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use of predefined functions and loops which reduce manual calculation efforts for 
larger numbers of networks. Meanwhile, a growing community of R-users develops 
new packages for specific purposes and shares ideas and codes.
4
 Following the 
philosophy of sharing scientific knowledge, I add my R-scripts for actual analysis to 
the appendix (C. Appendix). This should allow other researchers (i) to benefit from 
what has already been thought and make research in the best sense cumulative, and (ii) 
to facilitate the replication of my results. 
The first part of this dissertation is dedicated to theoretical considerations focusing on 
the complexity of multi-agent systems, the knowledge-based theory of the firm and 
network structures. The second part continues with an empirical study focusing on the 
drivers of network evolution in a German automotive network. I test whether 
knowledge related factors (absorptive capacity, technological distance between actors 
and the modular character of their knowledge-bases) influence the preference structure 
with regard to the selection of a cooperation partner. In addition, I test the influence of 
the geographical distance between actors, their collaborative experience, age, industry 
experience as well as the preference for being embedded in cohesive triads. The 
research questions raised in this dissertation are relevant for managers and policy 
makers alike. First, if co-location improves the chances of becoming embedded in an 
innovation networks, managers should keep this in mind when they decide about firm 
location and policy makers have a strong argument for cluster policies. Second, R&D 
activities can be aligned with network partners that apply a similar knowledge-base 
leading to small technological distances, or they can be carried out on the basis of 
diverging knowledge-bases, emphasizing a greater variety of knowledge. For the 
formation of a network it is important to know if the actors in the industry have a 
preference for partners with similar or rather dissimilar knowledge-bases. Moreover, a 
significant relevance of cooperation experience for partner selection suggests that trust 
and reputation matter, and that there might be a need for special incentives to 
cooperate with relatively young firms which have not yet had the chance to build 
trustworthy relationships. In general, the applied model can help to assess if the 
applied policy achieves its objective in that collaborative ties are formed between the 
actors that are expected to form the ties, e.g. inclusion of start-ups etc. In the empirical 
study of the sample knowledge-base, i.e. the aggregated patent portfolio, I investigate, 
among others, the centrality of technology classes which indicates how important a 
                                            
4 A good example is the website: http://www.r-bloggers.com. 
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certain technology is for the industry. This provides guidance for firms when they 
adjust their research strategy. 
This dissertation is divided into ten chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the 
second chapter illustrates why network embeddedness is a prerequisite for knowledge 
transfer and social learning. Moreover, I delineate how a Schumpeterian type of 
competition rewards firms with above-average learning capabilities which allow them 
shaping the structure of an industry. In the third chapter, the concept of a knowledge-
based economy as well as the innovation relatedness of some basic economic models 
is depicted and discussed. Additionally, this chapter introduces the evolutionary 
framework and its applicability for the analysis of economic problems. Chapter four is 
devoted to the theory of the firm which adequately explains collaborative behavior. 
With regard to an increasing knowledge orientation, the knowledge-based view seems 
to be an adequate basis for model building. In chapter five, I present methods of social 
network analysis and important findings from the study of innovation networks with 
regard to network positions and tie characteristics. Chapter six introduces key ideas of 
agent-based modeling (ABM) and shows its applicability for the analysis of evolving 
complex adaptive systems (CAS) and in particular of networks. Moreover, I depict 
peculiarities of longitudinal network studies. In chapter seven, relevant theories 
regarding the drivers of network evolution are presented. Network evolution is 
simultaneously driven by exogenous and endogenous forces. The presented theories 
constitute the conceptual framework for the development of hypotheses to be tested in 
chapter 9.10. Obviously, a key element in a knowledge-based view of the firm is the 
knowledge-base as such. As discussed in chapter eight, a patent portfolio is an 
appropriate proxy for a knowledge-base and contains additional rich information about 
inventors and applicants for an innovation economic analysis. In chapter nine, first, I 
characterize the situation of German automotive suppliers and manufacturers as well 
as their organization of R&D processes. Moreover, I present the analysis of the 
automotive sample knowledge-base, focusing on a number of structural characteristics 
and on technologies which are related to e-mobility. In addition, I illustrate to what 
extent the overlap of ties is correlated with tie strength. Subsequently, I introduce a 
model for capturing the drivers of innovation networks evolution for a network which 
consists of a sample of German automotive firms that are interconnected by publicly 
funded R&D projects. In a last step, I estimate model parameters and present the 
results of hypotheses tests. In chapter ten, I discuss a number of important research 
results as well as possible steps for further avenues of research. 
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2. Innovation and Industry Dynamics 
Schumpeter (1911) puts innovation in the center of his theory of economic 
development. In the beginning, he linked innovative success purely to the 
entrepreneurial success of outstanding individuals in an economy. Thirty years later, 
Schumpeter (1942) – inspired by the development of US industries – identified a 
significant change in the organization of R&D processes in specialized R&D 
laboratories of large firms (routinized innovation). And another forty years later, again 
a significant change had taken place in the organization of R&D. This change refers to 
the interaction among firms and other innovative actors, such as universities and 
public research institutes, forming innovation networks. Nevertheless, only since the 
end of the 1980s has a certain interest in the theoretical explanation of this 
phenomenon of collective innovation begun to arise in economics and related 
scientific fields, and the prevailing view of technological knowledge as a quasi public 
good begun to be challenged. Accordingly, it is not astonishing that we observe 
differences in firm performance, even in cases where the codified parts of a technology 
are commonly known. Such differences can (at least partly) be explained with 
heterogeneous levels of embeddedness in innovation networks (Dosi and Nelson, 
2010).  
2.1 The Case for Network Embeddedness 
The notion of an innovation network is frequently used in conjunction with 
agglomeration concepts such as clusters, industrial districts or (regional) innovation 
systems. The common underlying idea of these concepts suggests that spatial 
concentration matters for innovation activities on the micro level and for the related 
economic development from a macroscopic view. Marshall (1920) studied 
manufacturing firms that were located in the north of England when he brought 
forward the argument that their success is related to the localization within an 
industrial district that conveys the – intended or unintended – exchange of ideas: “If 
one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of 
their own; and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas” (Marshall, 1920, p. 
271). Within an industrial district, he further argued, knowledge is easily accessible by 
everyone: “The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the 
air” (Marshall, 1920, p. 271). As sort of a virtuous circle, firms absorb ideas developed 
by other firms in an industrial district, elaborate on them, learn from them and 
combine them with their own knowledge, creating in this vein the seed for new ideas 
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which can be grown into even more ideas spreading all over a district. Marshall’s 
discovery provides an argument for spatial clustering of firms. Furthermore, it shows 
that specialization within an industrial sector exerts the before mentioned externalities 
that favor the development of the entire spatially concentrated industry.  
In contrast to the specialization argument of Marshall (1920), Jacobs (1970) stresses 
diversity claiming that the exchange of knowledge between industries is more 
beneficial than exchange within an industry. Diversity enables a spatial cluster to bring 
new products to the market that are based on a combination of the variety of 
knowledge which is found in the local economy, thereby increasing the diversity of 
products which indicates a high innovation output. Recent work on clustering indicates 
the importance of knowledge exchange with firms that do not belong to the same 
cluster. Being embedded not only in local clusters but also in global value chains or 
sources of knowledge is relevant, above all, for firms, regions and countries seeking to 
catch up with respect to their innovation performance (Bell and Albu, 1999; Giuliani 
and Bell, 2005). A purely within-cluster R&D orientation creates the risk of getting 
trapped in a situation of a lock-in as cluster knowledge tends to become gradually 
more and more uniform over time (Asheim and Isaksen, 2002) following a possibly 
unfruitful technological trajectory (Grabher, 1993; Cantwell and Iammarino, 2003). 
The formation of extra-cluster linkages enables a cluster to prevent this lock-in 
(Asheim and Isaksen, 2002). In addition, Wuyts et al., (2005) find that too close and 
stable relations are harmful for learning since they reduce the optimal cognitive 
distance and hence learning opportunities. The integration of less similar external 
knowledge is a way of increasing the variety of knowledge in a cluster and to 
counteract the tendency of moving towards uniformity (Ghoshal, 1987; Fleming, 
2001).  
Technological breakthroughs possibly require a lower degree of cluster or network 
integration than a potential “optimal” degree which is suggested by transaction cost 
economics. Uzzi (1997) explains the paradox character of embeddedness: While on the 
one hand it helps a firm to adapt to the conditions of an ecosystem, on the other hand it 
hampers adaptation due to decreasing diversity of partners and knowledge-bases. The 
feeding of R&D processes with external knowledge raises the quantity and variety of 
knowledge elements which can be recombined with existing knowledge-bases 
(Fleming, 2001). However, effective knowledge transfer requires some but not too 
much of cognitive or technological proximity between industries or knowledge-bases 
in a region. Frenken, Van Oort and Verburg (2007) find that the higher the related 
variety in a region is, the higher the observed regional growth. Boschma and 
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Iammarino (2009) confirm that inflows of extra-regional knowledge, which is related 
(but not identical) to the knowledge-base of a region, is an explanatory factor for 
regional growth. It is important to keep in mind that innovation does not only come 
from adding new knowledge elements to the knowledge-base but also from adding 
new links to knowledge elements (see on that point also chapter 7.4 on modularity). 
The importance of diversity to the consistent creation of novelty is found in a number 
of industry studies. For instance, Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) find for the 
biotechnology industry that the higher the observed fluctuation in R&D partnerships, 
the higher is the performance of the network. Wuyts, Dutta and Stremersch (2004) 
discover a similar result for the technological diversity among alliance partners. In 
contrast, Goerzen and Beamish (2005) find for the case of multinational enterprises 
that diversity in partners diminishes innovative performance. The preference for 
diversity, or rather conformity, in partner networks will be dealt with in the empirical 
study of this thesis. 
Research not only influences the development of technologies, but it is the discoveries 
in research that change the organization of the research process as such. For instance, 
new connections between disciplines may require close cooperation for exploration 
and further progress. Acknowledging the advantages of interdisciplinary research is 
one thing, organizing effective interdisciplinary research is, however, another issue. 
According to Rosenberg (2009, p. 241), “it is unlikely to be successfully planned. 
Success in the academic world has often failed when administrators have simply 
decided to form a committee, or program, of researchers from a variety of different 
disciplines.” The rate of success is often higher if there is a prevalent impression 
within a certain discipline that progress can only be made by integrating solutions 
stemming from other disciplines (Rosenberg, 2009). 
While agglomeration and diversity are enablers for the innovative success of groups of 
firms, they cannot explain alone interfirm heterogeneity in innovative performance. 
Recent studies raise serious doubts about the existence of costless knowledge 
spillovers within a local district challenging the public good character of knowledge 
(Pyka, Gilbert and Ahrweiler, 2009). Gaining a sound understanding of the interaction 
between actors is seen as more promising for understanding the advantages of local 
clustering. Industrial districts are conducive for successful interaction as it is generally 
easier to talk to geographically co-located neighbors than it is to talk to a remote 
person. However, it is the development of network structures which explains 
successful agglomeration (Lechner and Dowling, 1999; Pyka, Gilbert and Ahrweiler, 
2009). Even in fields from which we may expect that the relevant knowledge is highly 
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codified, networks as channels and conduits of knowledge transfer play an important 
role. In fact, “the particular content of the relationships represented by the ties is 
limited only by a researcher’s imagination” (Brass et al., 2004, p. 795). Breschi and 
Lissoni (2001) find for the mechanical cluster of the Italian region of Brescia that – 
despite the relatively high degree of knowledge codification – knowledge diffusion is 
rather limited to a small group of firms. Medda, Piga and Siegel (2006) discover for 
Italian manufacturing firms that collaborative R&D increases productivity. Also in 
science-based industries such as biotechnology, chemistry or computer science, it 
holds that what is publicly known among experts of the same field is only 
complementary to more tacit and specific knowledge which is essential for the creation 
of novelties (Dosi, 1988).  
A conceptualization of knowledge which implies that knowledge can be acquired like 
a glass of cornichons from a supermarket shelf – but for free – is being replaced by a 
concept according to which a firm needs to be embedded in a network to absorb 
knowledge. On the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that a firm’s knowledge-
base is totally private and secret without any evaporating knowledge elements (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). In a nutshell, economically valuable knowledge is not flowing 
freely in the air but necessitates (costly) efforts to gain access and make use of it. 
Consequently, the network concept has a different connotation compared to the cluster 
or innovation system theory. The real value of a cluster, or respectively of an 
innovation system, is a function of the network ties that are created between the actors 
(Gulati, 1998). Relations spur innovation processes by providing access to the 
knowledge-base of other organizations, thereby constituting an element of a firm’s 
organizational capital. For this reason, network embeddedness is a vital asset 
constituting a firm-specific element of heterogeneity (Granovetter, 1985; Loasby, 
2001; Buchmann and Pyka, 2012b). Technological spillovers are not freely available 
as in the standard models of growth theory but have to be acquired actively by 
participating in innovation networks. Moreover, Rosenberg (1990) suggests that access 
to a network of firms is not costless either. Given that a firm seeks to get something 
out of it, it also has to bring something in. The results of a firm’s own research serve in 
this sense as a ticket to enter a network. 
While access to sources of knowledge requires embeddedness, firms also need to be 
able to absorb the knowledge that is accessed and exchanged through a network 
structure (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Thus, they need to develop a capacity which 
enables them to recognize valuable knowledge, to understand it and to make 
something out of it internally by combining it with existing knowledge. Understanding 
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this process is part of the answer which is asked in the title of an article by Rosenberg 
(1990): “Why do private firms perform basic research (with their own money)?”. 
Investing own money for research would be absurd if knowledge was a quasi-public 
good, i.e. absorbable without costs “from the air”. This would imply that own research 
results could not be protected and other firms could simply free ride. This “problem” 
raises the question about the appropriability of inventive outcomes. Moreover, it is 
often rather unclear – especially in basic research – if efforts will lead to any 
meaningful innovation that yields benefits in the form of new products or processes. A 
high level of uncertainty and the risk that the invested money is sunk without 
generating returns are strong arguments for a firm not to invest in R&D. 
2.2 Learning and Schumpeterian Competition 
Network embeddedness for knowledge acquisition is of particular relevance if we 
assume a Schumpeterian competition. This type of competition is defined as a “process 
through which heterogeneous firms compete on the basis of the products and services 
they offer and get selected with some firms growing, some declining, some going out 
of business, some new ones always entering on the belief that they can be successful in 
this competition” (Dosi and Nelson, 2010, p. 96). Competition is driven by innovation, 
adaptation and imitation. Selection is an endogenous process in which the knowledge 
absorbing and learning capabilities are important selection criteria in that they create 
winners and losers in competition. 
A firm’s abilities to learn, to innovate but also to imitate are regarded as central 
determinants of industry dynamics in evolutionary economic theories. In competition, 
two forces are setting the tone, namely idiosyncrasy of firms and market processes 
which generate profits or losses for firms and are thus selective in terms of survival 
probability. Learning processes are firm specific but also incorporate a strong 
collective element (Pyka, 1999). For instance, firms operating in the same industry 
have similar experiences when they are faced with emerging technological trends. In 
addition, the search process is a cumulative process: “What the firms can hope to do 
technologically in the future is narrowly constrained by what it has been capable in 
doing in the past” (Dosi, 1988, p. 1130). Firms learn from each other through different 
channels of interaction and from the part of knowledge which was generated within a 
firm and becomes publicly known (Dosi and Nelson, 2010). This is, however, not 
sufficient for successfully imitating other firms’ inventions. Also, tacit and 
idiosyncratic knowledge are essential for the development of any kind of technology, 
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be it an imitation or an innovation (Polanyi, 1967; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Such 
knowledge represents constituent elements of firm heterogeneity, yet they are not 
totally bound to a single firm but can be overarching such as labor mobility. Diverging 
learning capabilities, the ability to innovate, the adoption of external innovations, 
different propensities for investments and adaptation of the organizational structure 
lead to disparities in firm performance (Dosi and Nelson, 2010). Among the 
enumerated factors, the ability to innovate seems to be the one which is most unevenly 
distributed within any given population of firms. A confirming indicator is the 
distribution of growth rates (which is correlated with innovativeness) which is often 
highly skewed. This observation can be made across industries and sectors (Bottazzi 
and Secchi, 2003).  
Learning is not only a prerequisite for innovation but also plays a role for imitation. 
Yang, Phelps and Steensma (2010) demonstrate that the original innovator may benefit 
from imitations which are often improvements of the original idea. The knowledge 
which is incorporated in the original invention gets recombined with complementary 
knowledge of the imitating firm. Thereby, a new pool of external knowledge is 
established which is related to the knowledge-base of the inventing firm. As a matter 
of fact, this pool contains knowledge which can be easily understood by the 
originating firm since it has a high degree of relatedness with the originating 
knowledge-base. Thus, the original innovator rather easily learns from what the 
recipient firm has added to the original idea. Learning vicariously from other firms is a 
type of heuristic search. Organizations learn vicariously by observing the behavior and 
associated performance outcomes of other organizations and imitate behaviors that 
seem successful and avoid behaviors that seem unsuccessful (Cyert and March, 1963). 
By observing the innovative activities and outcomes of other organizations’ efforts, a 
firm can develop a cognitive model of how and why new combinations of knowledge 
are formed without the need for own experiments. Yang, Phelps and Steensma (2010) 
illustrate the example of Eastman Kodak. This firm developed in the 1980s an 
innovative light-emitting diode (OLED), a technology which is applied today in 
computer and TV screens. In the following decade, more than thirty firms (for example 
Sony and Xerox among others) benefited from this innovation and allocated own 
resources to further elaborate on the initial invention. This resulted in a number of 
additional innovations. Kodak, in turn, learned from these improvements of their 
original idea and was able to create additional own innovations. 
This example also confirms the assertion that knowledge is not purely a public good. 
In order to make meaningful use of the ideas and developments of other actors, own 
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resources need to be invested. The fact that the transfer of knowledge is not free of 
costs limits spillovers and at the same time creates incentives for actors to invest in 
innovative activities. Firms should also be aware of additional learning opportunities 
which are created when others pick up their ideas and elaborate on them (Yang, Phelps 
and Steensma, 2010). Also, by introducing the concept of an external knowledge-pool 
which is related to a firm’s original knowledge-base, the concept of spillover becomes 
highly firm specific in contrast to theoretical considerations which suggest that transfer 
happens within the same industry (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996) or by applying the 
same technology (Jaffe, 1986). Thus, innovating firms may even learn from the firms 
that imitate their products. This positive view of knowledge transfer for the inventor 
goes beyond a concept which considers knowledge transfer as harmful to the inventor 
and only beneficial to the imitator, and thereby lowering potential appropriability gains 
and thus the incentive to invest in R&D projects (Jaffe, 1986; Kogut and Zander, 
1992). Learning from imitators and other attempts, such as hiring experts or reverse 
engineering, qualify as means for extending a firm’s knowledge-base, even though 
they are often not comparably as effective as learning in innovation networks. 
2.3 Learning Patterns Shape Industry Structures 
The establishment of new solutions frequently necessitates that firms reach beyond the 
frontiers of established knowledge. The pioneering search strategy differs across firms 
and industries. It is a function of the individual experience of a firm, its internal 
organizational rules, its product portfolio, and its suppliers and clients (Dosi and 
Nelson, 2010). And even though the importance of technological leadership is 
prevalent, it is eventually on the market place where the successful firms are selected 
from the less successful ones (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The sources for successful 
innovation are scattered and industry specific. This is, among others, the reason why I 
focus in the empirical part of this dissertation on one specific industry-network 
composed out of automotive firms. Industries comprise firms in this approach not 
because they share ex-anti a common technology, managerial techniques or potential 
customers, but because common characteristics emerge through the interaction 
between firms. While formal R&D investments may play a role for developing new 
goods and services, it is a firm’s learning capability that can make the difference in 
performance (Freeman, 1994). Firms are learning organizations which learn from 
various sources, including the environment, their rivals as well as from their own 
successes and failures. Competitive success is thus a function of learning success. In 
addition, the learning process as such is specific and related to the underlying 
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technological paradigm. Consequently, the evolution of an industry is shaped by the 
learning patterns (Dosi, 1988).  
Learning in networks can be referred to as “social learning” which means that actors 
learn from others by observing their behavior and above all by directly interacting with 
them. This type of learning is widespread in nature and is hence expected to be 
advantageous in the evolutionary process of species. To a large extent, knowledge can 
only be acquired within a social context and it is often the cheapest way since it 
reduces efforts and risks which are prone to trial and error learning of own R&D. Yet, 
there is still the risk that things are learned which are misleading, outdated or not 
fitting to a firm’s knowledge-base. Rendell et al. (2010) organized a simulation 
tournament on learning strategies with the aim to identify the best performing strategy 
in competition. In this game, actors could learn or imitate decisions from other actors 
and the simulated agents could choose between three possible moves in each round, 
namely innovate, observe and exploit. The innovation strategy consisted of asocial 
learning which refers to learning through interaction with the environment. Trial and 
error would be an example for this category. The second strategy, observe, represented 
the social learning strategy which allows actors to imitate the behavior of other actors 
by observation or by interaction. The last strategy, exploit, referred to the performance 
based on an agent’s own repertoire. The result of this experiment demonstrates that 
social learning is a remarkably successful strategy, leading to the highest payoffs even 
if the costs for asocial learning are not higher than costs for social learning. The 
winning strategy in the experiment relies almost solely on social learning even though 
the established view suggests that social learning should be applied occasionally only 
in order to avoid the absorption of irrelevant or misleading knowledge. It is well 
known from evolutionary biology that the species which can exist with the lowest 
level of resource demand has the highest chances to survive. This concept transferred 
to and tested with the social learning experiments suggests that the dominant strategy 
is the one which keeps working with the lowest frequency of the very resource 
intensive asocial learning (Rendell et al., 2010). 
2.4 Conclusions 
If we consider knowledge as a (partly) private good rather than a (pure) public good, 
then there are learning opportunities or rather necessities for firms which are costly 
and time consuming. We can conclude that “industrial performance and industrial 
structures are endogenous to the process of innovation, imitation and competition” 
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(Dosi, 1988, p. 1157-1158). Learning is related to the exploration of particular fields of 
(perceived) technological opportunity, to the elaboration of search routines and skill 
improvement in developing and producing new solutions. Differences in the ability to 
learn and to innovate are main drivers for asymmetries in industry structure. Firms 
which come up with successful innovations are able to improve their position in 
competition.  
The diffusion of an innovation and the imitation by competitors should in theory allow 
all firms to catch up which would result in a convergence process and finally in a 
balanced industry structure. However, the extent to which a convergence process 
actually takes place depends on individual firm capabilities limiting the overall 
tendency for convergence. Often, even a process of increased divergence rather than 
convergence takes place. The best performing firms forge ahead and force low 
performing ones to leave the market, a process which increases the aggregate 
performance of the industry (Dosi, 1988; Rendell et al., 2010). Learning capabilities 
are not the only technology related feature which influences the industry structure. 
Also different technological opportunities influence the extent to which the better 
leaning firms can exploit the potential to improve their performance. Within an 
environment that offers many opportunities the good learners can distinguish 
themselves more easily from the bad learning firms which are consequently faced with 
a high selective pressure. The emerging result is a concentration in industry structure 
diminishing the chances for firms that are lagging behind to survive (Dosi, 1988).  
Static, formal and closed ways of firm organization hamper the process of mutual 
learning. Instead, open boundaries enable firms to gain access to the external sources 
of innovation: The networks of research institutes, suppliers, customers and 
competitors (Powell, 1990). Openness not only concerns firm boundaries but also 
network boundaries in order to channel new knowledge to the network and increase its 
variety. Various studies suggest that there is a positive correlation between the intensity 
and quantity of cooperation in a sector and its R&D intensity, respectively 
technological progressiveness (cf. Freeman, 1991 and Hagedoorn, 1995). To make use 
of the learning opportunities which networks provide, firms need to invest in their 
absorptive capacities and learning capabilities. 
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3. Methodological Framework 
This chapter deals with the fundamental ideas governing the analysis and 
interpretation of innovation-economic data as well as with the development of a model 
for explaining innovation network evolution. In particular, the knowledge-based 
approach and evolutionary concepts in economics are depicted. Knowledge is a 
peculiar kind of resource and played an important role for the development and 
performance of economies throughout all times. With rising development levels and 
with an accelerated technological progress, its importance relative to other types of 
resources has been even growing over time (Buchmann and Pyka, 2012b). 
Consequently, the term knowledge-based economy became popular among economists 
as well as among politicians. Knowledge-based economies are “directly based on the 
production, distribution and use of knowledge” (OECD, 1996, p. 7). 
3.1 A Knowledge-Based Approach to Economic Development 
The knowledge of a firm is its key resource which brings it in the focus of the analysis 
(Das and Teng, 2000). Accordingly, a firm can be described as a „repository of 
productive knowledge“ (Winter, 1988, p. 171). A key feature of knowledge is its close 
relation to other firm resources, its specificity as well as its lacking substitutability and 
the uncertainty in its generation process (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). The thereof 
derived heterogeneity between firms has proven to be often stable over time (Peteraf, 
1993). Knowledge in the economically relevant sense can be embodied in human 
beings (as human capital) or in goods and services (machines, technology, processes, 
patents and the like) constituting an organization’s knowledge-base. Human capital can 
be defined as “knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embodied in individuals 
which facilitate personal, social and economic well-being” (European Commission, 
2003, p. 14). Human capital is often regarded as a strictly economic factor of 
production, but beyond that, it has a more general meaning for social and cultural life.  
Four key drivers of increased knowledge orientation in modern economies have been 
identified (OECD, 1996): 
 Development and widespread use of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) 
 Accelerated technological progress and new scientific knowledge 
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 Increased global competition (facilitated by reduced trade barriers and declining 
communication costs) 
 Changing demand patterns due to rising income levels  
At the Lisbon Summit of the EU’s heads of state and government in the year 2000, an 
overarching strategy was adopted with the clear goal for the EU “to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” 
(European Commission, 2000, Annex I). EU policies were streamlined, stressing 
education, human capital and R&D investments. Especially the growing gap to the US 
in terms of productivity and GDP growth rates should be narrowed and finally 
completely closed (Sterlacchini and Venturini, 2006). 
Lane and Lubatkin (1998) find that in an increasingly knowledge-based competition, 
firms need to develop a profound understanding of the knowledge-base they own and 
how it can be applied in a productive way. Moreover, they need to be able to transform 
knowledge into processes and products, and to manage their knowledge and 
capabilities like other physical assets (Buchmann and Pyka, 2012b). Firms respond to 
an increased competitive pressure (Teece, 1992) by forming alliances in which the 
abilities to learn and exchange knowledge are vital. In other words: “The success of 
enterprises, as of national economies, is determined by their effectiveness in gathering 
and using knowledge and technology” (Stevens, 1996, p. 8). Teece and Pisano (1994) 
as well as Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) refer to continuous organizational learning as a 
crucial factor for the development of a competitive advantage. The transformation 
towards more knowledge-based activities is not limited to a few industries but affects 
economies as a whole. It involves also changes of institutions, habits and cultural 
behaviors. Hence, we are not only working in a knowledge-based economy, but we are 
living in an interlinked “knowledge society” (Figure 1). It is the people with their 
highly developed cognitive capacity, creativity, learning and understanding capabilities 
which are responsible for success (Rodrigues, 2003).   
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Figure 1: Stylized figure of the interlinked knowledge society (Source: own illustration). 
3.2 The Integration of Knowledge and Technology in Economic Models 
The relevance of knowledge for innovation and eventually economic growth suggests 
that micro-economic knowledge generation, innovation decisions and the interactive 
character of innovation activities should be explicitly included in economic models. A 
short overview of the basic principles and characteristics of the neoclassical standard 
model and the enhancements of the endogenous growth theory shows that they do not 
qualify for analyzing interactive processes. In fact, the search for the foundations and 
determinants of economic growth has a long standing history in economic research. 
There are a number of reasons for this strong interest, not least of which is the 
versatility of growth as a political goal. High growth rates are expected to increase 
incomes and general well-being, decrease unemployment rates, fill up the wallet of the 
minister of finance and rehabilitate social welfare systems, just to name some of them. 
Economic growth is a collective or aggregate phenomenon which forces us to develop 
a concept about how to get from the micro to the macro level. Moreover, the study of 
established models of growth allows for a reflection of their underlying assumptions in 
the light of previously made suggestions with regard to learning and knowledge 
transfer processes. Early models of growth concentrated on production functions with 
two (three) input factors, namely labor and capital (and land). Knowledge and 
technology were only regarded as external factors that influence production levels. 
Knowledge-based economy
Knowledge society
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However, technological progress, the development of knowledge-based industries and 
the importance of innovation for business success gave rise to the development of new 
models that integrate knowledge more explicitly in production functions. Particularly 
challenging is the adequate handling of knowledge investments as they are often 
characterized by increasing returns, whereas traditional production functions assume 
decreasing returns to inputs. This latter effect can – in neoclassical concepts – be offset 
by technological progress (total factor productivity) even though neoclassical theory 
does not provide an endogenous explanation for it. The analysis of historical data 
shows that decreasing returns are often an exemption than the rule. It is rather new 
ideas, inventions and innovations which create a counter effect to the relative scarcity 
assumption embodied in production functions (Dosi, 1988). In the 20
th
 and even more 
in the 21
st
 century, knowledge became the fastest growing production factor which 
creates a need for explicitly explaining the role of knowledge endogenously. 
In the neoclassical growth model, as it was developed by Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956), human capital is neglected as well as heterogeneity of actors. A basic 
production function takes the form: 
            ( 1 ) 
Y is the output, A stands for the total factor productivity (TFP), K for physical capital 
and L for labor. An increase in A (TFP) is called Hicks neutral technological progress. 
It affects the productivity of capital (K) and labor (L) likewise. The result changes if 
we assume for instance only labor augmenting technological progress (Harrod 
neutral). The production function will then be written as: 
           ( 2 ) 
E is a labor efficiency index. Technological progress that leads to an increase of E is 
based on a growth of labor productivity.  
Due to the assumed positive but decreasing returns to (physical) capital, long-run 
economic growth rates cannot be explained by the rate of capital accumulation. With a 
growing stock of capital the additional output for each additional unit of capital 
becomes smaller and smaller. Instead, the long-run growth rate is determined by the 
technological progress and the rate of population growth which are both exogenous 
variables. Moreover, for the long-run per capita growth rate only technological 
progress is relevant though it is not further explained in the model. This is rather 
unsatisfactory and gives little guidance for policy makers to promote per capita growth 
(Mankiw, 2000).  
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Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) argue that the effect of differences in (the returns of) 
physical capital becomes a lot smaller when differences in the stock of human capital 
are taken into account. The extended Solow model encompasses the accumulation of 
both, physical capital and human capital. The inclusion of human capital lowers the 
effects of saving and population growth. Accordingly, the basic model is revised and 
human capital as another variable with positive but decreasing returns becomes 
introduced in the following form: 
                          
     
         ( 3 ) 
H represents the human capital stock, α is the production elasticity of physical capital, 
β denotes the production elasticity of human capital and 1-α-β is the production 
elasticity of labor. Consequently, the average level of human capital in an economy 
affects the level of output in the sense that, for example, an increase in the average 
level of schooling increases the human capital stock H and hence the level of output Y. 
L and A grow exogenously at rates n and g. “g reflects primarily the advancement of 
knowledge, which is not country-specific“ (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992, p. 410). 
Real income depends on saving rates only (high saving rates lead to higher income). 
However, also by introducing human capital as a production factor in the suggested 
way, an increase has only a temporary effect on the growth rate of the economy. The 
long-run growth path remains determined by exogenous technological progress and by 
population growth (Canton et al., 2005). 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) find that human capital growth has an insignificant and 
negative effect on per capita income growth. They rather postulate an approach which 
does not take human capital as an additional input in the production function into 
account, but makes it an endogenous variable. Technological progress (TFP) is 
modeled as a function of the level of human capital. That is, human capital 
complements technology in that it helps to adopt and implement it from other nations. 
Moreover, it influences the capacity of countries to develop innovations which 
correspond with their production capabilities. Consequently, growth rates may differ 
across countries in the long run. Furthermore, the level of human capital influences a 
country’s success rate in attracting physical capital. 
The endogenous (or new) growth theory was mainly developed to overcome the 
shortcomings of the original neoclassical model which is based on positive but 
diminishing returns to production factors and exogenous factors, namely saving rates, 
population growth and technological progress. This implies that policy decisions have 
no influence on long-run growth rates. Even if we extend the model and assume that 
3. Methodological Framework 29 
 
saving rates and capital formation (including human capital) can be influenced, a 
change in policy would only lead to increased growth in a transition period. The 
growth path can only be shifted in the short and medium-run. In the long-run output 
growth is still determined by exogenous population growth and technological progress 
(Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001). Most endogenous growth models share the attempt to 
explain the long-run growth rate as an endogenously driven equilibrium outcome, 
determined by the behavior of rational actors on markets and by structural 
characteristics of the economy such as technology and (macroeconomic) policy 
(Fagerberg, 1994). A simple way to form a concept based on these criteria is to assume 
that aggregate output varies proportionally with the amount of capital as input to the 
production process. Consequently, marginal returns to capital are constant, rather than 
decreasing (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Lucas, 1990; Romer, 1990): 
      ( 4 ) 
Y is the output, K represents the capital and A is a constant that reflects the technology 
level. K is assumed to incorporate not only physical capital but also human capital 
which counterbalances the diminishing returns of physical capital. The capital 
accumulation process is modeled with the following equation (assuming a positive 
saving rate s): 
          ( 5 ) 
Changes in the capital stock ( K ) equal the investments (sY) minus the depreciations (
K ). The output growth rate becomes: 
 
  
 
 
  
 
      ( 6 ) 
The last two equations indicate that an economy can constantly grow (even without 
technological progress) as long as sA >  (Mankiw, 2000). Note that the per capita 
growth rate is now determined by a behavioral parameter (among others), namely by 
the saving rate s. However, the saving rate is an average rate of a representative agent 
without taking heterogeneity, social influence or the relevance of interaction in 
economic activities into account. Models in equilibrium economics are typically based 
on the assumption of a representative agent. The framework of analysis requires 
frictionless interaction whereas economic systems do not show this feature but are 
characterized by fluctuations and growth or decline (Chen, 2008). 
Lucas (1988) stresses human capital as a source for learning and as a means of 
knowledge transfer via interacting people. “Most of what we know we learn from 
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other people” (Lucas, 1988, p. 38). In this way, firms may benefit from the existing 
average level of knowledge in an economy. Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986) 
emphasize in their growth models the role of externalities due to learning (by doing) or 
knowledge accumulation combined with spillovers from one firm to another in order 
to counteract the effect of decreasing returns. That is, investments in physical capital 
increase a firm’s knowledge-base and trigger technological progress through “learning 
by doing”. 
In these models, new knowledge has the character of a public good and spills over 
across an economy in the sense of Marshall’s (1920) knowledge “in the air” idea 
without explicitly describing transfer channels and interaction patterns. As a 
consequence of the public good assumption, there are constant returns on the firm 
level but increasing returns to scale on an aggregate level. The result is suboptimal 
investment in knowledge as the private returns are lower than social returns due to 
benefits from new knowledge which cannot be entirely appropriated. In the respective 
models, knowledge is regarded as an input to production with an increasing marginal 
productivity. It is the sum of individual firm’s knowledge that can be freely used by 
other firms and has therefore a positive external effect (B) (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
2004). The respective production function takes the following form: 
            ( 7 ) 
The knowledge stock of an economy is regarded as the accumulated sum of individual 
firm knowledge stocks for instance reflected by the stock of capital: 
                              ( 8 ) 
The growth rate becomes: 
 
  
 
         ( 9 ) 
In view of recent findings in innovation economics a number of points can be 
criticized in the presented models: 
 The aggregate production function (8) still resembles the “AK model” (4). With 
elasticity greater than one, the growth rate would continuously increase with 
capital accumulation. And with elasticity less than one, the growth rate would be 
exogenous again. Furthermore, the externality depends on a scale effect if it is 
regarded as the sum of individual stocks of capital. An increase in the number of 
firms would increase the aggregate capital stock and hence the rate of growth in an 
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economy. Only if we assume that the external effect equals the average capital per 
worker, scale effects do not matter anymore (OECD, 2003).  
 The first generation of endogenous growth models, such as Romer (1990), is 
characterized by unit elasticity and scale effects. These models suggest that 
technological progress is a function of the stock of knowledge and of human 
capital that affects R&D activities. Contrarily, Jones (1995) argues that the 
prediction of scale effects is inconsistent with empirical evidence. Scale effects 
imply that by steady increases in R&D, growth rates would augment 
disproportionately. However, such large effects could hardly be observed even 
though many countries increased their R&D spendings considerably in the past. 
The second model generation (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1998) does not integrate 
the scale effects anymore. The fundamental new idea is that an increase in 
population leads to an increase in R&D activities and human capital, and even 
more importantly, to new products and industries. Additional R&D is absorbed by 
new industries. Consequently, the R&D share in each sector remains constant. 
Hence, not absolute numbers are important but rather the share of R&D 
investments per industry as well as the share of researches in the working 
population. 
 The argument of learning spillovers is not properly substantiated since learning is 
in reality time consuming and not effortless (OECD, 2003; Pyka, Gilbert and 
Ahrweiler, 2009). Moreover, the adoption of innovation and the quest for taking 
truly advantage of inventions requires considerable changes in a firm’s processes 
and organizational structures. These changes are time consuming which also 
means that there is a time gap between the initial introduction of, e.g. new 
machines in the production processes, and potential financial benefits due to 
superior production techniques (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000).
5
  
 Dosi and Nelson (2010) challenge the idea of input factor exchangeability inherent 
to usual production functions. By using different quantities of inputs the resulting 
product will most likely not have the same characteristics and cannot be 
considered the same product. It is consequently not possible to substitute different 
input factors when relative prices are changing. Instead, new recipes and 
procedures are required for varying input combinations. A subsequent question is 
whether small changes in recipes and routines result in small changes in the 
combination of factor inputs and – linked to this – whether disruptive innovations 
                                            
5 See for this point also the discussion on the “Solow paradox”. 
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in technologies and thus recipes also considerably change the relative intensities of 
input factors. 
 Furthermore, a problem of the presented models is a lack of necessary complexity 
which is inherent to innovation and knowledge creation processes. Take for 
instance possible reverse causality effects. Typical models assume a positive 
contribution of education to growth rates by increasing knowledge stocks. The 
causality could yet – at least partly – be the other way round: GDP and 
productivity growth signify increasing incomes that increase the demand for 
education if it has a sufficiently high income elasticity. Human capital 
accumulation receives from this influence an endogenous component (Sianesi and 
Reenen, 2003). The question arises if human capital accumulation leads to 
augmented growth rates or if it is rather the other way round. A realistic answer is 
probably that both directions are working simultaneously in a co-evolutionary 
manner. But simultaneous and co-evolutionary effects can hardly be tested with 
the depicted models. 
 Chen (2008) criticizes that general equilibrium models having a unique stable 
equilibrium do not incorporate phenomena we observe in reality such as increasing 
returns to scale and scope, interactive and strategic behavior in social spaces and 
product innovation. Moreover, the presented models assume representative agents 
and neglect nonlinear and collective behavior. 
3.3 Evolutionary Thinking in Innovation Economics 
Evolutionary neo-Schumpeterian models are expected to being better able to replicate 
and thereby provide plausible explanations for empirically observed phenomena and 
(stylized) facts in knowledge-driven economies. For instance, a deeper understanding 
of dynamic selection processes such as the functioning of market processes is required. 
Therefore, realism of micro mechanisms prevails in such models over the generality of 
orthodox models. For the exploration of innovation processes, agent-based models are 
useful as they allow for studying micro mechanisms and emerging patterns in detail, 
focusing on heterogeneous, bounded rational and interacting agents (Dosi and Nelson, 
2010). Evolutionary theory aims at demonstrating how organizational learning and 
other micro characteristics affect selection and thereby the behavior and characteristic 
of an aggregate structure. Following Dosi and Nelson (2010) a very basic evolutionary 
model, taking the selective feature into account, can be formulated as: 
                           ( 10 ) 
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In this example,       denotes the market share of a firm i at time t.       is an 
indicator for its competitiveness. Crucial for the market share is the relative fitness of a 
firm i which is determined by the competiveness of the other firms. Consequently, 
                        Competitiveness is seen as a characteristic which is 
determined by learning dynamics (see Schumpeterian competition) and by a variety of 
other factors. The function determining changes in market shares (     has often a 
nonlinear characteristic.  
3.3.1 Key Analytical Topics 
The evolutionary growth theory (which is also referred to as Neo-Schumpeterian 
growth theory) seeks to truly endogenize the drivers of economic growth by drawing 
on ideas originally developed by Schumpeter and further elaborated by scholars such 
as Nelson and Winter (1982), and Hanusch and Pyka (2007b). A fundamental 
difference compared to orthodox models is that decisions of heterogeneous economic 
actors with regard to the creation of innovation are crucial for explaining the growth 
path. Furthermore, the interplay and feedback loops between individual characteristics 
and collective features, leading to co-evolutionary processes, are neglected by 
orthodox theory but explicitly taken into account in the evolutionary theory. That is, 
orthodox theory typically models firms as a set of decision rules that are linked to 
external market conditions and internal constraints. Decision rules reflect the assumed 
objectives in that they specify a number of parameters: the maximization objective 
(often profits, sometimes more diverse objectives) and the knowledge of the firm (e.g. 
a production function). The maximization hypothesis is supplemented by the 
equilibrium paradigm in which the supply-demand equilibrium sets the market prices 
and determines the behavior of the firms (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
The generality, versatility and relative simplicity of such models needs to be 
confronted with observations of reality and the researcher’s interest. When we read a 
business newspaper we encounter ambitious entrepreneurs and failing firms, but also 
successful newcomers withstanding the market pressure and threatening the 
incumbents, creating new markets before they become themselves chased by 
motivated innovators with promising ideas and smart solutions. Dynamics is a 
ubiquitous scheme of capitalism. The explanation of such dynamic change processes 
in economic systems over time should be a cornerstone of economic theorizing rather 
than the search for explanations of balanced states. Starting with Schumpeter’s (1939) 
“business cycles”, we find plenty of theoretical and empirical evidence for the 
hypotheses that innovation (technological progress) is a main driving force for 
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industry dynamics, economic development and growth of firms, regions and countries 
(e.g. Malerba, 2002; Aghion and Griffith, 2005; Perez, 2010). The established 
neoclassical theory provides yet only limited explanations that can help us to 
understand the relationship between innovation, dynamics and economic success. 
Holland (1995, p. 85) stresses this point: “Though it might seem otherwise, market 
dynamics are not a natural area of study for classical economics”. The oversimplified 
assumption of representative agents and the overly abstracted modeling approach 
which does not cast light into the black box of the innovation process hinder the search 
for the micro causes and effects of change processes. As a general line of 
simplification stylized facts are analyzed in separation rather than considering their 
interrelated character. A further point of criticism refers to isolated model development 
which forecloses the integration of knowledge from other scientific fields such as 
management, organizational science, biology, sociology, physics and history.  
Evolutionary economic theory does not deny that firms are profit-seeking 
organizations; it even recognizes profits as an important firm objective. However, I 
argue in accordance with Nelson and Winter (1982) that it is doubtful to assume that 
firms are purely profit-maximizing organizations which can precisely select their 
strategy from a properly specified (exogenously determined) set of choices. A more 
realistic assumption is the one made by Simon (1956) and Barnard and Simon (1976) 
which became known under the notion of satisficing behavior. According to this 
assumption, firms set a minimum level which they want to achieve in terms of profits 
or other goals rather than firms seek to maximize their goals. Moreover, I refer to the 
idea of evolutionary processes in economic development determined by Knightian 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921), to dynamics instead of equilibriums, to heterogeneity of 
actors and to the concept of bounded rationality which allows us to develop a much 
more accurate description of firm behavior and to tell a different story of collective 
innovation and growth. The environments in which firms are embedded are typically 
highly complex, limiting the extent to which firms may act rational in space and time. 
Thus, I suggest firm decisions to be myopic, i.e. actors behave only bounded rational 
with adaptive expectations. These assumptions add complexity because the resulting 
model is characterized by interaction and adaptive behavior of the actors and absence 
of a single identifiable optimum solution (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
The optimization and equilibrium approach neglects the level of true uncertainty 
which is inherent to any real world innovation process (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005). In 
fact, uncertainty not only encompasses the lack of knowledge about the costs and 
benefits of possible alternatives, but it even means that economic actors do not know 
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which alternatives they have (Nelson and Winter, 1982). While risk refers to lacking 
information about the realization of a known set of alternatives, uncertainty means that 
the set of possible alternatives is unidentified and the consequences of a particular 
alternative are unknown. Uncertainty is a particular characteristic for the search of 
radical innovations which have the power to change technological paradigms thereby 
triggering market turmoil. The manifestation of a new paradigm goes hand in hand 
with a reduction of uncertainty (Dosi, 1988). Thus, uncertainty must not be confused 
with risk. This is clearly described by Keynes (1937, p. 213-214): “By ‘uncertain’ 
knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for 
certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to 
uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, again, the 
expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately 
uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a 
European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years 
hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth owners 
in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which 
to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.” In economic 
systems the degree of uncertainty is naturally high.  
3.3.2 Evolutionary Models in Biology and Economics 
In evolutionary models firms have some though not perfect control over the outcome 
of their decisions and actions. The existence of bounded rationality prevents firms 
from optimal adaptation to the same extent as we find adapted organisms (biological 
systems) in nature. Instead, firms learn and adapt their routines. “A routine is an 
executable capability for repeated performance in some context that has been learned 
by an organization in response to selective pressures” (Cohen et al., 1996, p. 683). 
Routines are firm specific and constitute an element of heterogeneity. The capacity of 
a firm to conduct R&D and to innovate is to a large extent embodied in the routines 
that determine a firm’s activities. The capabilities of an organization are based on the 
collection of routines an organization masters (Dosi and Nelson, 2010). Consequently, 
Dosi and Nelson (2010, p. 81) describe firms as “behavioral entities” which are 
controlled by “routinized patterns of action”. The specific capabilities – it is argued – 
are the main reason for differences in success rates of firms. The process of routine 
adaptation is comparable to the recombination and mutation of genes (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). However, Nelson (and Teece, 2010) clarifies “[…] I don’t have a 
biological view of economic evolution.” While there are clearly similarities, 
technological, business and economic evolution differ in many respects from 
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biological evolution. For instance, routines differ from genes in that they are 
frequently subject to changes either by purpose or unintendedly (Nelson and Teece, 
2010). By keeping in mind obvious differences between biology and economics, it is 
still worth studying the communalities of biological and economic systems. 
Evolutionary biology enriches the analysis of economic phenomena as it provides a 
broad framework that captures dynamic change processes which we observe in almost 
all industries. For instance, the development of an industry can be modeled by 
referring to the concept of selective mating in biology. The mating condition controls 
the tag of a potential mate if the two fit together. It is then a matter of sufficient 
resources to produce offspring by crossover, a process which is also conceivable for 
the case of two firms (Holland, 1995). Hodgson (1995, p. xxi) suggests: “Recognition 
of the shared problems of complexity in both biology and economics may lead 
economists to place less faith in methodological individualism and to recognize the 
legitimacy of levels and units of analysis above the individual.” In fact, biological 
concepts of evolution take different levels of hierarchical selection into consideration. 
In a nutshell, there is a variety of opportunities for economic theory to draw inspiration 
from evolutionary biology. However, we cannot transfer all concepts directly but need 
to decide from case to case if and to what extent a biological framework suits to an 
economic problem. 
3.3.3 Evolutionary Biology and Economics 
Industry dynamics resemble in essential features processes of natural selection in 
evolutionary biology which allows us to use the evolutionary framework to model 
dynamic economic processes. The selective power of markets affects firms but also 
any kind of technological novelty. Deviating from the direct analogy with biological 
processes of evolution, selective mechanisms of firms and technologies are not random 
but only contain random elements. The core determinant of the evolutionary process is 
the learning capabilities of the actors (cf.  chapter 2.2). Therefore, patterns and 
performance of learning characterize the evolutionary process (Dosi, 1988). Success 
on markets is a prerequisite to survive and to grow. Firms learn and experience which 
of their capabilities are related to success and they will seek to retain and renew them 
persistently (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Individual selection is complemented by group 
selection. Nelson and Winter (1982) suggest that “evolutionary progress” in a 
biological sense, that is, adaptation to the changing environment, is what Schumpeter 
described as the “process of creative destruction”. 
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The idea of transferring evolutionary theories into economic contexts is largely 
unexploited as inspiration is almost exclusively drawn from Darwin’s natural selection 
postulate. In particular, Spencer’s (1874) idea about the “survival of the fittest“ 
together with the views on competition, adaptation and gradual change became a 
pervasive principle in neoclassical thinking. The strong focus on efficiency has led to a 
conception of economic evolution similar to the neo-Darwinian view in evolutionary 
biology. All the change – it is suggested – is the result of steady and progressive 
changes in efficiency at the level of the individual firm. Going beyond the Darwinian 
idea, biologists found that species may evolve in a discontinuous form (punctuated 
equilibrium), whereas, gradual change remains a strong paradigm in economics 
(Hodgson, 1997). 
Whilst learning and the process of discovering new solutions is driven by people such 
as scientists and engineers that purposely seek to channel and focus their ideas and 
thoughts, the selection mechanism in biology is arbitrary to the best of biologists’ 
knowledge. This does, however, not totally exclude chance or probabilistic elements 
from economic models. Indeed, Nelson and Winter (1982) reject a hard distinction 
between “blind” evolution and “deliberate” goal seeking. They rather suggest that “it is 
neither difficult nor implausible to develop models of firm behavior that interweave 
‘blind’ and ‘deliberate’ processes” (Nelson and Winter 1982, p. 11). This is why 
evolutionary theories for economic change propose to integrate a stochastic element in 
the models, while they do at the same time not neglect that innovations are purposely 
created (Dosi and Nelson, 2010). 
Evolutionary biology centers on the analysis of group dynamics and opposes the kind 
of macro analysis which sums up the behavior of single entities or directly assumes a 
representative agent in the models. In particular, the conceptual distinction between 
group selection and individual selection is well established, suggesting that both, 
cooperation and competition, are crucial to understand evolutionary processes in 
biology as well as industrial dynamics (Van Den Bergh and Gowdy, 2003). A good 
example which shows how biology can inspire economic analysis is the communality 
between structural relations of firm interaction and stable triadic relations in a 
biological context (see chapter 7.7 for a description of triadic structures in networks). 
Hölldobler and Wilson (1990) describe in their book called “The Ants” a triangular 
structure which consists of a caterpillar, a fly and an ant (Figure 2). Interaction 
between the three actors has been observed in the following way: The caterpillar 
exudes nectar which attracts the fly that lays its eggs on the caterpillar. In this way, the 
fly becomes a predator through its larva. The third element is the ant which is a 
38  3. Methodological Framework 
predator on the fly. Furthermore, it is attracted by the caterpillar’s nectar but has no 
intention to threaten it. If a larger number of ants surround the caterpillar to degust 
from its nectar it is somewhat protected from the fly, meaning that it trades resources 
(the nectar) for protection. If one element of this relationship is removed, the entire 
triangle falls apart (Holland, 1995). Within an economic context the question can be 
asked, to what extent can individual actors be removed from a collaborative network 
without destroying the stability and functioning of the network structure?  
 
Figure 2: Triangle in a biological system (Source: own illustration). 
3.3.4 Group Selection and Punctuated Equilibrium 
Besides the selection of individuals in the Darwinian sense, two more higher-level 
theories of evolution have the potential for being adopted to describe evolutionary 
change in an economic system, namely group selection and punctuated equilibrium. 
Group selection refers to a selection mechanism that does not solely rely on the fitness 
of individual actors but assumes that fitness is also a function of a group characteristic. 
More precisely, it asserts that a group which is voluntarily formed of actors (e.g. an 
innovation network) showing some degree of altruism supersedes in its performance a 
formation out of selfish and kin actors. If this assertion was true, it would not only 
challenge the view of selection at the actor level, but also the homo oeconomicus 
paradigm (Wynne-Edwards, 1991). Group selection is important for economics as it is 
an even more effective mechanism in human societies than in lower animal 
populations (Van Den Bergh and Gowdy, 2003). 
The altruistic behavior of group members is constrained by the extent of free-riding 
behavior in the group. Free-riders benefit without bearing costs from the positive 
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characteristics of a group without contributing to the generation or conservation of 
these characteristics. A problem for the group emerges once the relative share of free-
riders exceeds a certain limit as the positive characteristics start to erode. For instance, 
Oxley and Sampson (2004) find that unintended knowledge transfer hampers firms 
from cooperating with other actors. It is relatively easy to forge group members to 
behave in an altruistic rather than self-centered way as long as competition is low and 
resources are abundant. It becomes, however, less self-evident once the environment 
changes in a way which makes survival more challenging and requires more 
adaptation and routine changes (Van Den Bergh and Gowdy, 2003). Giuliani (2005) 
finds evidence for the relevance of group characteristics, and in particular for the 
relevance of reputation, in a Chilean wine cluster. By studying the roles of different 
actors in the cluster it is shown that the so called technological gatekeepers (central 
actors which are well connected within the cluster and with extra cluster firms) tend to 
accept unreciprocated knowledge transfer to other firms when positive externalities 
play a role. That is, increased product quality of single firms due to superior 
knowledge is likely to improve the reputation of the entire cluster once this knowledge 
starts to diffuse, an effect which may overcompensate the costs that accrue for the 
most advanced firms if these firms transfer (voluntarily or involuntarily) knowledge to 
less sophisticated producers for free. Also, game theoretic models show that 
cooperation is beneficial in a context that allows for communication among 
participants and penalization of free-riders (Gintis, 2000). Human beings have 
tendencies to occasionally cooperate and sometimes purely exploit, thus showing a 
variety of behavioral patterns that constitute an important element of adaptiveness. 
Gintis (2000, p. 72) concludes that “seeing human groups as both communities of 
interacting strategies and (partially) adaptive units deserves to become a major theme 
in the future”. 
In short, punctuated equilibrium is a second element of a higher-level theory of 
selection. It suggests that evolution does not always take place in a gradual manner. 
Long periods of slow development or even (almost) standstill (“stasis”) are interrupted 
by sudden extensive advances. This concept supplements the theory of gradual change 
(Eldredge and Gould, 1972) and increases the level of complexity which is necessary 
to better model real world innovation processes. When Schumpeter elaborated his 
ideas of disruptive change and creative destruction, he was remarkably ahead of 
evolutionary theory building since evolution was still considered as slow and only 
incremental by biologists at that time (Hodgson, 1997). The 1970s stimulated the 
debate about optimization and gradual changes in standard models with the 
introduction of the entropy concept drawing on the theory of thermodynamics in 
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physics (e.g. Georgesçu-Roegen, 1971). But only Nelson and Winter (1982) at the 
beginning of the 1980s manifested the acceptance of nonlinear reasoning in 
economics.  
3.3.5 Evolution of Technology 
Due to the cumulative character of technological knowledge, technological change 
may take place for rather long periods in an ordered and only gradual manner, referred 
to as incremental innovation, thereby stabilizing a technological paradigm (Dosi, 
1988). A technological paradigm entails “a ‘pattern’ of solution of selected techno-
economic problems based on highly selected principles derived from the natural 
sciences, jointly with specific rules aimed to acquire new knowledge and safeguard it, 
whenever possible, against rapid diffusion to the competitors” (Dosi, 1988, p. 1127). 
Disruptive changes in technology are related to the appearance of new paradigms. 
Paradigms encompass both, elements of private and public knowledge (Dosi, 1988). 
The paradigmatic practice comprises the knowledge about how and why a certain 
solution works. However, an established practice is in reality not a perfect solution and 
there is consequently a constant search for better practices that – once established – 
render old and less effective solutions obsolete. The notion of a paradigm is also linked 
to the idea of design concepts which describe the properties of products and processes. 
Moreover, the establishment of a dominant configuration, i.e. a dominant design 
(Utterback, 1995), goes frequently hand in hand with the enforcement of a paradigm. 
Paradigms influence the development of technologies in technological trajectories that 
channel progress towards specific directions (Dosi and Nelson, 2010). 
The development pattern of new products and processes is shaped by trajectories that 
limit the degrees of freedom and, thus, the number of possible solutions. Trajectories 
can facilitate foresight exercises in that they reduce to some extent the degree of 
uncertainty vis-à-vis future developments in a field: There is only a limited number of 
new products and processes that can be generated due to the cumulative and 
paradigmatic characteristics of the knowledge-base. Most trajectories share at least 
two features: First, one can identify an overarching shift of process technologies 
towards increased mechanization and automation (Dosi and Nelson, 2010). Second, 
learning curves and, related to them, falling unit costs, following a power law rule 
where        with X as the cumulated production, α and β as constants specific to 
a certain technology and p representing the unit costs (sometimes also unit labor inputs 
or an indicator for product performance). Learning effects become manifest on the 
industry, firm and plant level (Wright, 1936). 
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Path-dependency and the interplay of increasing returns and network externalities may 
lead to the emergence of a dominant standard. A random event at the beginning of the 
lifecycle can lead to higher sales of a product and via a feedback mechanism this effect 
fuels exponentially the use of a specific technology rather than its technological 
superiority. Also, the cumulativeness of knowledge may trigger snowball effects, i.e. 
while at the beginning of the lifecycle there is no superiority visible, one technology 
gets in the initial phase support by different actors (due to various thinkable reasons) 
and receives consequently additional R&D efforts to further develop this technology 
and make it more sophisticated. There are indeed two stories of dynamically increasing 
returns: The first one stresses network externalities. If a large number of users start 
buying products which are similar or compatible, this process makes it attractive for 
other users to buy the same standard. ICT-networks, in which all users strongly benefit 
in having other users have compatible products, are typical examples for this first case. 
The second story stresses systemic aspects of products. It refers to a product which is 
accompanied by another complementary product or service that provides the core 
product with a particular advantage such as computers which gain their real 
(economic) value from compatible software (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989; David, 2001). 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter showed that neoclassical models are based on exogenous innovation to 
explain economic growth and are hence not suitable to explain innovation processes. 
To overcome further shortcomings of these models, such as decreasing returns to 
production factors, the endogenous growth theory was developed stressing the 
importance of knowledge and innovations. However, these models still suffer from a 
lack of realism due to stringent assumptions such as rationality of actors, homogeneity 
of behavior, knowledge spillovers without interaction, equilibrium outcomes and the 
representative agent assumption. If we follow the suggestions of many empirical 
studies according to which innovation is a crucial driver of dynamics and collective 
process, then there are good reasons to focus our analysis more on the process of 
innovation. A promising way to go is the modeling of innovation processes in a 
network perspective. This view is based on the interaction of innovative actors thereby 
forming a complex adaptive system. To understand the functioning of this system, we 
need to find, for instance, answers to the question which mechanisms account for 
different attachment patterns. Furthermore, if applied undogmatically, the evolutionary 
framework is useful to draw inspiration for analyzing dynamic innovation processes.  
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4. Cooperative Firm Behavior 
The innovation process of a firm gets fuelled by internal and external sources. First, 
scientists and engineers of a firm explore new combinations and exploit new 
knowledge for the development of new products and processes. This is linked to R&D 
units which have increasingly become permeable and connected to other departments, 
such as marketing or directly to customers (Von Hippel, 1988; Chesbrough, 2003). 
Second, knowledge and new ideas can be accessed externally through links to other 
actors. Innovation, in this case, is the result of a combination of internal expertise and 
external stimuli. In knowledge intensive industries firms cannot rely on the internal 
generation of new knowledge, and the access to external knowledge becomes of vital 
importance. “Tapping external sources of know-how becomes a must” (Tsang, 2000, p. 
225). Alliances are an instrument to bring knowledge and expertise of various firms 
together for the generation of innovations (Teece, 1992). Note that cooperation can be 
a highly effective solution for other purposes, too. Examples are: (i) search for stability 
when firms are faced with environmental uncertainties and threats; (ii) increase of the 
organizational efficiency; (iii) exercise of power and control over other organizations 
and (iv) meeting of legal requirements (Oliver, 1990). While in uncertain 
environments the stability argument is strong, in other situations it is rather the 
possibility to control competitors which motivates a firm to sign a cooperation 
agreement (Kogut, 1988).  
At first glance, following a cooperative strategy appears like an odd strategy for 
increasing the output of innovations (and eventually profits) since it may involve the 
sharing of own knowledge with potential or actual competitors. In particular, firms 
which operate at the technological frontier endowed with strong commercial skills run 
the risk of losing valuable knowledge and of strengthening their competitors (Kitching 
and Blackburn, 1999). A go-it-alone strategy for innovation seems to be more 
advantageous for them. However, based on a survey of the respective literature, 
Pittaway et al. (2004) list a comprehensive number of motives for network 
participation, a pattern which frequently emerges out of bi- and multilateral 
cooperation (Pyka, Gilbert and Ahrweiler, 2009): (i) risk sharing; (ii) obtaining access 
to new markets and technologies; (iii) speeding up time to market; (iv) pooling of 
complementary skills; (v) safeguarding property rights when perfect contracts are not 
possible; (vi) acting as a key vehicle for obtaining access to external knowledge. Most 
of these motives are related to changes in innovation processes in knowledge-based 
economies. That is, firms often cooperate as a reaction to increased complexity in 
knowledge generation and diffusion processes and to cope with technological 
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uncertainty. Hagedoorn (1993) reports a number of specific motives for network 
participation that explain why firms benefit from cooperative structures in their R&D 
processes. In different industries three reasons are important: (i) technological  
complementarities, (ii) shortening of the innovation time and (iii) market access as 
well as influence on market structures. To conclude, firms seek to better manage 
complexity and technological uncertainty by means of cooperation. 
4.1 Collaboration Characteristics 
The literature on interorganizational cooperation lists numerous types of cooperation. 
Prevalent types are joint ventures, equity alliances, joint production, joint marketing, 
supplier partnership (“one face to the customer”), distribution agreements and 
licensing agreements (Gates, 1993). A crude way to classify alliances is to differentiate 
between equity sharing and non-equity forms of cooperation. When talking about 
cooperation in this dissertation, I do essentially mean cooperation between firms in 
joint research projects on a contractual basis (Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996), 
encompassing no exchange of equity but an exchange of (intangible) resources. 
Exchange of resources is the result of regular interaction over a certain period in time 
which widens firm boundaries by partly mutual resource integration.  
Winter (1988), by reflecting on the concept of firm boundaries, asserts that the present 
state of the art is characterized by incoherence and contradictions. Teece (1986) argues 
that the boundaries of the firm can be found where the scope of a firm’s core 
competences ends. In line with the general reasoning of this dissertation, boundaries 
are considered as rather fuzzy structures that are permeable for resource inflows and 
outflows. They function as interfaces for the interaction with external organizations. 
The challenge for a firm is hence not to build Chinese walls in order to separate the 
inside world from the outside world or to protect internal knowledge from transfer to 
other organizations. The concern is rather to build appropriate ties and to find ways to 
share the boundaries with other organizations that allow for an effective knowledge 
exchange.  
4.2 Theories of Network Formation 
In order to analyze, explain and model (collaborative) firm behavior, a consistent 
theory of the firm has to be at hand. By taking the before mentioned challenges and 
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motives into account, it needs to theorize the nature of the firm, its operational 
motives, strategic objectives as well as its boundaries. In neoclassical economics 
(Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) firms are represented by a more or less complex 
production function reflecting the efficiency of the applied production technology. 
Contrarily, the resource-based view regards firms as heterogeneous entities that are 
characterized by the resources they own and apply (Penrose, 1959). Whilst the process 
perspective of a production function approach is akin to the resource based-view of the 
firm, it is not the production function itself which represents the firm, but the firm is 
represented by a bundle of unique resources and it rather develops, improves and 
adjusts its production function (Penrose, 1959; Rumelt, 1997). Marshall (1920) already 
contributed to the theory of the firm by suggesting that each firm possesses a unique 
set of relations with other actors. Such relations spur innovation processes by 
providing access to the knowledge-base of other organizations thereby constituting an 
element of a firm’s organizational capital. Relationships are vital assets for the survival 
of a firm and likewise a particular firm specific resource constituting an element of 
heterogeneity (Granovetter, 1985; Loasby, 2001). In the following subchapters I 
briefly delineate four frequently used concepts of the firm, namely the production 
function approach, the transaction-cost approach, the resource-based approach and 
finally the knowledge-based approach.  
4.2.1 Profit Maximizing and Cost Minimizing Concepts 
In the production function approach the firm is seen as a functional relationship 
between inputs and outputs of production. This production function approach 
constitutes the neoclassical workhorse of analysis. Accordingly, the questions to be 
answered are those on the optimality in the allocation of production factors and the 
respective incentives of firm behavior (Pyka, 2002). With regard to industrial 
innovation processes, since the early 1980s a branch of literature (new industrial 
economics) also analyzes the conditions and incentives of firms to engage in R&D 
cooperation by drawing on a game-theoretic framework (e.g. d'Aspremont and 
Jacquemin, 1988). Based on a Nash-Cournot type of duopoly model, the outcome of 
cooperative and non-cooperative R&D is analyzed. Different degrees of spillovers are 
taken into consideration ranging from no spillovers at all (β = 0) to complete spillover 
of the generated knowledge (β = 1). The maximum profit becomes a function of 
marginal costs c but also of the R&D intensity x and the degree of spillovers β (A is the 
intercept and B the steepness of the demand function): 
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According to this model, cooperation is beneficial in cases when the appropriability 
conditions for R&D investments are weak and, thus, the rate of knowledge spillovers 
among different actors is high (β > 0.5). Firms cooperate in order to benefit from the 
other firm’s knowledge and to compensate for the diffusion of own knowledge. The 
higher β, the more each firm spends on R&D. However, from a welfare perspective, a 
situation of cooperation with a low degree of spillovers (β < 0.5) can be 
disadvantageous since firms may reduce R&D to reduce competition, leading to higher 
prices and to a smaller consumer surplus. 
The second approach can be traced back to Coase (1937) and does not focus on 
immediate production processes but on transaction costs of economic activities. If we 
imagine an economy without firms, it would simply consist of isolated labor-sharing 
individuals connected by coordinating markets. Only the bundling and organization of 
sets of activities within a firm gives an industry its specific structure (e.g. small and 
medium-sized firms, large enterprises etc.). However, not only the existence of firms 
as such, but also their embeddedness in networks, constitutes a decisive feature of the 
economic structure. For Coase and his followers the main reason for the existence of 
firms is the costs that accrue from market transactions. Accordingly, firms come into 
being because the costs of coordinating transactions via markets are higher than the 
costs of a hierarchical organization within a firm. Essentially, it boils down to 
incentives for cost savings.  
These considerations are transferred to networks for instance by Williamson (1975). In 
this perspective, networks are an intermediate form of coordination between the 
dichotomy of hierarchy and markets. With the introduction of uncertainty and 
specificity of resources within an environment of bounded rationality and 
opportunistic behavior, networks are considered as a hybrid structure, balancing the 
costs for controlling an organization and the costs for acting on markets. In order to 
optimize the organizational structure, a firm has to take the transaction frequency and 
the importance of asset specificity into account: For intermediate degrees of asset 
specificity and intermediate levels of uncertainty innovation networks are considered 
the best organizational solution. With regard to market transactions that involve R&D, 
costs accrue due to (i) unclear contracts as research is largely uncertain in its outcome; 
(ii) inability to protect proprietary research results; (iii) risk of getting dependent on 
research suppliers which unilaterally benefit from a cooperation and (iv) monitoring 
costs (Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1992). 
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We may conclude from this approach that firms preferably employ their internal 
knowledge for research and development activities targeting new products and 
processes (and other kinds of innovations). External R&D is only used for non-critical 
activities that do not involve the risk of losing important knowledge. However, in 
knowledge-intensive industries, it is often less the internal R&D unit that makes all the 
difference in innovative performance, but it is rather the ability to learn from external 
actors which leads to a comparative advantage (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 
1996). The crucial questions for the formulation of the innovation strategy is hence 
less of the kind of to make or to buy; rather, in fields of high complexity where the 
comparative advantage is bound to innovative performance, the focal point of 
innovation is put on learning in networks of innovation (Powell and Brantley, 1992; 
Pyka, 1999). 
The above presented two approaches to explain the existence of innovation networks 
are increasingly criticized. The main critical point is the strong focus cost and profit 
considerations, that is, among a set of alternatives the less costly or most profitable 
alternative will be chosen. This assumption contradicts with the concept of uncertainty 
(Knight, 1921). Moreover, the creative potential of innovation networks, bringing 
together complementary knowledge and technologies, is not considered. In addition, 
Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996) find for the case of biotech firms, representing 
a science-based industry (Pavitt, 1984), that growing and ageing firms do not reduce 
the number of collaborations they are involved in. This contrasts with the transaction-
cost approach which suggests that firms increasingly use internal capabilities that are 
quasi free of transaction costs. Transaction cost economics can be characterized as a 
static cost trade-off analysis. The limitation on cost analysis does not take into 
consideration the induced possibilities for organizations to absorb knowledge in 
networks and the importance of social embeddedness in general. Moreover, the 
concept of transaction costs is vaguely defined and hard to measure, and hence 
unsuitable to provide guidance in decision making processes (Chen, 2008). From the 
perspective of a firm, there are strategic reasons other than cost considerations, such as 
knowledge sourcing, when they enter an alliance (Kogut, 1988; Powell, Koput and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996). Chen (2008) criticizes typical models which resemble in 
important aspects a perpetual motion machine, i.e. there are internal firm transactions 
which are free of costs. Any information collection or transmission requires some form 
of energy input and produces frictions, and entropy production increases in biological 
and social evolution. 
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4.2.2 A Resource-Based View of the Firm 
The third strand of literature, the resource-based approach, differs sharply from the 
previous two approaches (Kogut and Zander, 1993; Pyka, 2002). The resource-based 
view and its particular case, the knowledge-based view of the firm, serve as conceptual 
tools to shed light on the production function and technological progress, and help to 
identify its components and interaction patterns (Spender, 1996). Both approaches 
redefine the firm in ways that move us beyond a mere collection of rational 
individuals. Early contributors to this theory are Marshall (1920) who recognizes in 
particular knowledge as the decisive resource in production processes and Penrose 
(1959) who theorizes a firm by its bundle of resources. Resources are defined as 
“those (tangible and intangible) assets which are tied semi-permanently to the firm” 
(Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 172). Tangible assets are typically those assets which enter the 
firm from the external environment. In contrast, intangible assets such as knowledge 
are internally created and/or in their applicability highly firm specific. Constraints of a 
firm which hamper it from growing and enlarging its production facilities are linked to 
imperfections of the organizational knowledge rather than to external factors. Over 
time, firms are able to learn and adapt (Loasby, 2001). 
Firms seek to increase their value by combining resources according to the most 
beneficial recipe. The Neo-Schumpeterian scholars show that firms cannot be 
considered as atomistic entities in perfect markets. Firms constantly adapt the 
combination of their resources to changing environments and newly emerging 
paradigms. In the advent of new paradigms, incumbent firms have a hard time to adapt 
and new firms get chances to enter formerly closed markets (Hanusch and Pyka, 
2007b). Each firm is thus as a unique actor, i.e. the combination of resources it applies 
is unique. Even when formally applying the same combinations, the resulting 
production process may differ due to a tacit component. Tacit knowledge is of utmost 
importance in high-tech industries (Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 1997). What leads to 
technological progress on the aggregate level, is the process of imitation and diffusion 
of existing best practices, the constant striving of firms to improve existing practices, 
diminishing inferior technologies and fluctuating shares of new and incumbent 
techniques (Dosi and Nelson, 2010). 
If resources cannot be transferred on markets, cooperation is a possibility to anyhow 
enable a transfer between firms (Figure 3). For example, reputation can be transferred 
to a strategic alliance formed by two or more firms. This holds for the tacit knowledge 
of firms, too. The transfer requires trust and personal interaction, and often 
complementary resources are required in conjunction. Trust between cooperating firms 
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is a key ingredient for the recipe of successful knowledge exchange and it activates a 
teaching firm to actually understand which knowledge the learning firm seeks to 
acquire (Johnson et al., 1996). Trust moderates the partner’s behavior, reduces the risk 
of misbehavior (Gulati, 1995a) and regulates the magnitude and efficiency of 
knowledge transfer processes (Kogut, 1988; Johnson et al., 1996). Reciprocal 
knowledge exchange and synergistic creativity in innovation networks does not work 
without trust among the network participants (Almeida and Kogut, 1999). Trust 
facilitates knowledge exchange and learning in cooperative projects. The concept of 
interorganizational trust goes beyond individual relationships and develops into 
administrative routines, norms and values (Dodgson, 1993). Firms may work together 
in one project while they are rivals in another one. Organizing business in this way 
requires skills and methods that allow firms to change regularly their partners without 
destroying the common basis for later cooperation (Powell et al., 2005). Still, there are 
in practice considerable concerns that the open exchange of knowledge might 
strengthen competitors. Dilk et al. (2008) find for the automotive industry that only 
about 12 % of all innovation networks are horizontal. The necessary level of trust can 
emerge from the cumulative experience of past interactions (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1992). This holds even more for informal networks, which play a decisive role in 
speeding up knowledge diffusion. Firms that follow a strategy of isolation and secrecy, 
and do not actively seek to exchange knowledge in cooperative structures limit their 
possibilities to get access to external knowledge in the future since they lose the 
competences required for participating in cooperative projects (Shaw, 1993).  
 
Figure 3: Firm resources and their influence on alliances (Source: own illustration). 
A number of resource classification schemes are described in the respective literature 
on the resource-based view. As shown in Figure 3, a basic differentiation is the one 
between tangible and intangible resources (Grant, 1991). Reed and DeFillippi (1990) 
assert that the focus on physical assets alone will not be sufficient to attain a high 
performance level in the long run. Other authors suggest a more fine grained 
differentiation. For instance, Hofer and Schendel (1978) classify financial, physical, 
managerial, human, organizational and technological resources. Miller and Shamsie 
Firm resources
• Types: Tangible, intangible, 
etc.
• Charactersitics: Imitability, 
substitutability, mobility
Alliance formation
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(1996) distinguish property-based resources (PBR) from knowledge-based resources 
(KBR) (Table 1). In this concept, the PBRs encompass all assets that are legally owned 
by the firm. This applies to physical resources and financial resources but also to 
patents, copyrights etc. KBRs concern the know-how and skills of a firm. The notion 
of knowledge also encompasses technological and managerial systems which are not 
protected by legal regimes (Hall, 1992).  
Table 1: Resource types. 
 Resource Types 
Resource Characteristics Property-Based Resources 
Knowledge-Based 
Resources 
Imperfect Mobility Human resources 
Organizational resources 
(e.g., culture) 
Technological and 
managerial resources 
Imperfect Imitability 
Patents, contracts, 
copyrights, trademarks, 
registered design 
Imperfect Substitutability Physical resources 
Source: own illustration based on Miller and Shamsie (1996). 
Resources are characterized in terms of their mobility, imitability and substitutability 
(Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). The tacitness of knowledge makes knowledge-based 
resources hard to transfer and to imitate. Organizational resources such as firm culture, 
firm reputation or the learning and absorptive capacity have deep roots in a firm and 
are interdependent and interwoven in a way that they can hardly or not at all be 
retrieved from their original context (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). In addition, 
knowledge-based resources are inherently uncertain in the development process and 
difficult to substitute if better technologies are not available. In contrast, property-
based resources are more mobile, substitutable and tradable on markets. Grant (1996) 
sees the main contribution of the firm in the integration of knowledge – which resides 
within the employees – with their coordination capabilities. Accordingly, the focus is 
less on knowledge creation but more on knowledge application. In this perspective, the 
existence of firms is explained by the framework they create for the integration of 
individual specialized knowledge. This individualist view contrasts with a view which 
is more focused on knowledge generation and acquisition building up a strong 
organizational knowledge-base. 
In a nutshell, I model firms as knowledge-based organizations acting as “repositories 
of productive knowledge” (Winter, 1988, p. 169) that are able to adapt, learn and 
exchange knowledge among each other by interaction. The value of a specific 
knowledge element is firm specific. While in the example in Figure 4 the value of a 
knowledge unit D is rather small (small circle) for the firms j and k, it may have a 
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much larger value (large circle) for firm i. For the analysis of innovation networks and 
underlying knowledge exchange processes within the scope of this dissertation, I 
operationalize the knowledge-base by the approximation of its patent portfolio (cf. 
chapter 8). Imperfect mobility, imperfect imitability and imperfect substitutability of 
knowledge hamper firms from acquiring required knowledge on markets. An 
alternative transfer channel is consequently required. Cooperation and subsequently 
the emergence of networks open such channels and provide incentives to voluntarily 
participate in transfer processes.  
 
Figure 4: Exchange and diverging relevance of knowledge (Source: own illustration). 
4.2.3 Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of Interfirm Cooperation 
I state in chapter three that knowledge has become a resource of particular importance 
in modern economies. Consequently, I am looking for a model which adequately 
captures knowledge generation and exchange processes. In the previous subchapter, I 
delineate how knowledge can be operationalized within the framework of the 
resource-based view of the firm. Accordingly, the cooperative behavior of firms is 
influenced by the scale and scope of firms’ knowledge-bases. This allows us to 
generically develop complex firm aggregates like networks. In this context, four lines 
of knowledge-based reasoning for network formation are identified: First, network 
members benefit from knowledge, outsiders do not get access to. It is implicitly 
assumed that the trading of knowledge on markets is impossible (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Das and Teng, 2000; Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000; Vonortas, 
2009). Additionally, cooperation allows for the improvement of knowledge-bases by 
mutual learning. Hence, rather than building vertically integrated organizations, firms 
prefer intertwined network organizations that provide them with opportunities to learn 
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from each other and exchange a large variety of knowledge. Acquired awareness for 
the importance of mutual learning opportunities promotes eagerness to collaborate 
(Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Second, network actors may influence 
knowledge flows which provide them with a certain degree of power and influence 
(Pfeffer, 1978). Third, firms not only cooperate to compensate for a lack of own 
resources (knowledge) but also to explore and exploit their own knowledge-bases 
(Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Kogut (1988) illustrates the case of a firm 
which cannot make use of a resource it owns at a certain moment in time and which it 
wants to keep internally “stored” for potential later usage. This might be research 
personnel which is not used to capacity. A firm may now search for other firms which 
have different resources available, such as physical resources, that may be meaningful 
combined with the own research personnel. Fourth, Nelson and Winter (1982) suggest 
that firms run the risk of degrading their knowledge-base if they remain too long 
isolated from external stimuli which could reactivate unused elements of their 
knowledge-base. A firm has to decide whether it wants to permanently externalize the 
unused resource by a merger or acquisition, or if it rather wants to collaborate for a 
certain period of time in order to revitalize old capabilities by actually applying them. 
In highly competitive environments that are characterized by high velocities of 
innovation, knowledge intense products and fast-pace market entry strategies, 
collaborative innovation by transferring knowledge and learning from each other is 
key to success. Especially in industries which are characterized by a high level of 
interrelatedness and complexity, finding a complementary partner is a real advantage 
in competition (Hagedoorn, 1993). In such environments the sources of relevant 
knowledge are typically dispersed and controlled by a larger number of different firms. 
Furthermore, the required resources can typically not be separated from other 
resources a firm owns. Firms collaborate within such constellations to improve their 
innovation output and speed, and to reduce uncertainty (Ramanathan, Seth and 
Thomas, 1997). In less competitive environments where the crucial resources are 
rather concentrated in a single firm, the propensity to cooperate is often less strongly 
expressed (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996).  
Following Burt (1995), knowledge benefits are characterized by three distinct features, 
namely access, timing and referrals. As described above, the first feature is related to 
the provision of knowledge from partners in the network as well as from potential 
future partners. Because timing matters a lot in innovation processes, firms benefit also 
from an accelerated knowledge transfer which is given in network structures (Cowan 
and Jonard, 2004). Finally, valuable knowledge and information required by a network 
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actor may not be found in the intermediate neighborhood, i.e. from actors a firm is 
directly connected with. Instead, the specific knowledge might flow through the 
dispersed channels in the network coming from more remote actors. In an accelerated 
and complex knowledge generation and diffusion process, therefore, participating in 
an innovation network supports learning and updating of knowledge-bases of the 
actors that are members of an innovation network. Besides direct learning 
opportunities, networks are means to reduce uncertainty about the usefulness of things 
that can be learned (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999).  
Ties within innovation networks not only reflect formal contracts but also informal 
relationships (Hanson and Krackhardt, 1993; Pyka, 1997). Moreover, personal 
relations between two or more representatives of involved organizations are an 
important success factor for cooperation (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Doz, 1996) 
since they facilitate the transfer of information (Von Hippel, 1987) and the formation 
of trustworthy relationships (Gulati, 1995a). Freeman (1991, p. 500) finds in a study: 
“Although rarely measured systematically, informal networks appeared to be the most 
important. Multiple sources of information and pluralistic patterns of collaboration 
were the rule rather than the exception.” Dahl and Pedersen (2004) find for the case of 
a cluster of wireless communication firms in Northern Denmark that informal contacts 
considerably fuel knowledge diffusion processes. Owen-Smith and Powell (2004) 
analyze knowledge networks in the Boston biotechnology community and thereby 
confirm that informal relations between the actors foster knowledge exchange between 
agglomerated firms. A particular type of an informal network is observed by Von 
Hippel (1987) as informal knowledge exchange among scientists and engineers 
working for different and even competing firms. “Informal know-how trading is the 
extensive exchange of proprietary know-how in informal networks of engineers in 
rival (and non-rival) firms” (Von Hippel, 1987, p. 291). This exchange is based on 
trust and personal contacts which are systematically developed as a function of 
personal judgments of the usefulness and value of the knowledge to be received or to 
be transferred. Other examples are friendship networks among managers which are 
used by managers whose firms are in “troubled water” (McDonald and Westphal, 
2003). Even though the exchange does not undergo a formal evaluation process, the 
decision of an individual engineer to trade know-how is reasonable. The quality of 
advice can be immediately tested by applying it, while the sender can test the quality 
of expertise of the receiver by evaluating the sophistication of the expressed demand. 
Innovation networks have a special meaning for small firms. For example, in the 
pharmaceutical industry small firms frequently cooperate with the big players not only 
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to benefit from financial resources but also from marketing, juridical and operations 
know-how, i.e. they gain access to relatively immobile resources. In return, large firms 
gain the knowledge which they need to develop new drugs and regularly fill up their 
product pipelines (Müller, 2005). By studying the innovative performance of start-ups 
in the biotechnology industry Walker, Kogut and Shan (1997) find a positive 
relationship between the number of collaborative ties a firm formed and its innovation 
output. The exchange of tacit knowledge involves high transaction costs as it demands 
close interaction and synchronization of knowledge-bases. Small firms are particularly 
affected by the problems that are related to the tacitness of knowledge: First, smaller 
firms often sell highly specialized products for niche markets incorporating a high 
share of tacit knowledge. Second, work flows tend to be less formal and explicitly 
written down (Boschma, Eriksson and Lindgren, 2009). Network strategies are 
important for start-up firms as an entry strategy. Innovation networks provide access to 
knowledge and other resources which increase the chances to survive (Ostgaard and S. 
Birley, 1996). Entering established innovation networks opens up such possibilities for 
young and small firms which are hardly conceivable outside the network (Rothwell 
and M. Dodgson, 1991). 
Miller and Shamsie (1996) state that the protection of knowledge-based resources 
from unintended diffusion is much more difficult than the protection of property-based 
resources due to the lack of the applicability of legal rights. Cooperation partners are 
consequently concerned with the threat of losing their knowledge to a partner (Hamel, 
1991). In fact, many studies neglect the stimulating aspects of knowledge transfers 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992) with the exemption of creating an (unintended) industry 
standard (Spencer, 2003). However, also the knowledge which is embodied in 
property-based resources, such as patents, is not fully safeguarded. There are ways 
which enable firms to disrespect legal boundaries and to exploit other firms’ patents, 
for instance by “inventing around”. On the other hand, access to and transfer of 
knowledge as well as its application is not free of costs either. It requires absorptive 
capacity and internal R&D in order to recognize and make use of it. Furthermore, even 
if the unintended diffusion of private knowledge in networks is costly, for instance due 
to an increase in competition, imitation creates new learning opportunities. The 
recipient firm will recombine the absorbed knowledge with own knowledge thereby 
creating a new solution which creates in turn new learning possibilities for the 
originating firm whose knowledge-base is related to the recombined knowledge-base 
of the imitator (Yang, Phelps and Steensma, 2010). 
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4.3 Conclusions 
Concepts focusing on costs and profits in combination with assumptions of rational 
behavior and knowledge-spillover can hardly explain the increasing number of 
collaborative research projects. Resource- and in particular knowledge-based concepts 
focus on the singularity of firms and their internal characteristics. Resources have a 
strategic importance for the firm and hence, they need to find ways to gain access to 
vital resources they do not possess themselves. Varying resource endowments stresses 
heterogeneity. In contrast, concepts which focus predominantly on external factors, 
such as the competitive environment, are often too much based on the assumption of 
firm homogeneity (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991). Heterogeneity is a 
persistent property opening the door for the analysis and development of distinctive 
firm strategies by which a firm can gain an advantage in competition. According to 
Barney (1991, p. 102), “a firm is said to have a competitive advantage when it 
implements a value creating strategy not simultaneously implemented by any current 
or potential competitor”. Thus, a superior strategy is based on the combination of 
resources which creates more value than other strategies. However, the development of 
a successful strategy is not a straightforward task since it is not obvious which 
combination of resources eventually leads to a competitive advantage. It is related to 
the tacitness, complexity and specificity of resources (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990). 
This problem, also known as causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982), makes it 
for external persons particularly difficult to identify successful resource combinations. 
It exacerbates the search for resource substitutes and impedes the imitation of 
strategies. 
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5. Concepts of Descriptive Network Analysis 
Differing positions in a network are linked to operational opportunities or limitations, 
especially with regard to access to knowledge. It is not only advantageous to be a 
member of a network but it is also important to find the right place in the network, 
most of the time preferably a central position that allows for absorbing the latest 
developments. Furthermore, evolutionary dynamics is not a phenomenon which is 
limited to firms or technologies, but also networks change their structure over time. 
Consequently, the position of actors in the network changes. Also, the number of 
network members changes as new firms enter and incumbents leave a network. The 
topology of a network reflects the channels through which knowledge can be 
exchanged. To study the structure of a specific network, social network analysis 
(SNA) becomes applied. The basic methodology as well as a number of important 
findings which are drawn from the application of SNA to innovation networks will be 
presented in this chapter. However, to understand network evolution, studying a 
snapshot structure is only a first step. More information about the causes and 
consequences of dynamic interaction is required (Barabasi, 2007) (cf. chapter 6). For 
instance, many real-world network structures exhibit scale-free structures in which a 
relatively central node that has already many links gains further links more rapidly 
compared to a weakly connected node. The result is a positive feedback mechanism 
which favors the ones which are already well connected. More complex attachment 
mechanisms are delineated in chapter 7. 
5.1 Features of Natural Networks 
Social network analysis has become a widely used tool for the analysis of interaction 
processes in many scientific disciplines. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I 
referred with the cooking example already to the biological context in which network 
analysis is indeed a prominent method of analysis. For instance, the functioning of a 
biological cell can be described as a metabolic network with enzymes and substrates 
representing the nodes and chemical interactions representing the ties. Another 
biological network is our brain which consists of nerve cells connected by axons 
(Barabasi, 2007). Barabási and Oltvai (2004) find that structural characteristics of 
cellular networks resemble other complex systems such as the internet or society. They 
conclude that the laws governing most natural complex systems must be similar. Suda, 
Itao and Matsuo (2010) study transport networks in social and biological systems with 
a special interest in the robustness of network performance. Relevant aspects in this 
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context are costs, transport efficiency and fault tolerance. The basic hypothesis is that 
biological networks have been shaped by the pressure of evolutionary selection which 
should have given them a high performance level. To test this hypothesis, the slime 
mold Physarum polycephalum is compared with the Tokyo rail system. The main 
challenge in transportation is to strike a balance between the costs of generating an 
efficient network and failure resilience. A “biologically inspired model for adaptive 
network development”, which was derived from the study of the slime mold, was in 
experiments able to produce solutions which were performing at least as well as real-
world infrastructure networks. A widespread feature in natural networks is the scale-
free architecture (Barabasi and Albert, 1999; Barabasi and Albert, 2002; Barabasi, 
2007) contrasting the random structure of early network models such as Erdős and 
Rényi (1960). Scale-free indicates that there is no typical node in the network, that is, a 
node which could be regarded as typical for a certain network. The emergence of 
scale-free networks can be explained by a preferential attachment mechanism (Müller, 
Buchmann and Kudic, 2013). In presence of a preferential attachment mechanism, the 
likelihood P for a new node to connect to an incumbent node with k links is 
proportional to k.      = 
 
    
 with the sum encompassing all network members. In 
contrast, random networks have nodes with degree centrality measures deviating only 
slightly from the average degree. 
5.2 Collecting Network Data 
The first step to social network analysis is to collect data of nodes and ties. Network 
data about interpersonal or interorganizational networks is typically collected through 
surveys, questionnaires, from archived documents, observations or electronic traces 
(e.g. E-Mail, Facebook) (Newman, 2003). The reconstruction of networks based on 
interviews or questionnaires often suffers from inadequate sample sizes or from a 
subjectivity bias. An alternative method for capturing communication networks is the 
analysis of communication records. Thereby, the assumption is made that a tie between 
two persons comes into being if an email is sent from one person to another (Newman, 
2003). With increasing computational power, scientific fields such as biology and 
physics have been reframed by the capacity to collect and analyze large data sets. 
Deviating from this development, Lazer et al. (2009) observe that the application of 
large data sets within computational social science has been less pushed and “to date, 
research on human interactions has relied mainly on one-time, self-reported data on 
relationships” (Lazer et al., 2009, p. 722).  
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Collecting network data to analyze social networks in the widest sense can be quite 
cumbersome as a number of preconditions have to be fulfilled for a sound analysis: 
First, some methods of analysis require complete network data which is often difficult 
to guarantee (Freeman, 1979; Winship and Mandel, 1983). Second, some sort of 
network boundary has to be specified. This is often done by (i) applying geographic 
boundaries; (ii) by formalized membership (affiliation network); (iii) based on the 
attribute of a specific social and professional position or (iv) by the participation in an 
event (e.g. a conference) (Marsden, 1990; Laumann, Marsden and Prensky, 1992). The 
problem is partly comparable to the problem of defining the population for a regular 
econometric analysis. However, boundary specification is even more pertinent in 
social network analysis (SNA) since interdependencies between actors are explicitly 
modeled and analyzed. Arbitrarily left out actors may lead to skewed or artifactual 
results. Third, a cognitive effect may bias the analysis of networks which are based on 
questionnaires or interviews. People tend to keep regular structures well in mind while 
they are less attentive for irregular events. Freeman, Romney and Freeman (1987) find 
that reports on the attendance of persons at a particular event show a tendency to 
include persons that generally attended the event but not the particular event asked for, 
while, on the other hand, persons who attended the particular event but attended other 
events only irregularly were less remembered. The conclusion drawn from this 
example is that it is hard to report on interaction which takes place in a delimited time 
frame. Instead, it is relatively easy to remember regular enduring activities or 
persisting social relations (Marsden, 1990). Fourth, when designing a study one has to 
decide whether to investigate actually existing networks or if one is more interested in 
networks as they are perceived by the actors (also called cognitive networks) 
(Marsden, 1990). While for the study of attitudes and opinions perceived networks are 
more important, for the study of innovation diffusion processes or cooperation, 
knowledge about more formalized networks is appropriate. 
Interaction is a prerequisite for a variety of exchange processes – e.g. exchange of 
knowledge or other resources – but also for influencing mutual behavior. When 
applying the approach of routinized ties the character of the network is rather static. 
The move to a dynamic analysis creates a need for additional information about the 
starting point and the end point of interaction. This problem can be solved in different 
ways: First, if there are formal limitations of interaction as defined in a contract, these 
dates can be taken as start and end date, even though in reality (informal) interaction 
starts before the official beginning of a common research project and probably exceeds 
the official finalization date. Second, an assumption about the typical duration of 
interaction can be made. In the case of co-patenting networks a time span of five years 
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is often plausible. Third, in other cases such as friendship networks a start and end date 
has to be fixed according to the definition of the friendship concept or any other 
concept of social interaction which is applied (Marsden, 1990). 
For the study delineated in this dissertation, I apply archival information from a 
German database called “Förderkatalog” to reconstruct interorganizational networks in 
the German automotive industry. The problem of many other methods of data 
collection, such as surveys, questionnaires or interviews, is that organizational 
representatives are not necessarily aware of (all) the existing relations to other 
organizations. This is presumably a more severe problem in larger organizations that 
employ specialized staff and organize into separate business divisions. While at least 
the formal relations can be more easily analyzed in smaller organizations, informal ties 
are even there difficult to identify from outside. 
5.3 Social Network Analysis of Innovation Networks 
Most networks which are meaningful to be analyzed from the perspective of an 
innovation economist, such as patent networks or R&D networks, easily encompass 
several hundreds of nodes and can thus hardly be analyzed by simple eyeballing. 
Social network analysis (SNA) can help us looking deeper into the structure of such 
networks. Newman (2003, p. 171) expresses the advantage of special statistical 
techniques by asserting that it can answer the question: „How can I tell what this 
network looks like, when I can’t actually look at it?“. Social network analysis 
constitutes a tool which enables us to describe the interaction structure of firms in a 
network. Moreover, it focuses on the varying positions of actors within the social 
structure and measures their degree of embeddedness. The resulting measures allow us 
to draw conclusions, for instance with regard to the advantageousness of a certain 
position. Moreover, social network analysis is applied as a first step to disentangle the 
complexity of the network architecture (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). However, as 
long as the dynamic characteristics are not taken adequately into account, we cannot 
understand the full complexity of networks. SNA-indicators have been developed 
which allow for a description of networks, their structures and to some extent their 
dynamics. With the help of SNA-indicators internetwork comparisons become 
possible. 
For firms that are part of a network it is useful to understand the functioning of the 
whole network and the specific roles of particular actors. Social network analysis 
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offers a toolkit that helps to gain such insights. Central questions which SNA for 
innovation networks seeks to answer are: Which network structures are supportive to 
(collective) innovation success? Which position in a network is advantageous for 
individual actors? How robust is a network structure and which roles in networks can 
we differentiate from each other? Indeed, when we analyze the architecture of an 
innovation network one cannot oversee that some actors are more central while others 
are rather located at the periphery, and some actor have many ties while others have 
only few. More central actors have a relatively better position to absorb knowledge and 
exert influence. Moreover, central actors are able to bridge between different 
knowledge fields and may even be able to hamper other firms from access to 
knowledge. In a nutshell, the analysis of the network architecture is telling us how the 
network is functioning. The following graphs (Figure 5) exemplify the link between 
structure und functioning: 
 
Figure 5: Star (left) and ring (right) network topology (Source: own illustration). 
In the star structure, actor A takes the most important position. This node has a link to 
all the other actors in the network, while the other actors can only indirectly initiate a 
link via actor A. Quite the opposite distribution of power is manifested in the ring 
network as there is no single central actor but all actors are linked to their immediate 
neighbors. The degree centrality which is measured as the number of direct ties 
between ego and the alters (Freeman Degree) has important implications for actors as 
well as for the entire network. For the case of innovation networks it can be 
understood as an indicator for the extent to which an actor gets the chance to access 
the network’s knowledge base: The higher the measure is, the easier is the access. A 
couple of more complex indicators have been developed in order to describe the 
character of network embeddedness. For instance, the closeness centrality concept 
draws on the measurement of the length of path distances between actors and allows 
for a more comprehensive analysis of network structures (Jansen, 2006; Buchmann 
and Pyka, 2012a).  
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5.3.1 Why Centrality Matters 
Nodes in general and firms in particular differ in their extent of network 
embeddedness. Positional embeddedness refers to the advantages with regard to 
knowledge access that is inferred from a specific position in the network. A central 
position in the network is supportive for innovative success (Ibarra, 1993; Ahuja, 
2000a). It makes actors in a network both, more visible and attractive to be selected as 
partners and at the same time more influential without implementing more formal 
ways of control such as holding shares or having a formal say in the management 
board (Robinson and Stuart, 2002). The degree centrality is a measure for the direct 
connectedness of a firm to all other firms in the network. A high value indicates that a 
company is highly connected. Actors with high degrees of centrality exert power in the 
sense that they can control and brokerage knowledge in the network (Knoke and Yang, 
2008). From a strategic point of view, not only the number of links to other firms is 
relevant but also the distance to other firms. The closeness centrality indicator captures 
the distance of an actor to all the other actors in a network. It gives an idea of how easy 
and quickly an actor can get in touch with other actors in the network directly or via 
only few steps (actors) in between (Knoke and Yang, 2008). If an actor has a central 
position which allows it to control knowledge flows between other actors in the 
network, then its betweenness centrality is high. That is, the more often an actor is 
located on the shortest path between other actors, the higher is the potential to control 
or moderate flows of knowledge and other resources, and to play the role of a broker 
or gatekeeper (Knoke and Yang, 2008).
6
  
In addition, more central actors have a more comprehensive picture of the state of the 
network and more qualitative information about potential partners which reduces 
uncertainty about partner selection (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Gilsing et al. (2008) 
find that the value of centrality is also a function of the technological distance between 
ego and the alter actor as well as of network density. For instance, in the case of 
average technological distances, more central firms which are embedded in fairly 
dense networks perform better when it comes to the development of explorative 
innovations. Note that the quality of calculations of network measures, e.g. degree 
distributions, depends on the completeness of the available data set (Powell et al., 
2005). 
                                            
6 For a comprehensive overview of the formal centrality definitions see for instance Wasserman and Faust (1994) 
or Knoke and Yang (2008). 
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An effective strategy for a firm to attain a central position is to develop strong research 
skills that are appreciated by their partners and make these skills available to the 
network. Firms that are not conducting high-level research, which would allow them to 
maintain or expand their network, lose easily a central position (Powell, Koput and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996). In particular, Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996) find with 
regard to centrality: First, R&D cooperation influences positively the degree centrality. 
Second, collaborative R&D experience has a positive effect on closeness centrality. 
Third, non-R&D network experience affects both, degree and closeness centrality, and 
fourth, portfolio diversity has a positive influence on all three measures of central 
connectivity. It is the firms which gain the most central positions that provide impetus 
for the industry development (Powell et al., 2005).  
Degree centrality also seems to be a good predictor for the growth rate of a firm. Size 
is the result of a company’s behavior in the network, that is, growth processes are 
triggered by cooperative projects and reinforced by centrality. While cooperation leads 
to centrality, it is also centrality that affects in turn the extent to which a company is 
able to benefit from the network. Centrality has indeed two effects: First, it provides 
firms with access to a core group and thus enables them to benefit from critical 
knowledge and other resources. Second, centrality triggers a feedback loop as it 
supports firms with the formation of new ties and with the reinforcement of old ties 
(Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
Centrality serves as a tool which enables firms to benefit from information 
asymmetries (Baum, Shipilov and Rowley, 2003). Central firms can easily find 
partners as centrality is linked to reputation (Podolny, 1993). Despite the increased 
freedom of choice with regard to a partner, there are hints that central firms prefer to 
collaborate with other central firms for different reasons: There is the principle of 
status homophily which suggests that firms with similar centrality levels are more 
likely to cooperate due the signal they emit with their position (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 
1954; Podolny, 1994). Moreover, a firm might damage its own reputation if it 
cooperates with a less central firm (Podolny, 1993; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). 
5.3.2 Indirect Ties 
Not only direct links but also the indirect links play a role, reflected by the so-called 
structural embeddedness. Global structural embeddedness is formally expressed by the 
density of a network (Burt, 1995). Density measures to which extent the firms in a 
network are connected among themselves. In other words, it describes the realized 
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links as a proportion to all possible linkages. For example, a network density which 
reaches a level of 21% means that 21% of all possible ties are actually established. 
Comparisons between network densities are rather difficult, as the number of nodes is 
negatively correlated with network density (Scott, 2000). Ahuja (2000a) suggests an 
interpretation of indirect ties according to which they constitute a way to maximize the 
benefits that can be drawn from the network. However, high network density is not 
advantageous per se. In cases when a firm seeks to access new knowledge, many close 
linkages make redundancy of knowledge very likely. On the other side, Coleman 
(1988) suggests that a dense network enhances the creation of trust and shared social 
norms which are both conducive for voluntary knowledge transfer. Oliver (2001) 
shows that firms acting in densely connected networks develop similar expectations 
concerning the behavior of other network participants, i.e. a system of norms and 
mutual control emerges. Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt (2000) find that this allows 
for sanctioning actors not sticking to the commonly introduced rules.  
Despite the apparent value of indirect ties, there is no mandate to explicitly foster the 
formation of indirect ties. Especially the replacement of direct ties with indirect ties 
cannot be recommended for the following reasons: First, direct and indirect ties can 
have a very different function for a firm. While direct ties provide resource-sharing 
and knowledge- spillover benefits, indirect ties are less relevant for the resource aspect 
which makes them less interchangeable. Second, there may be cases when both kinds 
of ties provide the same kinds of benefits. Even in these cases, as suggested by Ahuja 
(2000a), the benefits provided from indirect ties are relatively low as compared to 
direct ties. 
Joining an innovation network will feed back on the behavior of other network 
members. Social norms of behavior are likely to emerge in densely connected 
innovation networks. With high network density a specific culture evolves framing the 
way actors think and act which distinguishes insiders from outsiders. Additionally, the 
costs for membership in networks are linked to the degree of density. For insiders of 
dense networks, costs can become low as the level of trust is expected to be high. 
Since the formation of network linkages requires a considerable investment and 
switching costs from one network to another are high, there should be no interest for 
opportunistic behavior.  
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5.3.3 Strong and Weak Ties 
Participants in innovation networks benefit from their relational and structural 
embeddedness. Whereas strong ties facilitate the exchange of complex and tacit 
knowledge due to the possibilities of further inquiries, weak ties enable the network 
actors to access entirely new knowledge. Weak ties connect actors to remote subgroups 
in a network where – with a higher probability – rather new knowledge is located 
(Granovetter, 1973; Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000). From a slightly different 
perspective we can also say that a strong tie network which consists of a lot of 
redundant ties is conducive to the diffusion of existing knowledge. The transfer of tacit 
knowledge is also accelerated in strong tie networks since redundant ties are an 
indicator for trustworthiness in the network. On the other hand, weak tie networks are 
more beneficial for explorative tasks, i.e. the generation of new knowledge which is 
restricted in dense networks in which redundant knowledge elements supersede 
(Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000). The answer to the question which network 
features are beneficial differs from industry to industry. Rost (2011) analyzes networks 
in the German automotive industry with regard to structural and relational 
characteristics. She thereby shows that a combination of strong ties and low network 
density is most conducive for innovation.  
5.3.4 Variety Regarding Exploration and Exploitation 
A high activity level within a network makes a network for outsiders more attractive. 
Once a network attracts new firms it raises the variety of knowledge and thus the 
possibilities for new combinations. In other words, “diversity entails a preference for 
exploration over exploitation” (March, 1991, p. 79). Inside a network, diverse 
knowledge can often be reached by the formation of a tie to actors in more remote 
technological fields. The respective actors are often located in less well connected 
subgroups of a network. In network terminology, this means to bridge so-called 
structural holes (Burt, 1995; Burt, 2004; Powell et al., 2005). 
The structural hole concept opposes the social capital concept. Social capital is 
approximated by the frequency of social interactions in a network. It refers to aspects 
of collective action such as trust and a system of values that determine the possible 
intensity of cooperation (e.g. Coleman, 1988; Burt, 1995; Walker, Kogut and Shan, 
1997). The amount of social capital is determined by the quantity of network resources 
invested by a network actor, which in turn influences the space of opportunities and 
therefore has a strategic importance (Vonortas, 2009). However, Walker, Kogut and 
Shan (1997) find that the most beneficial network positions are those which enable the 
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bridging of structural holes favoring more loosely knit networks. If we combine these 
considerations with growth phases of firms, it can be stated that, in the beginning, a 
dense network structure is more important while at a later stage bridging structural 
holes is more promising for a firm (Hite and Hesterly, 2001).  
The self-structuring process of a network is influenced by the characteristics of an 
industry and by knowledge dynamics. Stable network structures very likely reduce 
knowledge variety. Mature innovation networks are particularly affected by this 
rigidity. Consequently, the major advantage of innovation networks, namely 
cumulative knowledge creation based on the variety of knowledge of network 
participants, might be sacrificed for the sake of specialization and a lock-in to 
relatively predictable technological trajectories (Kogut, 2000; Vonortas, 2009). Related 
to this point, Walker, Kogut and Shan (1997) detect a trade-off between stability and 
variety in network structures. The question arises whether there is an optimal structure 
balancing the two diverging tendencies, i.e. stability and variety. On the one hand, ties 
in an innovation network are established to connect formerly not connected knowledge 
areas, which give access to so far unexploited knowledge from cross-fertilization, i.e. 
bridging structural holes. Innovations networks of this kind aim at the exploration of 
the knowledge space. On the other hand, network links are established to better exploit 
the techno-economic opportunities of a specific knowledge area. Efficient exploitation 
is based on experienced practices while exploration is a routine changing activity 
itself. For the transition from exploration to exploitation, a combination of explorative 
and exploitative elements is conducive. For instance, a core group of actors doing 
exploitative work may link to surrounding actors or networks to access new ideas 
(Vonortas, 2009). Moreover, networks often show a clear division between a core 
group and a periphery group, and a concentration of knowledge transfer within the 
core group. These considerations also refer to Granovetter’s (1973) concept of the 
strength of weak ties suggesting that weak ties avoid redundancy in the network and 
enable access to novelties. 
Whether a rather lose network with flexible structures or a more dense network with 
well-rehearsed routines is more advantageous depends on the actual problem that an 
innovation network is confronted with. The idea of an equilibrated network structure 
might be misleading as it does not respect the two diverging objectives exploration and 
exploitation. Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt (2000) reckon that high density and 
strong ties are better conditions for exploitation while low density and weak ties 
support exploration. In the same vein, Nooteboom and Gilsing (2004) suggest that new 
knowledge can best be discovered in structures of loose ties, whereas the transfer of 
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complex and tacit knowledge requires dense networks. Hagedoorn and Duysters 
(2002) do not share this opinion and claim that the propensity to search for more 
radical innovations and to learn by exchanging knowledge with network partners 
increases with network density. They argue that for bounded rational firms acting in a 
permanently changing environment, connections between remote areas of the network 
are not of high relevance. Instead, the promotion of openness, network density and tie 
redundancy is supposed to be more effective. 
As such, we have seen that there is no “one structure fits all network”, but network 
structures are ideally tailored to specific purposes – even though the ideal pattern is not 
always obvious. Take for instance the case that all network actors are faced with 
similar new technological opportunities. In this case redundant interlocking ties are 
beneficial since they allow for the establishment of a high level of trust (Almeida and 
Kogut, 1999). Conversely, for a network that is more dependent on external 
knowledge or the brokerage of technology, loose and non-overlapping ties are more 
advantageous (Arndt and Sternberg, 2000).  
5.3.5 Roles and Knowledge Absorption 
Empirical evidence indicates that there is a significant stable relationship between 
different forms of centrality and the absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Firms with low absorptive capacities get isolated in a network because their cognitive 
distance to other firms becomes too large to understand what these firms are doing. In 
contrast, once a firm has reached a comparatively high level of absorptive capacity, it 
is more likely to have many links in the network. Giuliani and Bell (2005) study 
network structures in a Chilean wine cluster by conducting a social network analysis 
based on interviews. Among others, they find evidence for the hypothesis that firms 
with a higher absorptive capacity have a higher probability to start a new tie. 
Furthermore, on the basis of their findings, three main roles of firms in innovation 
networks are conceptualized: 
 Technological gatekeepers: These actors have a high degree of centrality in the 
network, that is, they are well connected within the network and they are also 
strongly connected with external sources of knowledge. They are hence a main 
knowledge source for other actors in the network and control knowledge flows. 
Concerning the strategic position, the role of gatekeepers entails many 
opportunities for firms in an innovation network: Bringing-in new external 
knowledge refreshes the innovation activities in the network and may re-focus the 
activities from exploitation towards exploration. 
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 Isolated firms: These actors benefit only rudimentarily from the network as they 
have only few links. From a strategic point of view, this is in general not a 
desirable position as isolated firms cannot influence the direction and intensity of 
innovation activities.  
 External stars: Such actors possess strong linkages with external sources but only 
weak ties inside the network. These intra-network ties are almost exclusively 
focused on knowledge absorption. The role of external stars becomes visible in 
innovation networks that are composed out of firms characterized by very different 
sizes. In biopharmaceutical industries, for instance, the large pharmaceutical 
companies are typically connected with various small firms that conduct research 
in different areas of the knowledge space.   
Only the technological gatekeepers have strong connections inside the network and 
can, thus, stimulate the learning dynamics with “fresh” external knowledge. They 
constitute the central element of a network’s absorptive capacity. Strong external links 
enable these firms to enlarge their own knowledge-base and to improve their 
competitive strength. Less connected actors become aware of this disparity and try to 
connect to actors that are stronger than they are themselves, a process which increases 
the tie concentration (preferential attachment). Actors which want to play a 
gatekeeper’s role and thereby strengthen the absorptive capacity of the entire network 
generally follow a process that consists of three steps: First, they gain access to 
external knowledge. Second, thereby they create new combinations of knowledge 
which is exchanged with other members of their network. Third, by exchanging newly 
acquired knowledge they foster the intra-network knowledge diffusion process. The 
voluntary transfer of knowledge without necessarily expecting reciprocal transfers is 
notable. The reason for this behavior is not altruism but the expectation of positive 
externalities, i.e. an improvement of the reputation of the entire network through 
improved products and processes. 
5.4 Small-World Networks 
Besides the actor related properties, another feature describing the architecture of 
networks becomes increasingly studied (e.g. Baum, Shipilov and Rowley, 2003; 
Hidalgo et al., 2007). A pervasive feature of many observed networks is (i) the 
formation of network subgroups which are very tightly connected and of (ii) loosely 
interconnected subgroups (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). This observation is in line with 
the concept of small-world networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Newman, 2003). The 
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small-world attribute is assigned to a network if it is significantly more clustered than 
a random network, and if the average path length is relatively small. The path length is 
defined as the average number of ties that lie along the shortest path between two 
nodes. It is a measure for the global structure of a network. In contrast, the degree of 
clustering measured by the clustering coefficient is characteristic for a local network 
subunit. For its calculation, the number of ties among all partners of a firm i gets 
divided by the number of all possible ties that could exist among the partners of i 
(Watts, 1999). To decide whether a network can be considered a small-world network, 
the values of the calculated (average) shortest path length PL and the clustering 
coefficient CC are compared with the values calculated for random networks with the 
same number of nodes and ties.
7
 Yet, there is no generally accepted consensus with 
regard to critical values for these parameters. In large networks with high levels of 
clustering, it is often sufficient to establish some shortcuts between remote actors in 
order to fulfill the prerequisites of a small-world network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). 
Innovation networks having a small-world architecture combine two advantages: (i) 
faster knowledge diffusion compared to random and regular structures and (ii) 
provision of new knowledge to all network participants (Cowan and Jonard, 2003).  
 
Figure 6: Network topologies (Source: Watts and Strogatz, 1998). 
Three “archetypes” of network structures are identified, namely the regular, small-
world and random structure (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) (Figure 6). These networks 
range from a well ordered, regular structure linking each node with its immediate 
neighbor (left network in Figure 6) to a random structures linking nodes arbitrarily 
(right network in Figure 6). In a regular network, the average path length PL increases 
linearly with the number of nodes n. This development leads to a high degree of 
                                            
7 In a simplified way, the clustering coefficient can be calculated for a random network as k/n and the path length 
as ln(n)/ln(k) (Watts, 1999). n denotes the number of nodes and k the number of ties. 
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clustering. At the other side of the range (random), the degree of clustering becomes 
relatively low as PL grows only logarithmically with n, but the average path length is 
relatively short. In between is the small-world network which has a short average path 
length due to some shortcuts and a relatively high degree of clustering.  
When we observe small-world network structures, the questions about the emergence 
of this peculiar structure arises. Are small-world characteristics really a natural 
property of all networks, including interfirm networks? According to Watts (1999), 
small-worlds appear coincidentally in sociological, biological and technological 
networks. They are said to emerge from arbitrary interactions among actors in a 
network. In contrast, in the case of interfirm networks it could be the strategic behavior 
of firms which leads to a small-world structure rather than arbitrary interaction (Baum, 
Shipilov and Rowley, 2003). Baum, Shipilov and Rowley (2003, p. 698) assert that 
“there is a lack of empirical research exploring the evolution of small-world structures 
over time”. In particular, the questions about the emergence and persistence are still 
underresearched. There is especially a lack of (empirical) explorative work and 
evidence about how behavior influences the emergence of a particular network 
structure. 
In networks, firms are typically only loosely connected, that is, only a small proportion 
of all possible ties are realized (Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997). Moreover, dense 
subgroups of firms (cliques) emerge (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). These properties 
explain a high degree of cliquishness. Ties between the cliques are responsible for 
considerably shortening path lengths between actors. The drivers of network evolution, 
such as triadic closure (cf. chapter 7), leads do dense cohesive substructures. The 
following question arises: Where do these cliques as well as inter-clique ties come 
from? The strive for embeddedness provides an explanation for the formation of 
cohesive subgroups, but the short average path length between the actors can only be 
realized if ties between clusters emerge. Thus, the question is whether some form of 
strategic behavior explains the establishment of such ties. One possibility for 
explaining inter-clique ties is information strategies. According to Moldoveanu, Baum 
and Rowley (2003), a cooperative information strategy can be distinguished from a 
competitive information strategy. The key difference is distribution and commonality 
of knowledge in the network. The first strategy aims at distributing and spreading 
private knowledge with the objective to improve coordination and common action 
within the clique or the network, subsequently establishing highly interconnected 
structures. This is advantageous because coordination is improved through repeated 
exchange with stable partnerships that facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge 
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(Coleman, 1988). Whereas, with a rather competitive strategy a firm seeks to moderate 
and control knowledge diffusion in the network in order to gain a high betweenness 
centrality and to increase its influence and power. One possibility to implement such a 
strategy is to occupy structural holes in the network (Burt, 1995). By following this 
strategy, firms position themselves in so far unconnected parts of a network and bridge 
between independent subgroups. This gives a firm the chance to broker and control 
knowledge between two subgroups. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The collection of network data to be analyzed is particularly challenging in the case of 
longitudinal studies and large sample sizes. Social network analysis (SNA) is a 
valuable tool to analyze network structures and to identify characteristics of actors 
(position, role etc.) and of ties. Moreover, beneficial positions and ties in one situation 
may be inappropriate in another situation. For instance, exploration may require a 
larger diversity (and less density) of actors to have greater combinatorial possibilities 
of knowledge. On the other hand, strong ties might be important to build a high level 
of trust which facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge. To analyze and assess the 
features of (innovation) networks, inspiration can be drawn from networks in other 
fields, such as biology or physics. There are obviously uniform laws governing 
network structures in many fields. More research is needed to identify potential causes 
for the emergence of such laws (see for instance Müller, Buchmann and Kudic (2013) 
for an investigation of the causes for the emergence of small-world networks).  
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 “Classic” cross-sectional network analysis, as presented in chapter 5, captures the 
development state of a network at a certain point in time, i.e. it takes a snapshot of the 
status quo. This allows for studying the structural characteristics of the network and 
the positioning and embeddedness of individual actors. There is meanwhile a large 
body of established literature which applies this type of analysis, but there are also 
shortcomings with this approach. Even though we may conclude from SNA in 
combination with a correlation analysis that a certain network related correlation 
exists, the direction of causality is often very ambiguous. Take for instance the case of 
a hypothesized beneficial position in a network and an observed higher rate of 
innovation generation. Is it always the position that drives innovation (behavioral 
dynamics), is it rather the success and potential to develop good ideas that brings firms 
in a central position (network dynamics) or do both effects play a role and even 
influence each other (co-evolution)? Such a question can hardly be answered with 
cross-sectional data but requires access to longitudinal data to give a more profound 
answer. An interesting and for economic research valuable part of the analysis is to 
detect not only change processes as such, but to identify and capture driving forces and 
patterns that are present in the observed networks. Borch and Arthur (1995) criticize 
that researchers collect too often data only for a limited time period, even though their 
ambition is to investigate the dynamic aspects of network evolution. Consequently, the 
conducted studies usually have the character of cross-sectional analyses and the 
developed models lack important dynamic aspects. The existence of complex 
interaction patterns is probably one of the reasons why the evolution of complex 
adaptive systems (CAS), such as networks, is not sufficiently studied within 
economics. Often, it simplifies the analysis by focusing on patterns in a state of 
„behavioral equilibrium”, i.e. static patterns that are simplified aggregates of firm 
behavior (Arthur, 1999).  
6.1 Networks as Complex Adaptive Systems 
Complexity science regards socio-economic systems “not as deterministic, predictable, 
and mechanistic but as process dependent, organic, and always evolving” (Arthur, 
1999, p. 109). Economic actors continuously adapt their behavior on markets, such as 
purchasing decisions, prices and expectations. Strategic action, foresight and 
adaptiveness make the development of adequate models challenging. In particular, the 
dynamic character of innovation processes requires us to take these features into 
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account and go beyond mainstream economic analysis which studies states of 
behavioral equilibrium without considering further actions or reactions over time 
(Arthur, 1999). Schumpeter associated the idea of an evolutionary development with 
the concept of an economic sociology taking into account the endogenously changing 
framework of developing institutions. While changes in capital, labor or technology 
may lead to rather simple reactions of the economy, it is the “human factors” working 
on innovations that are responsible for the complex evolution of the economy 
(Schumpeter, 1911; Shionoya, 2007). 
6.1.1 Complex Adaptive Systems 
Due to dynamics, interaction patterns and adaptive behavior of firms, innovation 
networks are assigned to the comprehensive and general class of complex adaptive 
systems (CAS) (Holland, 1995). The constituent parts of a CAS, i.e. the actors, are not 
homogenous but can be distinguished in important characteristics from one another. 
Change in the system is driven by interaction of actors. It does neither follow a simple 
linear trend nor is it fully chaotic. Potential non-linearities in CAS signify that the 
behavior of a system “is more than a simple sum of the behaviors of its parts” 
(Holland, 1995, p. 5). Arguing in this vein implies that equilibrium models or simple 
trend analysis techniques can yield misleading results. Firms do neither interact 
randomly with all other actors in their environment in a way the molecules of gases do, 
nor do they interact solely with their immediate neighbors such as magnetic spins in a 
lattice. Instead, each firm interacts with a relatively small number of other firms. 
However, the interaction is in its resulting effect not limited to actors directly involved, 
but exerts influence throughout the network (Barabasi, 2007). 
A further element of CAS is adaptive behavior of actors. Adaptation is, first of all, a 
typical reaction of organisms when they are faced with competitive pressure. However, 
the notion of adaptation – as it is generally understood – is too narrow to describe the 
actual process of selection. Adaptation refers in most cases only to “any feature that 
promotes fitness and was built by selection for its current role” (Gould and Vrba, 1982, 
p. 6). Besides, there is a second concept, namely exaptation, which plays likewise an 
important role. It describes characteristics which “evolved for other uses (or for no 
function at all) and that were later “coopeted” for their current role” (Gould and Vrba, 
1982, p. 6). Such exaptations evolve from a combination of micro and macro 
constraints and processes. Considering both concepts, adaptation and exaptation, 
enriches the analysis of economic micro actors. In fact, there are applications of 
instruments, technologies and skills that were originally developed for a different 
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purpose. For instance, the famous yellow post-it-notes were developed by the 
company 3M out of a mistake when they were looking for a new super-strong 
adhesive. What they discovered was however an adhesive which is weak from the 
beginning and does not get harder or softer over time (Brand, 1998). 
There are more characteristics and mechanisms which are on a very general level 
common to all complex systems that are built from (adaptive) interacting parts 
(Holland, 1995):  
 First and most straightforward, aggregation of system elements is based on 
categorization putting elements which share the same category in the same basket. 
This implies that innovation networks are based on the interaction of firms 
belonging to a network structure. 
 Second, many concepts in economics assume linearity in causes and effects and 
consequently linearity in the models. Linearity means that the value of a function is 
a weighted sum of the values of the independent factors in the model. However, 
complex systems do not necessarily behave according to this strict assumption of 
linearity, instead they allow for nonlinear patterns that make predictions a lot more 
ambiguous (cf. chapter 6.2).  
 Third, CAS change over time and have a flow character. They consist of three 
principle elements, namely nodes (firms), ties (channels of interaction) and 
resources (knowledge) that are transferred. While the network changes, new nodes 
and ties can come into existence but also disappear if firms are not able to adapt. 
“Neither the flow nor the network are fixed in time. They are patterns that reflect 
changing adaptations as time elapses and experience accumulates” (Holland, 1995, 
p. 23).  
 Fourth, diversity is a further property of CAS. Each firm finds its position in a 
network as a consequence of its interactions. If one actor is removed from the 
system it undergoes a process of re-configuration eventually replacing most of the 
interaction pattern of the removed actor. This resembles convergence processes in 
biology. Also, a change in focus of one actor provides new opportunities for other 
actors to change their interaction patterns in turn.  
Two important mechanisms are immanent to CAS and can be found in (models) of 
innovation networks (Holland, 1995): 
 A first one is tagging which enables firms to purposely select an interaction 
partner. Without tagging, partner selection would happen in a purely arbitrary 
manner. Thus, it is a prerequisite for any kind of strategic action and for the 
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formation of persistent subgroups to being able to distinguish actors from each 
other. 
 Second, actors process knowledge from outside based on an internal model which 
allows them to make expectations regarding the future. This modeling element, 
which has a tacit character, determines a current action of a firm by envisaging a 
target state of the future. The assumption that actors seek to attain a desired state of 
a system is – as we will see in chapter 9.5.1 – operationalized in the applied model 
by an objective function which firms try to maximize by a myopic stochastic 
optimization rule. The internal model is influenced by the perceived environment 
which changes over time. “Perceived” implies that firms reduce the complexity of 
the reality into more abstract blocks that reflect the focus of their perceptional 
capabilities. 
6.1.2 Modeling Tie Relatedness 
A major challenge for modeling complex network structures is endogeneity which 
leads to related ties and violates the assumption of independent events of many 
statistical analysis techniques. In networks, we observe endogenously developing 
dependencies like clustering or triadic closure (formation of substructures which 
consist of three nodes). In view of these characteristics, regression analysis techniques 
which require statistical independence of tie formation cannot be applied. An 
appropriate alternative are stochastic network models following the approach of 
explicitly modeling dependency (Snijders, 1996). Robins et al. (2007) provide a list of 
arguments why we preferably apply stochastic methods for the analysis of network 
dynamics:  
 A “breeze” of randomness, even just a small one, into a generally regular network 
formation process can make it very difficult to predict the outcome (Watts, 1999). 
The advantage of a stochastic model is related to its ability to take both features 
into account, the regular as well as the random one. 
 A statistical significance test can tell us which (social) processes most probably 
drive the evolution of a network. The formation of certain substructures can be 
identified and shows that it is not just a random evolution. 
 The formation of a certain kind of substructure can be caused by a social process 
but also be driven by the properties of the agents. If we take for example the 
tendency of clustering of actors in a network, it could either be a structural effect, 
such as structural balance, or rather an effect on the node level, such as homophily, 
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leading to the very same result. If we include both effects in a model we can 
decide which one of them is more important in the network we observe. 
 A central question in social network research is: How do the dynamic processes on 
a local level lead to the formation of substructures, and in turn, how do these 
subunits combine to build the overall network structure. In most cases this 
investigation cannot be done without a proper model since the interaction of 
subunits is complex and the outcome is not evident. The simulation approach of a 
stochastic model can help to understand the micro-macro link. 
While lots of effort was spent during the last years to develop more sophisticated and 
fine grained techniques of (cross-sectional) social network analysis, some researches 
focused on network change aspects and developed methods for modeling network 
evolution processes based on empirical data. Prominent examples are the “Exponential 
Random Graph Model” (ERGM) (Robins et al., 2007) and the “stochastic actor-based 
model for network dynamics” (Snijders, 1996; Snijders, 2001; Snijders, 2005). 
ERGMs use as their core element a “probability mass function” (PMF) which specifies 
the probability that a random graph is drawn from the same distribution as an observed 
graph. In doing that, we are able to explore the foundations of a certain network 
structure. By feeding the model with observed data we can estimate model parameters 
and test the model goodness of fit. However, different processes can lead to similar 
structures and ERGMs cannot account for this. For example, a tendency for clustering 
is frequently observed in social networks and different micro processes can lead to the 
same pattern: (i) persons who are socially highly active create clusters; (ii) homophily 
tendencies leading to assortative mixing may result in clustered networks; (iii) triadic 
triangles create clusters. It is highly desirable that we are able to fit these effects 
simultaneously and disentangle underlying mechanisms which becomes possible with 
the “stochastic actor-based model for network dynamics”. 
6.2 Agent-Based Modeling 
Capturing real-world dynamics of innovation networks requires a toolkit which allows 
for the explicit consideration of the rich dynamics of firm interaction and the 
heterogeneity of actors. Agent-based (simulation) models (also referred to as actor-
based models) focus on micro mechanisms in a longitudinal analysis and fulfill these 
requirements as well as the ones of modeling CAS delineated in chapter 6.1.1. Agent-
based modeling (ABM) focuses on the behavior of individual actors and thus on the 
lowest (meaningful) level of aggregation. “ABMs deal with the study of 
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socioeconomic systems that can be properly conceptualized by means of a set of 
‘micro-macro’ relationships” (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005, p. 468). This focus enables us 
to model in a more realistic manner aggregate phenomena such as network formation 
and evolution or the diffusion of innovation that happen within a context which is 
characterized by interaction and mutual influence of actors. By focusing on the 
modeling of network actors, we assume that network evolution is based on individual 
decisions (which can be influenced by other actors).  
A first series of economic simulation models was designed to model complex system 
interaction but was not linked satisfactorily to empirical phenomena. A second series, 
developed since the end of the 1990s, was better able to replicate empirical findings 
and stylized facts. Technically, simulation is “a set of ’laws’ that relate the dynamics of 
the process to the progress of the calculation” (Holland, 1995, p. 145). A general 
guideline for (simulation) models is to keep modeling mechanisms rather simple in 
order to avoid an obviously pre-deterministic behavior of the model, also called 
unwrapping. Unwrapping takes place if the final result of a simulation model is built 
into the program code in a way that a certain result or path is quasi inevitable to 
emerge. In this case, the final result becomes simply stepwise revealed during the 
simulation run and it is not emerging from the interplay of micro mechanisms. 
Consequently, it cannot provide new insights and limits the scientific value of such a 
model considerably (Holland, 1995). A further challenge of modeling can be described 
as follows: On the one hand, a model should be general enough to reproduce a broad 
variety of different phenomena. On the other hand, models should be able to describe 
and explain very specific phenomena in all their richness (narrative models). This 
trade-off can – if not fully solved – at least be mitigated by the development and 
application of agent-based models (ABM) (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005). On the micro 
level, ABMs are based on heterogeneous actors which interact with each other. 
Specific interaction patterns emerge over time. ABM aims at the description and 
analysis of such complexities based on the characteristics and behavior of micro 
actors. For instance, Müller, Buchmann and Kudic (2013) study the network structures 
which emerge if a certain partner selection strategy is applied as well as the 
relationship between network diversity and innovation performance. We analyze the 
structural consequences of homophily, reputation and cohesion mechanisms in a 
scenario of information scarcity. In this context, agent-based modeling addresses the 
emergence of macro structures from simple micro strategies, such as cooperation 
routines. Moreover, we illustrate (i) that a transitive closure mechanism combined with 
a tendency for preferential attachment produces networks that show both, small world 
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characteristics as well as a power-law degree distribution; (ii) diversity in the selection 
of cooperation partners is important for the innovative performance. 
Furthermore, complex network phenomena such as path dependencies, dynamic 
returns, emergence of structures as well as mutual knowledge generation and learning 
can be analyzed. ABMs of innovation networks are based on actors characterized by 
(i) imperfect knowledge and the aim to improve the knowledge-base, and (ii) on actors 
that are confronted with uncertainty. Knowledge imperfections and uncertainties are 
tackled with the help of cooperation partners. Firms can improve their innovation 
performance by increasing the size and quality of their knowledge-base through 
learning from others. In comparison to approaches of micro aggregation 
(microfoundational macro models), ABM shows two decisive advantages: First, ABMs 
are able to showcase processes of emerging collective phenomena. Interaction of 
agents can be analyzed in depth, including the causes and effects of individual 
behavior of heterogeneous agents and the magnitude of their contribution to collective 
phenomena. Also, the timely process when a system starts to destabilize or decay can 
be observed in a microscopic manner. Second, ABM not only allows to conduct in-
depth analysis of complex systems, but by understanding the systemic forces it 
becomes possible to setup computational laboratories which provide an idea of how 
the systems could evolve considering a varying institutional framework or incentive 
structures established by policy makers (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005).  
The general approach of ABM is about designing a model bottom-up in an inductive 
manner, starting with heterogeneous actors and the description of their behavior and 
endowments. A key challenge is to strike a balance between a high level of descriptive 
accuracy and observable micro processes. In other words, rendering a model more 
realistic by introducing sophisticated behavior rules and interaction patterns raises the 
level of complexity which goes at the expense of understanding causal relationships 
and implications of parameter variation. Researchers who apply ABM need to be 
aware of this trade-off and have to decide which approach they find more fruitful for 
the problem to be analyzed (Pyka and Fagiolo, 2005). Additionally, mechanisms which 
cannot be captured with empirical data can be explored.  Computational laboratories 
enable us to investigate complex systems more accurately than it would be possible 
with econometric techniques alone. In particular, they can demonstrate that a (micro) 
mechanism is sufficient to generate an observed phenomenon and deliver hints for 
situations when a system starts to develop into an unexpected direction (Holland, 
1995). Saviotti (2009) points out that the important explananda in economic systems 
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are (i) the emergence of order in an evolutionary process and (ii) possible 
discontinuous transitions a system may undergo. 
During an evolutionary process, a system may reach a point from which it can further 
develop into many different directions. This point is called bifurcation point (Poincaré, 
1885). An industry can have a rather stable development path for a long time and 
change only gradually up to a point when change in technology (e.g. a shift from the 
internal combustion engine to the electric automotive engine) may change the industry 
structure more radically. Some firms may be prepared or even drive the change while 
others are not able to adapt. The result is an abrupt change rather than a gradual 
transition and sudden increase in the number of possible system states (development 
paths). For the case of innovation networks, this means that the structure of the 
network and the relevance of certain attachment mechanisms may change substantially 
over time. For instance, the advent of a new technology may require a rapid shift 
towards more explorative R&D and consequently towards partners which have more 
dissimilar knowledge-bases. Accordingly, longitudinal models which seek to 
investigate the drivers of network dynamics and/or the drivers of behavioral changes 
should control for time heterogeneity in the estimated parameters. From a period of 
relative “stasis” an industry may undergo at a certain point a rapid change process, also 
described as punctuated equilibrium (see also chapter 3.3.4). Relatively small events 
can, via feedback loops, become that powerful that they determine the further system 
development path (e.g. the industry structure) in the future up to the next bifurcation 
point. Thus, even if we know all the determinants which influence the development of 
a system, for a system that can be described by a non-linear equation, small changes in 
initial conditions may lead to very different and hardly predictable outcomes over 
time. These considerations are reflected, for instance, by the logistic map (Figure 7) 
which shows the non-linear characteristic of a system that is described by a relatively 
simple equation. As an example, a simple model which is used to describe population 
growth is written as: 
                 ( 12 ) 
   can take values between 0 and 1 and informs about the ratio of the existing 
population size to the maximum possible size in year n. r designates a combined rate 
of starvation and reproduction (e.g. firm leaving and entering an industry) thereby 
taking values larger than 0, and x0 represents the initial ratio of population to the 
maximum population size in year 0 (Verhulst, 1845; Verhulst, 1847; Ricker, 1954; 
Briggs and Peat, 1990). 
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Figure 7: Logistic map (Source: own illustration, applied R-code adapted from: http://www.r-
bloggers.com/logistic-map-feigenbaum-diagram, see C. Appendix). 
 
The abscissa in Figure 7 shows the values of the parameter r. The ordinate shows the 
possible long-term values (after 1000 periods) of x (accumulation points of the 
sequence; x0 = 0.1). Small values of r result in single stable fix point (convergence 
points). For r = 3 the first bifurcation point is reached and the graph is split up into two 
alternating streams of development. The two streams split into four streams once the 
next bifurcation point is reached. The tendency of a doubling at each bifurcation point 
and rather well defined lines continues (with decreasing parameter intervals) up to a 
value for r of about 3.57 when the system starts to fall into chaos. Once the chaotic 
behavior has set on, a typical characteristic becomes revealed, namely very small 
changes in r result in dramatically different results. Remarkably, in the sea of chaos we 
can find small islands of stability for instance at about r = 3.83 with an alternation 
between three values only. Thus, such a system is very sensitive for alternations in 
parameter values. This holds for most values between 3.57 and 4. Consequently, it 
becomes impossible to make predictions once r grows beyond 3.57, i.e. predictions 
become in an exponential way progressively worse. For values of r < 3.57 there is an 
infinite number of fixed points with different periodicities and an infinite number of 
periodic cycles (Li and Yorke, 1975). Such a behavior entails problems with regard to 
models of socio-economic systems. Small errors in our knowledge of initial parameter 
values can lead to wrong predictions due to sequences of iterates that diverge 
exponentially. While exact predictions are impossible in non-linear systems, we can 
still calculate probabilities for a certain state if there is a phase of stability (attractor). 
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A probability measure will give the proportion of times in which the system is moving 
around within the region of the attractor. Non-linearity relates to dynamical trajectories 
which are indistinguishable from a stochastic process. This knowledge can be used to 
make decisions based on system states. In other words, the fact that we cannot predict 
an exact state does not mean that there is total randomness (May, 1976).  
The extent to which a socio-economic system tends towards non-linear behavior or 
rather behaves in an exactly predictable way depends, among others, on the adaptive 
behavior of the actors. With their reactions they can weaken or amplify the tendency 
towards extreme outcomes. For instance, they can be more or less well capable of 
adapting to new (even endogenously created) technological paradigms depending on 
the absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), the network embeddedness, etc. 
Compared to the modeling of systems in natural science, adaptiveness can make 
outcomes in socio-economic systems more stable and predictable or even more chaotic 
and unpredictable. 
6.3 Conclusions 
In view of the fact that “a complete theory of complexity does not yet exist” (Barabasi, 
2007, p. 33), agent-based models can improve our understanding of complex systems 
such as evolving networks. Moreover, ABM can be used to explore innovation policy 
and potential results of policy intervention. The general assumptions which are made 
for complex adaptive systems (CAS) can be transferred to networks and their 
constituent parts. Compared to cross-sectional analysis, longitudinal studies enable us 
to identify the drivers of network evolution and to study the mechanisms of change on 
the micro level based on the interactions of agents. When model parameters are 
estimated over longer periods of time, a check for time heterogeneity should be 
conducted to control for discontinuous shifts in development patterns of an industry 
which may change the rules of the game, such as attachment mechanisms in networks. 
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7. Determinants of Network Evolution 
Evolutionary thinking in a network context emerged only recently on the research 
agenda. For instance, Glückler (2007) addresses the question how tie selection 
constitutes an evolutionary process in networks. More precisely, he argues that 
network tie selection processes cause retention and variation within network 
structures. Hite (2008) presents an evolutionary multi-dimensional model of network 
change that explicitly considers micro level network change processes. Witt (2006) 
argues that selection processes are, in line with Neo-Schumpeterian approaches, 
constitutive for evolutionary economics. Studies on the evolution of network structures 
have typically focused on external factors (e.g. competitive pressure) as drivers for 
change processes. The focus on external determinants is, however, not sufficient to 
understand which partners are actually selected, according to which mechanisms and 
preferences. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999, p. 1440) conclude: “While exogenous factors 
may suffice to determine whether an organization should enter alliances, they may not 
provide enough cues to decide with whom to build those ties”. For instance, firms with 
rather poor technological competencies are not considered to be attractive to connect 
with (Ahuja, 2000b). Partners in the automotive industry are often selected by their 
level of technical knowledge (Dilk et al., 2008). 
A core research question deals thus with the determinants for the emergence and 
dissolution of a tie between actors. From a firm’s perspective the question addresses 
the preference structures that determine the decision to cooperate and to select a 
cooperation partner. There are essentially three types of determinants (Figure 8): (i) 
firm characteristics (covariates), (ii) differences between firm characteristics (covariate 
(dis-)similarities) and (iii) preferences in network structure (endogenous factors). In 
other words, it is neither the characteristics of the firms alone, nor the relationship 
structure in isolation which are important for analyzing the evolution of networks, but 
it is a combination of the three mentioned elements which has to be taken into 
consideration (Garcia-Pont and Nohria, 2002). According to the concept of 
cooperation partner similarity (distance / proximity) (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and 
Cook, 2001), similar nodes have a higher probability to form a tie between each other 
compared to more dissimilar network actors. Similarity may refer to a variety of 
dimensions. Firms may be similar with regard to technological, organizational or 
financial characteristics, or even comparable in terms of reputation and status. For 
instance, Gulati (1995b) as well as Rothaermel and Boeker (2008) demonstrate that 
status similarity increases the rate of tie formations in interorganizational networks. 
Once a network has left the infant phase, it ripens and becomes structurally more and 
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more differentiated; hence, it incorporates information about all other network actors 
(Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). The network becomes not only a repository of knowledge 
but also of firm reliability and capability.  
Firms collaborate for a variety of reasons among which learning and coping with 
uncertainty are important ones (cf. chapter 4). However, collaboration itself is a source 
of uncertainty with regard to the selection of the most appropriate partner. The 
selection process generates search costs and even if the “ideal” partner is found, the 
risk of opportunistic behavior cannot be fully eliminated (Gulati, 1995a). The central 
goal is to find a collaboration partner which complements a firm’s own knowledge-
base and at the same time is reliable and does not follow a hidden agenda (Van de Ven, 
1976). This precondition is of special importance for the case of longer lasting 
collaboration endeavors such as collaborative R&D projects. Gulati and Gargiulo 
(1999) show that networks incorporate information about the complementarity or the 
reliability of a potential partner and are thus a source of relevant facts to make a 
partner choice. Firms may use this information, for instance, to minimize the risk of 
opportunistic behavior by considering the reputation of a potential partner. Reputation 
works as a social signal for firms in search of a cooperation partner and helps to select 
a potentially valuable partner (Dollinger, Golden and Saxton, 1997). 
Derived from previous research in different fields, such as innovation economics, 
management science, economic geography and sociology, I introduce in the following 
subchapters effects which hypothetically play a strong role for the selection of 
cooperation partners in the empirically analyzed innovation network. I am particularly 
interested in knowledge related effects, following the knowledge-based approach 
described in chapter 4.2.3. These effects will, in a further step, be formulated as 
independent variables determining the evolution of the analyzed innovation network of 
German automotive firms. Figure 8 shows a conceptualization of the applied 
evolutionary network model. 
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Figure 8: Conceptual model of network evolution (Source: own illustration). 
7.1 Preferential Attachment 
The simplest attachment model of a network is a random graph (Erdős and Rényi, 
1960) which places (undirected) ties randomly between a certain number of n nodes. 
Altogether, there are n(n-1)/2 possible ties in an undirected network with a probability 
P (Newman, 2003). In contrast to the random attachment mechanism, Price (1976) 
finds that academic research papers which are relatively often cited, have higher 
probabilities to be citied again compared to less frequently cited papers. This “rich get 
richer” or preferential attachment mechanism is one of the essential non-random tie 
formation mechanisms. According to this principle, actors having many ties   have a 
higher probability      to establish even more ties in the future compared to actors 
having fewer ties only. In other words, the probability that a new actor attaches to an 
incumbent actor in the network is proportional to his number of established links in the 
network, i.e. newcomers preferably connect to established actors that are already well 
connected. As a consequence, the distribution of the degree centrality in a network (the 
frequency of nodes with degree k) varies as a function of 
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distribution of degrees shows a long tail to the right meaning that there are many nodes 
with high degree levels (compared to a normal distribution). Whereas, in random 
networks (Erdős and Rényi, 1960) with large numbers of nodes, the degrees resemble 
a Poisson distribution (Barabasi, 2007).  
Preferential attachment is regarded as an explanation for the development of scale free 
networks (Barabasi and Albert, 1999; Barabasi and Albert, 2002). However, Powell et 
al. (2005, p. 1137) criticize this “elegantly simple but over generalized” explanation 
for the phenomenon of scale-freeness. Other attachment processes are equally able to 
produce scale free degree distributions or even small world networks which represent 
network properties that can frequently be observed in real world networks (Müller, 
Buchmann and Kudic, 2013). Furthermore, Balland, De Vaan and Boschma (2012) 
find that the preferential attachment mechanism is strongly correlated with other 
structural attachment mechanisms and therefore decreases the goodness-of-fit level 
between simulated values and observed values in the stochastic actor based model for 
network evolution (Snijders, 1996). Consequently, I do not take the preferential 
attachment mechanism into account. 
Economists and sociologists identified more mechanisms which are crucial for the 
development process of social and economic networks. In this regard, three general 
effects are relevant drivers of tie changes: First, the structural position of actors in a 
network plays a role, e.g. friends of friends become friends. Second, the characteristics 
of actors, e.g. the absorptive capacity (actor covariates), are determinants for the 
decision to collaborate. Third, characteristics of pairs of actors (dyadic covariates), e.g. 
their geographical distance, matter. The assumptions about potential drivers can be 
formulated as hypotheses. While classical social network analysis (SNA) is a type of 
descriptive network statistics, for hypothesis tests, an inferential-statistical approach 
has to be applied. This requires knowledge about distributions of test statistics for 
calculating p-values of hypotheses tests. The challenge is to construct distributions for 
entire networks (see also the permutation approach in chapter 9.3).  
7.2 Absorptive Capacity 
A first knowledge related independent variable to be considered is the absorptive 
capacity. In line with the knowledge-based view of the firm, firms differ in their ability 
to make use of external knowledge. This is substantiated by the concept of the 
absorptive capacity of a firm which reflects a firm's ability “to recognize the value of 
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new, external knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990, p. 128). If a firm has already accumulated knowledge in the same or 
related fields, it is easier to recognize, evaluate, assimilate and apply external 
knowledge. Studies on the processes of learning suggest that storing new knowledge in 
memories is self-reinforcing, i.e. the more there is already stored the easier new 
knowledge can be acquired (Bower and Hilgard, 1981) and contextual knowledge is 
essential to make full use of new knowledge (Lindsay and Norman, 1977). In a 
nutshell: “Learning is cumulative, and learning performance is greatest when the 
object of learning is related to what is already known” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, 
p.131). Cumulativeness refers to knowledge creation in the present and future being a 
function of the knowledge with has been created in the past. Dean et al. (2012) argue 
that the success of human culture is predominantly related to the cumulative character 
of knowledge and technology over time. To identify the causes of cumulative culture 
they study social and cognitive capabilities of children, capuchin monkeys and 
chimpanzees. Their findings suggest that cumulative culture is unique to the human 
species. In fact, teaching, communication, observational learning and prosociality are 
found to be relevant elements of human culture only. Building up a highly effective 
absorptive capacity is not effortless but requires regular and intense examination and 
application of the existing knowledge-base to build associations between new and old 
knowledge elements (Lindsay and Norman, 1977). 
Thus, firms have advantages in integrating and applying external knowledge when 
they can draw on own experience in research (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Moreover, 
we can distinguish between the prerequisites required by the receiver to make use of 
and integrate external knowledge, and the relevance of the characteristics of the 
external knowledge which will be discussed in the next chapter. The avenue of 
knowledge production can be directed by technological paradigms or by technological 
trajectories which reduce the degrees of freedom (Dosi and Nelson, 2010). Learning 
processes themselves may be improved by the development of learning skills which is 
referred to as learning to learn (Estes, 1970).  
In networks, collaboration partners are faced with the risk of being “misunderstood” 
when they exchange knowledge due to a lack of absorptive capacity. In contrast to this, 
neoclassic economists stress a different risk, namely the risk of knowledge spillovers 
(at zero costs) (Griliches, 1992). Thus, a core proposition of the concept of absorptive 
capacity is that actors need strong internal capabilities in order to learn from external 
sources. With regard to the innovative performance of a firm, Tsai (2001) finds that the 
absorptive capacity together with the network position has a significant effect, and 
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Giuliani and Bell (2005) detect great variety and thus heterogeneity in firm absorptive 
capacities. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) raise the question whether the absorptive capacity can be 
introduced to an organization from external sources via acquisitions, consultancy 
services or hired employees, or if it must be truly developed internally. They suggest 
that at least some elements of the absorptive capacity are very firm-specific which 
limits the possibilities of acquiring absorptive capacity from external sources. The 
successful integration of non-trivial knowledge presupposes, besides time, that a firm’s 
engineers, technicians etc. are not only experts in their field but are also aware of the 
firm’s internal organization, its routines, its external relations and operational 
procedures (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The very nature of knowledge may also 
require a firm to conduct basic research as it gives orientation to choose where and 
how to conduct more applied research downstream to the market once the most 
essential functioning of a technology or a natural phenomenon is understood. Basic 
research serves as a compass for applied research and to assess its possible 
consequences (Rosenberg, 1990). Progress in one technology may open new 
possibilities in another technology by cross-fertilization (Mokyr, 1990) which means 
that a firm needs a broad knowledge-base to master different technology fields 
(Cantner and Pyka, 1998). 
7.2.1 The Value of Own Skills 
Systematic incorporation of external knowledge is a prerequisite to survive in 
innovation competition. It allows firms to operate at the cutting edge of technology. 
However, the feature of permeable firm boundaries and innovation network 
embeddedness for internalizing external knowledge does not mean that internally 
created knowledge and own capabilities become obsolete. The opposite is actually 
true: Internal skills are a conditio sine qua non to detect, evaluate and integrate 
external knowledge. Effective exchange of knowledge requires a high level of 
absorptive capacity. It enables firms to understand what is going on outside their own 
organization. Firms which conduct own R&D are consequently more likely to absorb 
valuable external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989).
 
The incentive to invest in 
R&D and thereby to increase the absorptive capacity is dependent on the quantity of 
the knowledge that can potentially be absorbed and on the difficulty to absorb it. For 
the kind of knowledge which is more difficult to internalize, more prior knowledge 
needs to be accumulated which is more costly and requires higher prior investments in 
R&D. Firms that are operating in environments in which learning is relatively difficult, 
86  7. Determinants of Network Evolution 
the costs for additional R&D are accordingly higher but have to be borne, otherwise 
firms will fall back in competition. Whereas, firms operating in fields where learning 
is relatively straightforward, the effect of R&D on the absorptive capacity is smaller 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
A network of collaboration is the instrument to access and to test R&D results in the 
community. For instance, Rosenberg (1990) studies basic research in the USA and 
finds that the majority of it is conducted within the university community. Firms which 
want to access and exploit this knowledge need highly developed capabilities and 
therefore have to conduct at least some own basic research in the respective field in 
order to absorb knowledge from universities. Giuliani and Bell (2005) demonstrate 
that knowledge in networks is not evenly distributed but often concentrated within a 
group of core firms that have significant over-average absorptive capacities. The extent 
to which a firm is able to learn new knowledge and apply it in a meaningful way is a 
function of the scale and scope of its previously acquired knowledge stock. If a firm 
has already accumulated knowledge in the same or related field, it is relatively 
unproblematic to understand related new knowledge (Frenken, Van Oort and Verburg, 
2007; Boschma and Iammarino, 2009).  
7.2.2 From Individual to Organizational Absorptive Capacity 
The herein discussed firm models abstract from individuals and consider the 
organizational level. “An organization's absorptive capacity will depend on the 
absorptive capacities of its individual members” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p. 131). 
It would be misleading to simply sum up the absorptive capacities of an organization’s 
employees in order to determine the organization’s absorptive capacity. Instead, the 
absorptive capacity of an organization is characterized by a variety of building blocks. 
Besides getting access to new sources of knowledge, an organization also needs to be 
able to meaningful use this knowledge. Therefore it needs the capability to internally 
process the knowledge which is at the moment of transfer extracted from the original 
context (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
Knowledge can effectively diffuse and be processed if there is some common 
understanding for it within an organization. On the other side, diversity between 
individuals instead of too much common understanding is beneficial as it forges the 
emergence of innovative solutions (Molina-Morales and Martínez-Fernández, 2009). 
Diversity enables the integration of different knowledge fields and the formation of 
new associations (Cantner and Pyka, 1998). Consequently, the absorptive capacity of a 
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firm is not anchored in individual employees but “depends on the links across a mosaic 
of individual capabilities” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p. 133). A firm which is highly 
specialized in one particular technology field has a very sophisticated knowledge in 
this field and is probably able to learn easily from related fields. However, the overall 
absorptive capacity of such a firm may still be rather limited since, due to the 
specialization, the number of related fields is rather small. Thus, it is advisable to 
develop a dispersed knowledge profile in order to cope with the uncertainty of 
selecting the right source of valuable knowledge. Diversity also works as a learning 
accelerator as it allows for bridging between knowledge fields (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990).   
In line with Giuliani (2005), the absorptive capacity of a network of firms can be 
defined as the capacity of a network to absorb, diffuse and creatively exploit extra-
network knowledge. Without a continuous integration of external knowledge, 
innovation networks might mutate to less innovative cliques as the knowledge of 
network members becomes increasingly homogenous after a sequence of mutual 
knowledge exchanges (cf. chapter 2.1). For this reason, the ability to refresh the 
innovation network’s internal knowledge highly matters. The network absorptive 
capacity is a function of the member’s capacity but not a simple aggregation as the 
links functioning as conduits of knowledge acquisition and diffusion are central 
components of the network capacity. 
Previous research indicates that firms with higher absorptive capacities are better 
connected to sources of knowledge located outside the network. This can be explained 
with the size of a firm’s individual knowledge-base that determines the possibilities to 
create links with external actors. Also, firms with a high level of absorptive capacity 
are cognitively closer to external knowledge and play the role of a knowledge 
gatekeeper which supports (or hinders) the diffusion of external knowledge inside the 
network. In other words, high absorptive capacities indicate that a firm’s knowledge-
base allows for more interfaces with the knowledge-bases outside the network which 
spurs knowledge transfer into the network (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). By studying 
roles of network actors, Giuliani and Bell (2005) find that firms which have relatively 
higher absorptive capacities are more eager to build ties to sources of knowledge 
external to the network which is related to the observation that these firms are 
cognitively closer to external firms. Closeness facilitates the absorption of external 
knowledge. As a consequence, absorptive capacity can be regarded as a moderator 
which determines how much external knowledge can be transferred via the 
gatekeepers to the internal knowledge system. 
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7.2.3 Interaction between Network Position and Absorptive Capacity  
The ability to internalize and apply external knowledge also influences the effect of the 
network position on the innovation performance. While a central position provides 
control and access to many sources of knowledge, the potential advantage can only be 
realized if the firm actually absorbs accessible knowledge. Firms with relatively low 
levels of absorptive capacity may still be able to spot interesting knowledge but they 
are unable to transfer it and internalize it. This is what Hansen (1999) calls a “search-
transfer problem”. Moreover, central firms have the advantage of being able to access 
a much broader variety of sources of knowledge compared to less connected firms. 
This advantage can however only be exploited if the central firm has developed the 
absorptive capacity that enables it to make use of the entire variety of knowledge. 
Consequently, a firm needs to invest in parallel into its absorptive capacity when it 
increases the number of ties in a network to make effective use of new ties. This 
process is not only time consuming but also costly which – in tandem with network 
administrative costs – sometimes shrinks the potential benefits of a large number of 
ties considerably (Tsai, 2001). Accordingly, I control in the applied network evolution 
model for the degree (density) which reflects the costs for additional ties. 
7.2.4 Path Dependency and Absorptive Capacity 
The absorptive capacity of a firm is to a large extent determined by the amount of 
previously acquired knowledge. The role of previous knowledge is indeed twofold and 
has to be analyzed over time: First, the level of a firm’s absorptive capacity in t is a 
determinant for the level it can reach in t+1. Second, as technology-based firms 
operate in highly uncertain environments, a broad knowledge-base helps to evaluate 
the significance of small changes in technology development. This is helpful to 
recognize at an early stage potential trajectories a technology may follow and to assess 
its potential for commercialization. The two effects imply in tandem that the 
development of the absorptive capacity is path dependent and influenced by historical 
states. A lack of investment into the right technology at an early stage can become a 
serious problem since there is a risk of missing the train and of never catching up 
again. The firm which is lacking behind at an early stage gets locked out of recent 
developments (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest that the aspiration level of a firm in a certain 
technology field is dependent on the absorptive capacity rather than on the past 
performance. The more absorptive capacity it has developed, the more opportunities 
will be revealed to the firm and the more actively it will search for new technological 
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and business opportunities. The interconnection between a firm’s aspiration level and 
its absorptive capacity can result in a self reinforcing-cycle which keeps some firms 
persistently in a leading position while others are deemed to remain technologically-
wise left behind. 
7.3 Technological Distance 
Lane and Lubatkin (1998) identify three distinct methods of knowledge acquisition, 
namely passive, active and interactive. The first form of learning, which is passive 
learning, takes place when people learn from written or oral contexts such as books, 
journals, seminars or consultants. Active learning, the second option, encompasses for 
example benchmarking and competitor intelligence which provides insights into a 
third firm’s capability portfolio. However, only what can be observed or what is 
organizational intelligence can be acquired. Both described forms of learning can add 
only relatively unspecific and broadly diffused knowledge to a firm’s knowledge-base. 
Such knowledge is known to a large audience and is therefore not scarce or costly to 
imitate and thus cannot be regarded as unique knowledge providing an advantage in 
competition (Spender, 1996). Interactive learning, which constitutes the third way of 
learning, enables a firm to acquire knowledge which has the potential to really make a 
difference. For this, the learning firm may be required to be located in short 
geographic and especially in short technological distance to a teaching firm in order to 
grasp the tacit elements of production or managerial processes. The transfer of this 
“how and why knowledge” requires a high level of trust between actors. It is context 
specific and hard to imitate, thereby adding real value which can in the best case 
eventually be transformed into profits (Spender, 1996). The required level of proximity 
(in various dimensions) can be realized by the formation of alliances of interacting 
organizations but not from simple observations.  
Consequently, the capabilities to absorb and make use of external knowledge not only 
depend on prior R&D investments but also on the following points (Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998): 
 The similarity of the knowledge to be learned 
 The similarity of the knowledge processing systems 
 The similarity between firms’ organizational structures and practices 
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That is, the ability of two firms to learn from each other is determined by dyadic firm 
characteristics. These aspects are reflected in the technological distance between two 
actors which is the second knowledge-related effect to be tested. As I focus on 
innovation networks, the similarity of the technological knowledge-bases is of outmost 
importance. The concept of technological distance refers to shared technological 
experiences and knowledge-bases (Knoben and Oerlemans, 2006). This understanding 
is somewhat similar to the concept of cognitive proximity (distance) as it is described 
for instance in Boschma (2005), even though cognitive proximity is more 
comprehensive.  
The more the internal knowledge-base is related with external knowledge, the easier 
external knowledge can be captured. Consequently, a firm can learn more easily from 
other firms which belong to the same industry (Henderson and Cockburn, 1996) or 
which operate with similar technologies (Jaffe, 1986). For instance, in a descriptive 
manner, Yang, Phelps and Steensma (2010) refer to relatedness by conceptualizing a 
spillover knowledge-pool which consists of knowledge elements of the originating 
firm recombined with elements of the recipient firm and derivatives from them. To 
make meaningful use of the knowledge of other firms, external knowledge needs to be 
combined with the internal knowledge. Since knowledge-bases are heterogeneous, also 
the way in which firms can exploit external knowledge differs from firm to firm and is 
thus a distinguishing firm characteristic (Sorenson, Rivkin and Fleming, 2006). 
Thereof we can draw two conclusions: First, it is relatively easy to learn new things in 
fields in which we developed already some expertise, while it is relatively difficult in 
fields which are completely new to us. Second, the characteristic of a knowledge-base 
changes mostly incrementally due to the fact that learning takes preferably place in 
fields that are related and somewhat similar to familiar fields. It is not only the amount 
of previously acquired knowledge which determines the absorptive capacity but also 
the diversity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Cantner and Pyka, 1998). 
Lane and Lubatkin (1998) confirm for a sample of pharmaceutical-biotechnology 
R&D alliances that the similarity of the partners’ knowledge-bases is positively 
correlated with interorganizational learning. In cases where knowledge is 
predominantly tacit, knowledge-base similarity in combination with strong ties is a 
necessary prerequisite for knowledge transfer. Knowledge that is transferred from one 
actor to another is always subject to the interpretation of the receiver, i.e. what is sent 
is never fully identical to what is received, which gives rise to misperception and 
misunderstanding. Consequently, with growing degrees of tacitness knowledge 
transfer becomes increasingly difficult. Learning necessitates a certain degree of 
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similar problem perception (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Colombo, 2003). This idea 
transferred to the dyadic level suggests that cooperating firms must, for effective 
learning, have similar knowledge-bases which reflect a common understanding of 
technological problems. When the knowledge-bases are very dissimilar, firms are 
probably working on different technological problems and are following a different 
technological trajectory which means there is not much they can learn from their 
partner (Giuliani, 2010). Similarity in knowledge-bases facilitates communication, 
comprehensibility and thus the efficient exchange of knowledge. It supports learning 
and fosters the enlargement of a firm’s own knowledge-base.  
Note, however, that firms need to strike a balance between technological proximity 
and distance in order to guarantee a sufficient degree of novelty of the exchanged 
knowledge. Larger distance increases the probability for gaining access to substantially 
new knowledge with a potentially higher impact on innovation (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990) as invention and innovation are understood as new combinations of knowledge 
which requires more dissimilar knowledge-bases. 
7.4 Knowledge-Base Modularity 
As a third and – to the best of my knowledge – so far untested knowledge-related 
factor, I suggest the modularity of the knowledge-base to be a determinant of the 
preference to cooperate and select a partner. Modularity constitutes a basic 
evolutionary principle (Pyka, 2002). Complex systems often exhibit a modular 
structure, i.e. (i) interdependency between modules is low, (ii) interdependency within 
modules is high and (iii) modules can be reconfigured upholding the functionality of 
the system (Baldwin and Clark, 1997). Modularity has been mostly studied with regard 
to product architecture and organizational structures (see for instance Sanchez and 
Mahoney (1996); Baldwin and Clark (2000); Schilling (2000); Ethiraj and Levinthal 
(2004)). The purpose of a modular product architecture is to buffer elements of a 
system from each other and to prevent the emergence of ripple effects. A modular 
architecture strengthens the stability of the product and its performance as well as 
facilitates repair since modules can be replaced separately from one another. On the 
other hand, the ripple effects, which are harmful with products, are rather desirable in 
the context of knowledge since they trigger exploratory search between modules 
(Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008).  
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Modularity effects, concerning the knowledge structure, have so far been of minor 
interest in innovation economics. A few studies identify a relation between the 
structure of the knowledge-base and innovation related outcomes. Lane and Lubatkin 
(1998), for instance, find that the degree to which two knowledge-bases overlap 
influences positively the ability of mutual learning in cooperation. Coupling of 
knowledge elements leading to a modular structure is related to three distinct motives: 
(i) there might be a natural interdependence between some knowledge elements; (ii) 
search routines may be directed to the coupling of certain knowledge elements while 
other elements are more independently used; (iii) innovation processes are 
recombinant which implies the coupling of so far unrelated knowledge elements. The 
varying degrees of decomposability explain why knowledge-bases that consist of the 
same knowledge elements may (and most often do) differ in their actual application 
(Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008). 
Brusoni and Prencipe (2001) summarize the suggestions made in the literature on 
modularity: First, there is a strong link between knowledge, product and organizational 
modularity which means that the knowledge encapsulated in a modular product is also 
modular. Moreover, there seems to be a link between the organizational structure of 
firm departments and the structure of the knowledge-base. A firm which conducts its 
R&D processes in sharply separated and independent working units is very likely to 
generate a relatively strong modularized knowledge-base (Yayavaram and Ahuja, 
2008). Second, modular product architecture facilitates the division of labor inside a 
firm as well as between firms. Third, modular product architecture reduces 
coordination efforts in the division of labor. In particular, Arora, Gambardella and 
Rullani (1997) argue that modularity of knowledge and technologies supports the 
division of labor in innovative activities. In a stylized way, modularity divides 
innovation processes in two separate components, namely in (i) the production of new 
(basic) modules and (ii) their combination for tailor-made technologies and designs to 
meet market needs. While “specialized upstream suppliers” focus on the production of 
new modules stressing economies of scale, more downstream firms combine these 
modules to assemble complex products. 
High levels of modularity often characterize mature industries such as car-
manufacturing. Here, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) outsource activities to 
increase the efficiency of manufacturing. They receive from their suppliers pre-
assembled and pre-tested modules, e.g. doors, cockpits, etc. Whereas, firms operating 
in an industry that is still in an early phase of growth without a dominant design 
(Utterback, 1995), are more inclined towards vertical integration. From this follows 
7. Determinants of Network Evolution 93 
 
that a modular production system is likely to stipulate knowledge division among 
firms. Suppliers develop and produce modules exploiting intensively their expert 
knowledge. For OEMs it is important to keep internally some knowledge of the 
modular content in order to integrate the outsourced modules into a final product 
(Takeishi, 2002). The global integration of production went hand in hand with an 
increased modularity of process technologies. This process gave external suppliers a 
more prominent role in the value chain taking over parts of the design and engineering 
tasks (Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck and Gereffi, 2008). 
Invention is often regarded as the outcome of knowledge recombination (Schumpeter, 
1939; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). Thus, firms not only try 
to find a partner which has a similar technological understanding, but they attempt to 
recombine and link technologies and the underlying knowledge. I expect firms which 
have modular knowledge-bases to be preferably chosen as collaboration partners 
because this facilitates the combination of knowledge. In particular, a decomposable 
knowledge-base enables researchers to conduct recombinant search processes without 
getting trapped in complexity and endless combinatorial possibilities (Yayavaram and 
Ahuja, 2008). The recombinatorial possibilities become rapidly very large even with 
rather modest sized knowledge-bases. Firms that search for an appropriate cooperation 
partner to combine elements of their own knowledge-base with elements or a partner’s 
knowledge-base to come up with innovative solutions are confronted with a high level 
of complexity, an overload of possibilities and uncertainty at the same time. Hence, I 
propose that the propensity of two firms to cooperate rises with their ability to 
structure their knowledge-base in a modular way. Modularity reduces time and costly 
search process as compatible technologies can be identified more easily, and it 
decreases complexity through a reduced number of combinatorial possibilities. This 
argument relates to a study of Yang, Phelps and Steensma (2010) on 87 
telecommunications equipment manufacturers. They find that the rate of innovation is 
higher if the external knowledge-pool (represented by patents) is greater and more 
related to the originator’s own knowledge-base. This effect is yet not without limits. 
Once the size of the pool grows larger and larger, the positive effect shrinks and finally 
becomes negative due to overwhelming complexity which grows in parallel with a 
growing pool of knowledge. 
The characteristic of a modular knowledge-base is synonymously also referred to as a 
clustered or highly decomposable knowledge-base. The feature of modularity of a 
firm’s knowledge-base is approximated by its degree of clustering. The degree of 
decomposability is reflected by a continuum of structures. From a non-modular to 
94  7. Determinants of Network Evolution 
highly modular a knowledge-base the ties between knowledge elements become 
increasingly clustered (Figure 9). 
To summarize, firms with modular knowledge-bases are preferably chosen as 
collaboration partners because (i) it is easier to integrate their knowledge and (ii) it 
increases the speed of engineering of collaborative products. Accordingly, I suggest 
that not only the absorptive capacity or the technological distance matter for the 
propensity to cooperate but also that the decomposability of the knowledge-bases into 
modular knowledge substructures plays a significant role.  
 
Figure 9: Stylized relation between modularity and clustering (Source: own illustration). 
A highly modular knowledge-base is characterized by some knowledge elements 
forming a dense cluster while clusters are not knit together (Figure 10). Whereas, in 
nearly decomposable structures (Simon, 1962) nodes are clustered through dense links 
and there are links connecting the clusters (Figure 11). Finally, a non decomposable 
pattern does not show identifiable clusters but the ties are arbitrarily distributed 
(Figure 12). 
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Figure 10: Modular knowledge-base (Source: own illustration). 
 
Figure 11: Nearly modular knowledge-base (Source: own illustration). 
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Figure 12: Non modular knowledge-base (Source: own illustration). 
7.5 Geographical Distance 
An obvious reason why geographical distance influences collaboration is its influence 
on transaction costs, such as transportation. Also, it is easier to find a suitable partner 
among a group of co-located firms (Tabuchi, 1998). Despite the wide diffusion of 
communication technologies which shrink perceived distances between actors, 
geographical distances still play a role when it comes to the propensity to cooperate 
and to select a cooperation partner. Feldman (2000, p. 373) defines location in the 
context of knowledge creation “as a geographic unit over which interaction and 
communication is facilitated, search intensity is increased, and task coordination is 
enhanced”. Modern information and communication technology (ICT) has helped to 
decentralize a lot of economic activities (conversational interactions), but the very 
same technologies also lead to the emergence of new activities that are complex and 
thus cannot be conducted over longer distances (handshake interactions) (Leamer and 
Storper, 2001). Boschma and Wenting (2007) examine the local clustering of the 
British automobile industry in the period 1895-1968 and find two evolutionary 
explanations for concentration patterns, namely agglomeration economies in 
combination with spinoff dynamics. In regions, where a lot of firms from related 
industries were located, such as bicycle or coach making, the hazard rate of 
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automotive firms was considerable lower. This holds particularly for the infant phase 
of the industry. Knowledge externalities and locally bound skilled labor are to a great 
deal the explanations for this observation. Even in highly computerized industries 
personal interaction is still inevitable. Tasks which cannot be standardized and 
routinized require a high level of implicit knowledge (Storper and Venables, 2004). In 
fact, in various industries we find tendencies for an uneven distribution of firms in 
geographical space which is a first indication that geography matters for firm location. 
This holds in particular for high-tech industries (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). 
Accordingly, geographical distance is considered as a further determinant of network 
formation. 
Innovation is a collective learning process which takes to a large extent place within a 
spatially bounded local milieu (Camagni, 1991) and many innovation networks have 
indeed a strong regional focus (Boschma, 2005). Geographic proximity facilitates the 
exchange of knowledge among firms. Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) show 
that geographical proximity is conducive to mutual learning. Knowledge flows are 
typically stronger between close and similar regions or countries and weaker between 
regions that are further away from each other, that have different languages or are 
specialized in dissimilar sectors (Peri, 2005). The extent to which firms tend to 
network with other firms in close geographic distance depends among others on the 
degree of tacitness of the respective knowledge. The transfer of codified knowledge 
via journals, books, etc. is relatively independent from the geographical distance. In 
contrast, exchange of tacit knowledge requires personal contacts and trust which is 
easier to develop in a regional context (Von Hippel, 1994). Leamer and Storper (2001) 
demonstrate that the transfer of tacit knowledge via modern information and 
communication technologies is difficult. Jaffe (1989b) provides evidence for the 
effectiveness of spillovers by considering a regional parameter in the estimations.  
However, I doubt that short distances per se improve the diffusion of knowledge. 
Rather, short distances facilitate the establishment of network ties which allow for 
extensive knowledge exchange and the collection of information about activities of co-
located firms. The gist from different geographical observations and studies is that 
there are essentially two channels by which distances exert influence (cf. Glückler, 
2007):  First, short distances positively affect the formation of interfirm networks. It is 
not the physical distance as such which influences network formation. Instead, it is the 
possibilities and preferences of human beings to communicate (Storper and Venables, 
2004), i.e. infrastructure and possibilities to travel faster are to be taken into account 
(Marquis, 2003). We often find not only a tendency for clustering with regard to an 
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industry’s location but also in terms of interaction patterns (Weterings, 2006; 
Hoekman, Frenken and Van Oort, 2009). Shorter distances provide more opportunities 
to meet which is conducive for developing trust serving as a precondition for 
knowledge exchange (Howells, 2002). Face-to-face interaction facilitates interactive 
learning. Thus, there is an indirect relationship between geographical distances and the 
possibilities and propensities to form fruitful agreements of interaction. Second, 
locations play a role by providing opportunities to access specific and locally bound 
resources (e.g. specialized workforce) and regional unequal distributed business 
opportunities (Sayer, 1991; Bathelt and Glückler, 2005). By analyzing US patent 
citations, Sonn and Storper (2008) confirm a positive effect of geographical proximity 
on the innovation output. However, geographical proximity is not the exclusive driver 
of collective innovation processes but also an enabler for realizing other forms of 
proximity (Boschma, 2005). The integration in networks is more important than mere 
geographical proximity (Breschi and Lissoni, 2003; Balconi, Breschi and Lissoni, 
2004; Buchmann and Pyka, 2012a; Buchmann and Pyka, 2012b). Also, Boschma and 
ter Wal (2007) stress the importance of integration in global networks and value chains 
for innovative performance besides local network embeddedness. 
7.6 Basic Sociological Concepts of Attachment Mechanisms 
The question of whom to choose as a partner is not unique to firms which search a 
cooperation partner. The selection problem is likewise prevalent in other fields of life. 
For instance, human beings choose their partner preferably from their own race. As a 
general feature, in social networks there is a preference for the selection of partners 
which are similar (Newman, 2003). For this tendency, Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) 
introduce the notion of homophily, defined as the formation of friendship between 
people of the same kind (“birds of a feather flock together”). Consequently, a 
determinant influencing the probability for the emergence of a tie between any two 
actors is their degree of similarity. This means that the propensity to cooperate is 
dependent on the actor characteristics and the embeddedness in a network as two 
actors can be similar in terms of (i) their structural position in a network or (ii) with 
regard to attributes such as size, reputation or resources including the knowledge-base. 
Therefore, two forms of homophily can be differentiated. Structural homophily 
(Podolny, 1994; Popielarz and McPherson, 1995) refers to the structural embeddedness 
in a network such as the degree centrality. Covariate related homophily (Van de Bunt 
and Groenewegen, 2007) relates to similar actor attributes. That is, the probability that 
a tie will be created between actors i and j is higher when they are similar in one or in 
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a number of characteristics. The homophily effect is a reciprocity effect, i.e. when 
actor i is similar to actor j, then actor j must be similar to actor i. 
In contrast to individual covariates, dyadic covariates are calculated for pairs of actors. 
A typical example would be all kinds of distance (proximity) measures between actors, 
such as geographic distance or technological distance. Dyadic covariates measure the 
extent to which the formation of a tie between two actors is more probable when the 
dyadic covariate is larger or respectively smaller. This kind of homophily is 
particularly interesting to study for the case of innovation networks where small 
technological distances indicate same understandings of problems (Giuliani and Bell, 
2005). 
7.7 Transitivity and other Triadic Effects 
Even though I follow in my argumentation predominantly a knowledge-based view, I 
do not neglect that costs also play a role for selection processes. Consequently, there is 
a further factor which makes a selection process based on social criteria advantageous, 
namely costs which accrue for searching and evaluating the quality of a potential 
partner (Gould, 2002). The search for the ideal partner can be cumbersome, time 
consuming, cost intensive and requires capabilities of judgment. Especially small firms 
lack the necessary resources to conduct extensive search that covers all potential 
partners and produces reliable information for making a choice (Giuliani, 2010). When 
the level of uncertainty is high and hard facts about other firms are scarce or lacking, 
social signals play a strong role for reducing the circle of potential partners (Ibarra, 
1993; Lazega et al., 2012). Firms are incentivized to create stable ties and relationships 
which enable mutual learning based on trust and cooperative behavior, reduce search 
costs and the risk of selecting the wrong partner (Powell, 1990). Garcia-Pont and 
Nohria (2002) study alliance dynamics among the 35 globally largest firms in the 
automotive industry. They find that the denser the network of the group is knit, the 
more their behaviors resemble and the higher is the probability that they select a 
partner from the group. Triadic structures, such as transitive triads, are a common 
pattern found in many networks. Transitivity is a structural effect which refers to the 
positioning of actors in a network. It describes a tendency of the partners (i, j) of an 
actor (k) to initiate a collaboration which leads to a closed triangle (Figure 13). The 
number of these triangles is expected to exceed the number of triadic structures in 
random networks (e.g. Davis, 1970; Holland and Leinhardt, 1971).  
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Figure 13: Triadic structure (Source: own illustration). 
The formation of triads is an indication for the formation of dense interconnected 
cliques (Skvoretz and Willer, 1991). Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) find confirmation that 
common third-party ties between previously unconnected organizations increase their 
probability of initiating a collaboration. As firms operate in an environment of 
bounded rationality and imperfect information – also in terms of potential partners – 
they face the risk of opportunistic behavior (Gulati, 1995a). Acquiring reliable 
information about a potential partner is a difficult task, yet it is essential for the 
formation of alliances that serve both partners. Firms which share a common partner 
gain information about each other from their shared partner (Baker, 1990). Moreover, 
alliance partners have to cope with potential moral hazard threats due to the barely 
predictable behavior of the partner firm. For instance, one firm could try to free ride by 
making none or only very limited contributions to a common project while the other 
partner invests a lot more resources; or by using commonly developed knowledge in a 
way which damages the eligible interests of the partner (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). 
Whenever a firm is looking for a collaboration partner, existing links are most valuable 
and trustworthy sources of information about potential partners. For instance, if actor j 
collaborates with actor k and actor i collaborates with actor k, then actor k is a reliable 
source of information about the trustworthiness and reputation of actor j. This effect 
leads to closed triangles (the two-path i → k → j is closed by the tie i → j).   
The formation of such closed triangles creates social spaces which are reinforced by 
shared beliefs and opinions that prevent actors from opportunistic behavior, it allows 
for the formation of trust and forges the exchange of tacit knowledge (Uzzi, 1997). 
The triadic structure may even lead to a reputation lock-in, i.e. there is a strong interest 
of the three actors that each partner behaves well to ensure a good reputation of the 
group. Selfish behavior will be reported to common partners and can be immediately 
penalized (Raub and Weesie, 1990; Burt and Knez, 1995). Consequently, triads tend to 
i j
k
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be more stable and durable compared to dyadic ties (Baum, Shipilov and Rowley, 
2003).  
7.8 Experience with Cooperation 
A further factor I examine is a firm’s experience with cooperation. For firms that have 
only little or even no experience at all with collaborative projects, entering a network 
is not a trivial task and various obstacles that hamper effective collaboration can be 
found in literature. According to Hennart (1988), Pisano (1989) and Parkhe (1993) the 
most prominent ones are: (i) lack of trust between the partners; (ii) unwillingness of 
sharing control and leadership in projects; (iii) overly high complexity of the project; 
(iv) uneven capabilities in learning; (v) confusions on the question about who is a 
partner and who is a competitor.  
I suggest that a large record of collaborative activities signals a larger attractiveness as 
well as preference for further collaboration. Firms that are experienced cooperation 
partners find more easily additional partners (Ahuja, 2000b). This reflects that from 
outside it is rather difficult to scan a firm’s valuable resources, in particular its 
knowledge-base. A firm which has been often involved in cooperative projects signals 
to be a valuable partner with a good reputation and established routines of 
collaboration. Furthermore, a long record of cooperation demonstrates that a firm 
made positive and obviously valuable experience with cooperative projects in the past. 
This will increase its willingness to initiate further collaborative projects in the future. 
Alliance or cooperation capabilities are specific and not transferable resources which 
enhance a firm’s ability to identify a partner, initiate collaborations and manage a 
partnership successfully (e.g. Makadok, 2001). Experienced firms install dedicated 
collaboration management routines to coordinate the portfolio of different types of 
alliances (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002). Developing experience takes time since it 
forces a firm to adapt its internal routines (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
However, it is worth the effort as it not only enables a firm to become effectively 
embedded in a formal innovation network but also paves the ground for informal 
collaboration (Pyka, 2000).  
Clearly, history matters when decisions about future cooperation partners are made. 
Firms which have to make decisions about the configuration of their ego-network are 
confronted with a variety of potential hazards. In order to prevent the potential 
negative impacts, they make use of the information provided by already existing ties 
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(Powell and Smith-Doerr, 1994; Gulati, 1998; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Decision 
makers use information about preceding alliances as a guideline for future partnerships 
as they provide reliable and timely information about the availability, capabilities and 
reliability of future partners (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Availability heuristic may 
also play a role when managers decide about future alliances remembering past 
experiences with partners. The timely characteristic is particularly important in 
industries where time-to-market is a central determinant of competitiveness. Every 
new tie adds to the pool of information which constitutes the basis of decision making 
for the present and future. This information is derived from prior direct cooperation 
partners but also from indirectly connected firms and from the reputation that is linked 
to the positions of a potential partner in the pre-existing network (Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999). Prior ties between two firms increase the probability for establishing a 
trustworthy relation and reduce uncertainty with regard to future common projects 
(Podolny, 1994). Moreover, the regular interaction which is associated with ties 
between two firms may give rise to new ideas resulting in future projects that would be 
way more difficult to initiate if there was no pre-existing tie (Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999). Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr (1996) find for the investigated network in the 
biotechnology industry that an estimated number of 15% of existing ties are terminated 
each year. Yet, the relationship often does not completely break up when the 
collaboration in a specific project comes to an (envisaged) end. This event may 
directly trigger a new project. For example, a common research project may be 
followed by a project of the same kind or by a common manufacturing project.  
7.9 Conclusions 
The evolution of interfirm innovation networks is driven by forces which have 
different points of application. Prior research on innovation networks suggests that 
there are drivers related to actor characteristics, to dyadic characteristics but also 
endogenous forces stemming from the network structure itself. Derived upon the 
concepts presented in this chapter (absorptive capacity, technological distance, 
knowledge-base modularity, geographical distance, transitivity and experience with 
cooperation), I test in chapter 9 the significance of hypothesized drivers for the 
particular case of a German automotive innovation network. Some of the presented 
effects are approximated with the information that is embodied in patent documents. In 
the following chapter, I explain which kind of patent information might be relevant 
and to what extent patent measures can be applied in the described context.  
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8. Patenting 
Patents serve as a rich source of information about inventions (and innovations). A 
large patent pool is a signal for a high level of competence and knowledge in one or 
more technology fields. Patents function therefore as an attractor for the search of a 
cooperation partner. A patent is a legal title granting its holder the exclusive right to 
make use of an invention for a limited area and time by preventing others from 
making, using or selling it without permission. In return, it forces the inventor to 
reveal the technical details of the invention. The aim of the patent regime is to solve 
the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. Static efficiency refers to the 
perpetuation of the incentives to innovate, while dynamic efficiency focuses on the 
socially desirable diffusion of new knowledge. The character of a legal right provides 
a patent with a (potential) economic value. From a technical point of view, a patent is 
the outcome of a successful patent application procedure and is granted by a patent 
office after it has been scrutinized for its validity. This scrutiny process is conducted 
by national or regional authorities who grant a patent or reject the application. The 
largest national patent offices are the USPTO (for the USA) and the JPO (for Japan). 
In principle, protection for an invention is only guaranteed in the country where a 
patent is granted and a patent has to be applied for in each country separately. 
However, for Europe the European Patent Office (EPO) facilitates the application 
process by granting a European patent. For validity in a specific country, the country 
still needs to be explicitly mentioned in the application document.
8
 The system of 
national and regional patent offices is complemented by an international regime, the so 
called Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). With this scheme, pre-applications can be 
filed to a variety of national patent offices at the same time. A key advantage is that the 
costs are relatively low compared to the amount that applications to all the individual 
national offices would cost. The PCT-scheme is administrated by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (Maraut et al., 2008).  
A principal objective of the patent system is to sustain the incentives to innovate. 
When a firm allocates considerable resources to R&D, it expects a reasonable rate of 
return from the investment. Thus, there is a genuine interest on the side of the firms to 
protect the knowledge on which their inventions are based and to ideally ensure a 
monopoly for the exploitation. The existence of a link between (costly) innovative 
efforts and the opportunity to beneficially exploit the results is a central assumption in 
                                            
8 An agreement for a unitary EU patent (with the exception of Italy and Spain) was adopted during the European 
Council of 28 - 29 June 2012 (European Parliament, 2012). 
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many (innovation) economic models. Accordingly, a lack of appropriability regimes 
for profits derived from an invention is regarded as the main reason for 
underinvestment in R&D and low rates of innovation. In fact, technologies incorporate 
a mix of public and private good features (Arrow, 1962; Dosi, 1988). The latter allow 
firms to appropriate gains from their innovations and create incentives for further 
investments in R&D. Appropriation protects own novelties from being easily copied at 
the expense of a loss of own profits. The conditions of appropriation are industry and 
technology specific. Levin, Cohen and Mowery (1985) propose the following means 
of appropriation: patents, secrecy, lead time, costs and time required for duplication, 
learning-curve effects, superior sales and service effects. Dosi (1988) argues that due 
to partly tacit and partly private elements of technological knowledge, imitation is not 
a simple copy-paste process but requires creativity and resource employment, a task 
which is somewhat similar to the original inventory process and also costly.  
By considering, for instance, the concepts of technological paradigms and trajectories, 
we may conclude that there are other reasons than a lack of appropriability responsible 
for differences in the rates of technological progress between firms and industries, 
such as limited technological opportunity spaces. For that reason, strengthening patent 
laws is an inadequate lever to increase the innovation rate in an economy and may 
even trigger patent wars which are foremost beneficial for the involved lawyers. (Too) 
strong patent laws may lead to a slowdown of technological progress if we presume a 
cumulative knowledge creation process in the sense that yesterday’s achievements in 
the search for new solutions and protection of past inventions hamper researchers from 
implementing existing knowledge in their search routines. This conjecture holds 
particularly for very basic inventions that have a potentially broad field of application. 
Thus, there is no direct link between the degree of possible appropriability and a firm’s 
efforts to innovate, and the different rates of technological progress cannot be traced 
back to differences in appropriability regimes (Dosi and Nelson, 2010). There is even a 
downside related to early and rigorous protection of inventions. As other firms are not 
allowed to apply the invention they cannot draw on this technology and develop and 
improve it even further. Thus, other firms cannot create additional learning 
opportunities for the firm which originally developed a technology.  
 
8. Patenting 105 
 
8.1 Patents as a Proxy for Innovation 
Entrepreneurial strategies to protect inventions and innovations differ across 
industries. While in the pharmaceutical and telecommunications industry patents are 
an important instrument and measure of innovation (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003), 
this is less the case in other industries where time to market, learning curve 
advantages, secrecy or complementary assets and services are more important. 
Especially when firms introduce innovative (production) processes, it is often secrecy 
that serves as a means for the protection of new knowledge (Levin, Cohen and 
Mowery, 1985; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2002). Moreover, some firms in an industry 
may not patent at all but still conduct R&D to understand what others are doing (Dosi, 
1988). This is related to internal efforts which are necessary to establish an effective 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In a direct way patents only 
represent the part of a firm’s knowledge-base that can be codified, but this part is 
strongly correlated with measures reflecting the tacit component (Narin, Noma and 
Perry, 1987). The use of patent data for statistical analysis is seen as problematic if 
applied across industries (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001). Consequently, one is 
advised to focus on one or few industries in the analysis or to analyze different 
industries separately from each other (Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003). 
To measure the innovativeness of a firm, we are asked to identify some kind of proxy 
which is strongly correlated with the innovation output. Despite the described 
limitations, patents can be regarded as a valid measure for the output of the R&D 
process. Previous research shows that patents are indeed a valid indicator for the 
output, value and utility of inventions (Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 
2005). They are a measure of invention which is externally validated during the 
application process at a patent office, and since this process is time consuming and 
costly, firms most probably launch the application process only for inventions which 
have some sort of potential economic or strategic value (Griliches, 1990). Moreover, 
there is a relatively large body of literature which employs patents not only as a proxy 
for invention but also for innovation (output) (e.g. Pavitt, 1985; Hagedoorn and 
Cloodt, 2003). By analyzing a large number of studies Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003, p. 
1368) conclude that “in large parts of the economics literature, raw patent counts are 
generally accepted as one of the most appropriate indicators that enable researchers to 
compare the inventive or innovative performance of companies in terms of new 
technologies, new processes and new products.” Furthermore, Niosi (2005, p. 22) 
suggests: “Even if not all commercially useful novelties are patented, not all patents 
are exploited in the market, and the exploitation may occur in a place different from 
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the one where the innovation took place, no other indicator is better suited to the study 
of innovation.” 
8.2 Application of Patent Data for Innovation Economic Analyses 
In fact, the exploitation of patent data delivers rich information about the inventor, the 
applicant, the concerned fields of technology and knowledge flows (approximated by 
citations). For instance, from the addresses we can get geographic information which 
allows for testing hypotheses regarding the influence of geographic distance on 
cooperation. The regionalization of patent data is either based on the geographic 
coordinates of the inventor (a person) or of the applicant (firm, university, etc.). In the 
first case, we get to know the place where the inventor lives. Due to the fact that most 
inventors are not working in their own laboratory but are employed by a firm, 
university or research laboratory this is mostly also the place where the invention was 
made (as long as the inventor lives and works in the same region). In the second case, 
we get the information of the firm location. Some prudence is required as in some 
cases only the address of the headquarters is documented. Results from R&D 
cooperation leave sometimes traces on patent documents in the form of several named 
organizations on a single patent document. Also, inventor collaboration is a prolific 
mode of scientific work. Therefore, there is often more than just one inventor 
mentioned on a patent document. These kinds of information can be very helpful when 
we are looking for paper traces of R&D collaboration. In particular, the detection of 
large scale networks is challenging. One promising avenue is the use of patent data 
because they provide information on co-invention as well as citation patterns (Balconi, 
Breschi and Lissoni, 2004). Another possible application is demonstrated by 
Debackere, Luwel and Veugelers (1999) who use EPO patent data to proxy 
technological advantages. They link this data with a measure for comparative 
advantage based on trade data for the Belgium region of Flanders. By doing this, they 
search for a link between technological strength of a region and its economic strength. 
To illustrate further kinds of studies which were conducted on the basis of patent data, 
I report some of the results: 
 Gilsing et al. (2008) find that the innovation output increases with firm size but 
under-proportionately. Especially when it comes to the exploration of new 
technologies, small firms perform better. In addition, R&D intensity has a 
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significantly positive effect on the innovation output and the age of the firm is 
negatively correlated (but non-signiﬁcantly) with (exploratory) patents.  
 When looking for explanations of innovative performance, Hagedoorn and Cloodt 
(2003) do not find a systematic disparity among the R&D inputs, patent counts, 
patent citations and new product announcements.  
 De Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009) study the relation 
between patent counts and R&D performance at the country level and find a strong 
correlation. Moreover, their results suggest that the propensity to patent and the 
research productivity are both relevant factors for explaining cross-country 
disparities in patent counts per scientist. 
 Breschi, Lissoni and Malerba (2003) use patent data to test the hypothesis that 
technological relatedness is an important determinant of the diversification of a 
firm’s knowledge-base. They find strong evidence for this hypothesis and 
conclude that, fueled by learning processes and the properties of knowledge, such 
as complementarity, firms predominantly focus their R&D efforts on technological 
fields which are related. Remarkably, even firms which have a very diversified 
technology portfolio mostly patent in fields which are knowledge-wise strongly 
related. 
8.3 Building the Knowledge-Base from a Pool of Patents 
Based on the previous discussion, I conclude that – as a proxy – patents can be 
regarded as the most elementary (discrete) building blocks of a firm’s knowledge-base. 
This approach is in line with other studies reconstructing a firm’s knowledge-base out 
of patents (see for instance Jaffe, 1989a; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Fleming and 
Sorenson, 2001). For the purpose of the empirical study conducted for this 
dissertation, patent data are extracted from the OECD REGPAT database which 
contains patent (application) data that has been linked to geographic locations based on 
the addresses of inventors and applicants. All patent data included in the REGPAT 
database are taken from two primary sources, namely the EPO’s Worldwide Statistical 
patent database (PATSTAT) and the Inventors and Applicants records from EPO 
patents extracted from Epoline web services. In the REGPAT June 2010 edition, the 
data is retrieved from the Patstat April 2010 edition and the complementary OECD 
patent database based on EPO’s epoline@ database which covers publications up to 
June 2010. REGPAT covers patent applications filed to the EPO from 1977 to 2007 
and partial data afterwards according to the priority data (OECD, June 2010).  
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For the regionalization of the patent data, 36 countries have been taken into account 
encompassing many OECD countries and a selection of European non-member 
countries. The REGPAT database includes applications to the European and US patent 
office (however incomplete) as well as applications filed under the umbrella of the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). The link between inventors or applicants and a 
region was established by matching the postal codes or town names which are part of 
the address with regional units such as the NUTS3 regions. In general, researchers are 
interested in the date when the invention was made. This is best expressed by the 
priority year as it indicates when the applicant first filed for a patent. Other dates can 
also be found in the documents. The publication or grant date depend on the specific 
administrative procedures of the scrutinizing authority and can lie up to ten years after 
the invention (Maraut et al., 2008). 
8.4 Conclusions 
Despite a number of limitations, patents are the best publicly accessible proxy, both for 
inventions and innovations. In particular, for large studies there is no other comparable 
source which contains such rich information about inventors, applicants and 
technology fields. Consequently, I use patent data to map a firm’s knowledge-base. 
Moreover, by using the information of the IPC classes which are documented on a 
patent, the structure of the knowledge-base can be represented as a knowledge network 
(cf. chapter 9.3). 
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9. An Automotive Innovation Network 
In this chapter, I first describe characteristics and challenges of German automotive 
suppliers and manufactures followed by an analysis of the structure of their collective 
knowledge-base, focusing on e-mobility technologies. Second, I introduce a model for 
the analysis of evolutionary change patterns of an interfirm innovation network (Pyka 
and Fagiolo, 2005; Pyka and Hanusch, 2006) which consists of a sample of German 
automotive firms. A stochastic actor-based model is applied to estimate parameters 
which reflect the impact of hypothesized effects. The elementary building blocks of 
the analyzed innovation network are nodes (firms) and ties (derived from collaborative 
R&D projects) representing interaction structures that serve as channels of implicit and 
explicit knowledge exchange. These basic network elements aggregate into a complex 
network structure which is embedded in a wider economic system. That is, an 
innovation network can be described as an integral part of the regional, national or 
sectoral innovation system. 
Increasingly complex technologies in the automotive industry spur collaborative 
efforts of knowledge creation. Hardly any firm can maintain a leading role in 
competition by solely relying on isolated R&D endeavors. “[...] organizations can no 
longer hold mastery over all the emerging technologies which have the potential to 
impact on their products” (Birchall, Tovstiga and Chanaron, 2001, p. 86). Joint R&D 
projects, strategic alliances and other forms of collective innovation processes allow 
for the pooling of knowledge and competences (Teece, 1992). R&D cooperation opens 
channels to access critical resources. In contrast to the transaction cost approach 
(Coase, 1937) which focuses on cost minimization, Neo-Schumpeterian economists 
emphasize the importance of learning opportunities and the knowledge transfer 
processes in networks (Hanusch and Pyka, 2007a). Knowledge as the key resource for 
invention and innovation is scarce. It is hard to imitate, to transfer on markets and to 
substitute (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Knowledge intense industries such as the 
automotive industry foster the general movement towards collaborative innovation 
(Powell et al., 2005; Pyka and Saviotti, 2005). “Collaborations are a useful vehicle for 
enhancing knowledge in critical areas of functioning where the requisite level of 
knowledge is lacking and cannot be developed within an acceptable timeframe or cost” 
(Madhok, 1997, p. 43). 
Actor-based models for network evolution enable us to shed more light on the complex 
dynamics of continuously emerging and dissolving ties between firms (Ter Wal and 
Boschma, 2009) and are, thus, a useful instrument to learn about underlying micro 
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mechanisms and to disentangle the driving factors of evolutionary change. For the 
analyzed innovation network, I consider actor characteristics (on the individual and 
dyad level) and social factors to be relevant drivers for network evolution. Based on 
the described theory (chapter 7), I test factors which are suggested to affect both, the 
propensity to cooperate as well as the preference for a certain type of partner. In 
particular, I suggest the following factors to be relevant: absorptive capacity, 
technological distance, the level of knowledge-base modularity, geographical distance, 
transitivity and experience with cooperation. In addition, I control for capacity effects 
such as the experience of a firm in the industry and the size of a firm, and for 
coordination costs of ties. 
9.1 Industry Context: Cooperation in the Automotive Industry  
A first step to understand network evolution is to understand its broader context. 
Single firms are part of industries and changes in industries feed back on individual 
firms (Brass et al. 2004). The growing importance of suppliers in design and 
production of components requires frequent interactions between suppliers and OEMs 
as well as among suppliers and among OEMs (Kotabe, Parente and Murray, 2007).  
Due to the high requirements of data availability, the evolution of innovation networks 
was so far only studied in few industries and only few studies have focused on the 
mechanisms of evolutionary change over time: Ter Wal (2013) studies drivers of 
network evolution in the German biotechnology industry; Balland (2012) analyzes the 
global navigation satellite system industry (GNSS); Giuliani (2010) applies a dynamic 
network model in a study on a Chilean wine cluster and Balland, De Vaan and 
Boschma (2012) investigate the determinants of network evolution in the computer 
games industry. Traditional manufacturing industries, such as the automotive industry, 
have so far not been analyzed and the empirical understanding of innovation network 
evolution is still preliminary. Further research is needed to better grasp the role of 
industry specificities shaping innovation network evolution.  
9.1.1 Industry Trends 
The German car producers and suppliers are faced with a variety of challenges which 
force them to optimize their cost structure, and even more importantly, to search for 
innovative solutions with regard to their product portfolio and their organizational 
structure. To escape the selective pressure, new strategies are developed and 
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implemented. Innovations allow firms to run-off a destructive price competition and to 
create unique selling propositions. However, in important future oriented technologies, 
such as hybrid engines, German firms are lagging behind (Dilk et al., 2008). 
Intensified innovation competitions as well as shortened product life cycles emerge as 
a race for innovation (Staiger, Gleich and Dilk, 2006). Furthermore, the automotive 
industry has undergone and is still undergoing a consolidation process which leads to 
(successful und unsuccessful) mergers and acquisitions. The mergers of Daimler-Benz 
and Chrysler and of Hyundai and Kia, the strategic alliance between Renault and 
Nissan as well as the takeover of Jaguar and Volvo by Ford and their resale to Tata 
Motors and Geely are just a few examples of this enduring process. Intensified 
competition, over-capacity and the catching-up of Asian firms challenge the old 
champions of the industry. During the 1980s already, Japanese car manufacturers 
increasingly formed strategic alliances on a global scale which provided them with a 
competitive advantage. Also, Rycroft and Kash (2004) identify globalization as an 
important driver for the proliferation of network structures in the automotive industry. 
Interestingly, there seems to be a co-evolutionary effect, that is, networks also push 
globalization dynamics: Technologies lead to both, changes in organizational 
structures, and the creation of more integrated markets and strongly rising trade 
volumes which feeds back on technological and organizational developments. Besides 
access to global value chains, firms need access to tacit and locally bound knowledge-
bases of regional innovation systems to generate innovation for diversified and 
heterogeneous global markets. Innovation based on the ubiquity of codified knowledge 
(large data bases, ICT) complements locally sticky knowledge. 
Increased complexity and new technologies, such as electro-mechanical integration, 
inter-connectedness of components and internet-based car solutions (Dilk et al., 2008) 
amplify the pressure to form alliances with partners operating at the cutting edge of 
technology. The complexity of cars rises sharply, making system integration an 
increasingly challenging task. On the other hand, technologies help to shorten time to 
market and increase flexibility by new design and engineering (rapid prototyping) 
tools, smart manufacturing facilities and collaboration. Stricter environmental 
regulation
9
 requires solutions beyond the established design of the internal combustion 
engine fuelled with petrol. To face air pollution and climate change, the automotive 
industry finds itself increasingly under social and political pressure to produce more 
environmental friendly cars. German producers are particularly affected by regularity 
                                            
9 For instance, EU Regulation 443/2009 forces car producers by 2020 to reduce CO2 emissions of their product 
portfolio to a level which does not exceed the threshold of 95g CO2/km. 
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hurdles since their cars are known for being high comfort which went in the past hand 
in hand with heavy weight and high emissions. The dominant design of the internal 
combustion engine, as the heart of the power train, is increasingly challenged by new 
and supposedly more efficient technologies. With the established design being 
challenged also the “masters” of this design, the incumbent car manufacturers and 
their suppliers, are threatened by new firms appearing now on the playing field. New 
technologies leverage the possibilities and lower market entrance barriers for 
innovative firms. New solutions lead to an erosion of the value of incumbent 
knowledge-bases if they are not “refilled” with new knowledge. A modular structure of 
the knowledge-base helps to adopt such new technologies (chapter 7.4). With electric 
cars, completely new components are needed in a number of fields for which the 
incumbents not necessarily have the required expertise. This concerns, i.a. the power 
train (e.g. electric engine, gear box), the battery, brakes, electronic control units, 
climatisation, light bodies and the chassis. Taken together, the described changes open 
a window of opportunity for new players from inside and outside the industry to enter 
the market.  
The automotive industry is characterized as a scale driven but likewise knowledge-
intensive industry. The advent of new technologies in tandem with a high level of 
uncertainty concerning the power train, assistant systems as well information and 
communication technologies, triggered increasing R&D efforts during the last years. 
In a discussion with an automotive expert of a large consulting firm I asked the 
question if joint R&D projects are seen in the industry as a means to cope with 
technological uncertainty. The expert made the point that “a high level of uncertainty 
with regard to future dominant technologies is a strong driver for cooperation. None of 
the many small suppliers has a clue of what will become a standard. The network 
serves as a laboratory to do ‘experiments’ without taking too much risk” (Roland 
Berger, 2010). A study of Deloitte Consulting (2009) identifies a current phase of 
industry convergence, i.e. in the current phase of the life cycle new players enter the 
field and cooperation is not anymore an intra-industry phenomenon but takes place on 
an inter-industry scale. For instance, battery producers cooperate with climatisation 
experts in cooling technologies. A particular active field of current convergence 
processes is research and development. As a kind of anecdotal evidence, this gets 
confirmed by (unsystematically) collected information on collaboration projects 
announced in the German (business) newspapers Financial Times Deutschland, 
Handelsblatt and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung between September 2010 and 
August 2012 as presented in Table 2. The collected information indicates that the 
OMEs cooperate among each other to develop technologies that lie beyond the current 
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paradigm, but also with suppliers, such as SGL Carbon, that have, for instance very, 
specific competences in the field of light materials.  
Table 2: Collection of collaborative projects. 
Date Source Firm (i) Firm (j) Motivation 
17.9.2010 
Financial 
Times 
Deutschland 
Daimler Toyota 
Access to Toyota’s 
hybrid technology 
Daimler BMW 
Development of hybrid 
technology 
Renault Nissan 
Development of 
environmentally 
friendly power trains 
Daimler Evonik 
Development of 
batteries for electric cars 
13.7.2011 Handelsblatt Daimler Bosch 
Common factory for 
electric engines (joint 
venture) 
29.7.2011 Handelsblatt Daimler Renault 
Renault Twingo 
(electric) receives 
battery from Daimler; 
Common development 
of Twingo and Smart; 
Renault provides 
platform of Kangoo; 
Common development 
of engines 
24.8.2011 Handelsblatt 
Bosch 
BASF 
Thyssen-Krupp 
Production of high 
capacity batteries with 
lithium-ion technology 
29.8.2011 Handelsblatt Opel 
30 suppliers of 
renewable 
energy 
Renewable energy for 
electric cars 
1.9.2011 Handelsblatt 
Siemens Volvo Electric cars 
GM LG 
Development of electric 
cars 
2.9.2011 Handelsblatt 
Daimler RWE E-mobility 
BMW SGL Carbon 
Common factory for 
carbon fibers (joint 
venture) 
21.9.2011 
Financial 
Times 
Deutschland 
GM SAIC 
Common development 
and manufacturing of 
electric cars; access to 
Chinese market 
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Volkswagen SAIC 
Access to Chinese 
market 
29.2.2012 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
GM Peugeot 
Equity alliance (GM 
buys shares of PSA) for 
common product 
development of Opel 
and Peugeot 
Peugeot Mini 
Peugeot delivers diesel 
engines 
5.3.2012 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
Jaguar Chery 
Common car 
manufacturing in China 
15.3.2012 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
Volkswagen MAN 
Volkswagen delivers 
power trains; MAN 
complements portfolio 
with small trucks 
16.4.2012 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
Ford Dow 
Development of light 
material (carbon fiber) 
General 
Motors 
Teijin 
Development of light 
material (carbon fiber) 
Volkswagen SGL Carbon 
Development of light 
material (carbon fiber) 
(VW buys shares) 
BMW SGL Carbon 
Development of light 
material (carbon fiber) 
(BMW buys shares) 
Daimler Toray 
 
Development of light 
material (carbon fiber) 
(Joint Venture) 
Daimler BASF 
Development of Smart 
Forvision (concept car) 
24.8.2012 Handelsblatt Daimler 
Renault-Nissan 
(Infiniti) 
Cooperation for 
development and 
production; Cost 
reductions 
In a stylized way, the automotive industry stands in a life cycle concept between the 
"alliance" phase and the "restructuration" phase (Figure 14). If we consider the power 
train as the core module of a car, the dominant design of the internal combustion 
engine became established at the end of a pioneer phase. In the following phases, 
changes in technology (in particular with regard to the power train) where more or less 
incremental only. The paradigm shift towards new concepts of the power train, which 
we now observe, requires more radical new knowledge and thus a renewed industry 
9. An Automotive Innovation Network 115 
 
knowledge-base (cf. chapter 9.3). This pushes firms to enter R&D alliances which are 
characteristic for the current phase. Consequently, the industry is leaving a rather 
exploitative phase and is entering a more explorative phase. A new phase of the 
industry life cycle takes off which is characterized by the integration and development 
of new knowledge. It strengthens the explorative side and requires strong absorptive 
capacities to acquire and process external knowledge which might even stem from 
external industries. 
 
Figure 14: Industry lifecycle (Source: own illustration based on Deloitte Consulting, 2009). 
This explorative side of the industry finds its counterpart by the attempt to exploit the 
existing knowledge-base in the most efficient way. In the automotive industry, both, 
product and process innovation play important roles. Moreover, process innovation 
(e.g. production technologies yielding economies of scale) plays an important role for 
a continuous growth in productivity (Van Biesebroeck, 2003). The ongoing 
consolidation of the industry and the high correlation of sales with the general business 
cycle forces producers to build flexible production facilities and cultivate close 
relations with their suppliers. Sophisticated production technologies and a high level of 
flexibility in combination with modular product architecture
10
 create advantages in 
competition by allowing the realization of economies of scale and flexibility at the 
same time.  
9.1.2 The Importance of the OEM-Supplier Network 
The basic structure of the automotive industry is characterized by few OEMs (Original 
Equipment Manufacturers) and a large number of suppliers grouped in different tiers. 
                                            
10 See for instance the MQB (Modularer Querbaukasten) architecture of Volkswagen. 
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The latter group encompasses component manufactures (often SMEs) as well as big 
multinational enterprises (e.g. Bosch, ZF) which assemble entire systems that are just 
in time supplied at the assembly lines of the OEMs. During the last decade, more and 
more value creation (including R&D), and with it relevant knowledge, was shifted 
from the OEMs to specialized suppliers (Chanaron and Rennard, 2007). This 
organizational shift together with increased complexity of parts and systems created 
new coordination and transaction problems along the value chain. Electronic systems 
linking various units of a car need to communicate with a common language and be 
able to interact without interference in a perfectly reliable manner. Taken together, this 
means that the different parts have to be developed within a comprehensive 
framework. Collaboration in common research projects is seen as the answer to this 
challenge. From single bi- and multilateral collaboration projects, networks develop as 
a strategic instrument for the long run, i.e. firms envisage stable relations and not only 
single common  projects (Staiger, Gleich and Dilk, 2006; Dilk et al., 2008).  
Due to the network character of the entire car production and development process, the 
costs as well as the quality and innovativeness of a car are linked to the supplier-OEM 
network. For instance, Dyer (1996) finds that firms which create specialized supply 
networks are more successful than competitors. The quality of collaborative 
component development is related to at least three fields of producer-OEM 
interactions: the approach of problem solving, communication pattern and the size and 
quality of the knowledge-base. Hence, for the analysis and explanation of success or 
failure of automotive clusters, the relational view of the network is a most promising 
approach. In highly integrated production systems, such as we find them in the 
automotive industry, the competitiveness of the system integrators (OEMs) is highly 
dependent on supplier capability and on how well the involved firms manage the 
division of labor (Takeishi, 2001). A large number of very “specialized suppliers” do 
product innovation primarily based on informal R&D, tacit knowledge and in close 
relation with their customers. Moreover, advanced production processes imply that 
firms master complex systems (manufacturing of complex products) which entail high 
R&D investments. At the same time, economies of scale and mass production are 
important. A classic example for a dense and strongly knit supplier-OEM network is 
the Toyota supplier association. Due to highly developed knowledge transfer routines, 
membership is positively correlated with high productivity performance. To facilitate 
the transfer of valuable tacit knowledge and to effectively disseminate the Toyota 
production system knowledge, a key objective from the beginning was to form strong 
ties (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). The shift of value creation and R&D to suppliers 
requires that the OMEs actively manage the network. Takeishi (2001, p. 419) 
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summarizes the necessary efforts for the OEMs with the words: “Ask not what your 
suppliers can do for you; ask what you can do with your suppliers.” Thus, there are 
three main goals for the installation of automotive networks (Dilk et al., 2008): 
 Access to internally not available knowledge and technologies 
 Contact with clients and downstream market participants  
 Long-term bonding of suppliers and clients 
9.2 Selection of Relevant Network Actors 
For an empirical analysis of the evolution of an automotive network, the first step is to 
select the firms which are considered to be (potentially) part of the network. This 
opens the discussion about the boundaries of the network which is a topic for its own 
in the literature on social network analysis (e.g. Laumann, Marsden and Prensky, 
1992) and will hence not be discussed extensively in this dissertation. The aim at this 
point of the dissertation is to study a publicly funded innovation network in the 
German automotive industry. While it is relatively easy to filter German firms by their 
location (address), the approach for capturing firms of a specific industry, that is a 
sample of firms selected according to some criteria, is more contentious.  In light of 
the convergence process, delineated in the previous subchapter, which brings new 
players in the game, the reliance on standard classifications such as NACE 
(Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne) 
can easily lead to samples that are lacking important actors. Since the general line of 
argumentation in this dissertation is led by a knowledge-based view of the firm, the 
composition of the sample (which must not be confused with a probability or random 
sample) is based on the character of firms’ patent portfolios. To identify relevant firms, 
I scanned in a first step the patent portfolios (OECD, June 2010) REGPAT database 
(unadjusted) of the largest German automotive OEMs and the largest suppliers. A 
ranking of the IPC classes (3-digit) by their relative frequency of occurrence shows 
that the class “B60” (vehicles in general) is the dominant patent class in the OEMs’ 
portfolios and strong in the suppliers’ portfolios (patent priority years 1977-2008). 
Moreover, the top 9 classes account for 68% - 91% of all the patents that belong to the 
selected firms.  
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Table 3: Distribution of relevant IPC classes. 
IPC 
 (3-digit) 
Volkswagen Porsche 
Daimler, 
Mercedes 
BMW Bosch Continental ZF 
B60 30% 31% 26% 27% 16% 38% 19% 
F02 17% 14% 13% 14% 26% 11% 1% 
F01 10% 12% 7% 10% 2% 1% 1% 
F16 10% 19% 7% 10% 5% 8% 57% 
G01 5% 2% 5% 4% 11% 8% 2% 
B62 5% 10% 7% 8% 0% 2% 9% 
H01 2% 0% 5% 3% 6% 3% 1% 
B29 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 6% 0% 
F04 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 3% 2% 
Sum 79% 90% 72% 78% 68% 81% 91% 
Source: own calculations. 
Both, the widespread use of patents to protect inventions and the high R&D intensity 
of the automotive industry are indications for the importance of patents in the 
automotive industry. Accordingly, I picked in a next step all firms from the OECD 
(June 2010) REGPAT database which filed at least one patent application in the class 
“B60” within the period 1998 to 2007, and I neglected non-patenting firms. Firms 
which do not hold patents are most likely unimportant actors in the industry from a 
technological point of view (Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008). In addition, I discarded 
those firms which were exclusively operating in the market for commercial vehicles or 
car accessory kits based on information from companies’ websites. Hence, I excluded 
all firms which were not directly related to the production of passenger cars. I also 
excluded firms which have not been involved in at least one collaborative research 
project during the observation period. The design of the sample according to this 
“recipe” resulted in a selection of 153 firms belonging to the network sample (Table A. 
2). 
The analyzed networks are reconstructed based on information retrieved from the 
German “Förderkatalog” (subsidies catalogue). This is a database which contains rich 
information about all kinds of research projects funded by the federal government. The 
database is publicly accessible via the website www.foerderkatalog.de.
11
 Only those 
firms were eventually picked for the analysis which participated during the period 
                                            
11 On the European level a similar database is available covering the projects of the European framework 
programs. For the US, there is the National Cooperative Research Act-Research Joint Venture (NCRA-RJV) 
database of US-based research joint ventures research, a longitudinal database of strategic technical alliances. 
The NCRA-RJV database contains all RJVs registered with the US Department of Justice under the National 
Cooperative Research Act of 1984 and its amendments in 1993 (Vonortas, 2009). 
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1998-2007 at least once in a funded project. In order to model network evolution, the 
first step is to collect observations. The question is: What is an observation in a study 
on complete networks? We will see that for this kind of analysis the entire network is 
considered an observation. For the network reconstruction, the following assumption is 
made: A tie emerges between two actors i and j if they participated in the same project 
(see Broekel and Graf (2010) for this approach with the “Förderkatalog” database). 
Despite the fact that the database contains rich information about subsidized 
cooperative research projects, it has thus far rarely been used (Broekel and Graf, 
2010). This is surprising because compared to patent data, information on joint 
projects documents research activities of firms in an earlier stage of the innovation 
process. In this phase R&D subsidies are used as a policy tool not only to incentivise 
and to channel R&D investments into new technologies, but also to support the 
exploration of knowledge synergies and mutual knowledge generation. 
R&D subsidies for collaborative research have become a common tool for innovation 
policy makers for a number of reasons: First, due to the sheer scale and broadness of 
some projects they cannot be operated by single firms. Second, knowledge transfer 
from public to private organizations shall be fostered by the participation of 
universities and other public research facilities such as Max Planck and Fraunhofer 
Institutes. Third, collective learning processes shall be fostered (Broekel and Graf, 
2010). In German innovation policy, elements of collaborative research in the design 
of innovation policies gained considerably in importance since the 1990s and include 
cooperation among firms as well as cooperation between firms and public research 
institutes. The projects listed in the “Förderkatalog” contribute to knowledge transfer 
and collective learning (Broekel and Graf, 2010): The participants have to sign 
agreements explicitly stipulating that generated knowledge within the project is freely 
shared among participants. They even have to grant free access to their know-how and 
IPRs within the scope of the projects. Furthermore, they commit to collaborate actively 
with the aim to find new solutions (BMBF, 2008). In the year 2002, almost 70% of 
direct subsidies in the field of mobility and traffic were assigned to collaborative 
projects (Czarnitzki et al., 2003). Moreover, theses funding schemes have a proven 
economic relevance: Czarnitzki, Ebersberger and Fier (2007) find that R&D subsidies 
influence collaborating and patenting activities. Fornahl, Broekel and Boschma (2011) 
find for the German biotech industry that R&D subsidies for collaborative research 
lead to increased patent output. 
To reconstruct (two-mode) networks from project data, at least the following 
information is needed: name of the project, starting and end date as well as the names 
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of the participating organizations. In addition, we can find information about the grant, 
the location of the receiving/executing organization and a classification number which 
divides funded technologies into different classes like biotechnology, energy etc. The 
title of the project is important to separate cooperative projects (“Verbundprojekt” or 
“Verbundvorhaben”) from non-cooperative projects in which single organizations are 
funded. If two firms participate in the same project, this affiliation leads to joint 
activities, interactions and exchanges. “Thus, a two-mode network often goes together 
with interactions that can be described by one-mode networks” (Snijders, Lomi and 
Torló, 2013, p. 265). 
As an example, say project “1” is a cooperative research project in which the four 
firms A, B, C and D collaborate. The participating firms are only considered if they 
fulfill the before mentioned criterion: They must have applied for at least one patent to 
which the IPC class “B60” was assigned. If, for instance, firm D does not fulfill the 
criterion, it is not considered a relevant actor for the analysis. Accordingly, firm D is 
not part of the network but the other three firms A, B and C are connected with each 
other forming a closed triad (Figure 15). In this way, all projects of the database which 
involve at least one of the actors from the sample are analyzed and the network for the 
entire sample gets reconstructed.  
 
Figure 15: Network mapping of project partnership (Source: own illustration). 
Sources containing information about interfirm networks, in particular for longitudinal 
network studies, are scarce. The application of the “Förderkatalog” database to 
reconstruct networks can be regarded as a complementary source to more established 
and “exploited” sources such as patent data or publication data. Still, patent data 
provide valuable information on the knowledge-base of the analyzed firms. 
Project 1
Firm A
Firm B
Firm C
Firm D (no B60 patent)
A
B
C
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9.3 Analysis of the Automotive Sample Knowledge-Base 
Patent documents are classified by one or more classification codes of the International 
Patent Classiﬁcation (IPC) scheme (cf. chapter 8). One of the basic methods to analyze 
a knowledge-base which consists out of patents is to simple count the technology 
classes (IPC) that are assigned to a firm’s patents. However, Engelsman and Van Raan 
(1991), Breschi, Lissoni and Malerba (2003) as well as Saviotti (2004) identify 
characteristics of knowledge structures which imply a different kind of analysis. Their 
analysis is based on the relatedness between technology fields which is approximated 
by the co-occurrence of IPC codes assigned to patents. The following assumption is 
made: The frequency of co-occurrence of IPC codes on the same patent is a proxy for 
the strength of technology and knowledge relationship. A possible objection towards 
the application of IPC codes to approximate the relatedness of knowledge refers to the 
fact that they are assigned by patent examiners and do allegedly not necessarily reflect 
the firm’s perception of relatedness between technology fields. However, as patent 
examiners classify all technical aspects of the invention, the assignation of multiple 
codes reflects in a more impartial way technological relatedness. Before a code gets 
assigned, other patent documents are scanned and if a technological feature is found in 
another document, the respective code gets assigned.  
In this subchapter, I explore the knowledge-base of the selected automotive firms and 
analyze some interesting characteristics such as the degree distribution, the tendency 
towards a small-world network, the development of the centrality of e-mobility patents 
and the influence of ties strength on overlapping ego-networks. In particular, I 
investigate to what extent the emergence of e-mobility technologies is reflected in 
changes of the knowledge-base structure of the firm sample. Moreover, I test if a 
tendency for overlapping ego-networks of IPC classes correlates with the tie strength. 
9.3.1 The Knowledge-Base as a Network 
The correlational and interpretative structure of knowledge makes it possible to 
analyze a knowledge-base as a network (Loasby, 2001; Saviotti, 2004). Elements of a 
knowledge-base are typically not independent from each other but there is some kind 
of relatedness between them. The aim must be to understand the relational structure 
between knowledge elements and its implications (Saviotti, 2004). For the analysis of 
the knowledge-base of the sample of 153 selected firms (chapter 9.2), the network is 
reconstructed as a dichotomized structure, i.e. it is checked if a tie between two IPC 
sub-classes (i,j) is present (      ) or absent (      ). Present means that two IPC 
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sub-classes (4-digits) co-occur on the same patent. Implicitly the assumption is made 
that co-occurrence means that there is a connection between the two elements. I look 
at the patent data through a five year moving window, i.e. five networks of consecutive 
time windows are reconstructed with the first window encompassing the patents first 
applied for between the years 1998 and 2002 (priority date). 
Table 4: Industry knowledge network characteristics. 
 1998-2002 1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 
Number of 
nodes 
473 467 454 459 458 
Number of 
ties 
6002 5958 5817 5312 4902 
Density 0.054 0.054 0.057 0.051 0.047 
Source: own calculations. 
Table 4 indicates that the number of nodes, which is the number of occurring IPC sub-
classes, remains relatively stable with the lowest value in the period 2000-2004 being 
however only 4% lower than the highest value in the initial period. In contrast, the 
number of ties is constantly decreasing with the lowest value in 2002-2006 being 18% 
smaller than the highest value in the beginning. The density is relatively stable in the 
first periods but falls back in the last period to a value of 4.7 %. A decreasing density 
measure can be interpreted as a transition from an exploitative phase in the life cycle 
to a more explorative phase. Exploration requires the recombination of old knowledge 
with (for the industry) new knowledge and thus new nodes entering the network. The 
formation of new ties is not expected to occur simultaneously with the occurrence of 
new ties. Consequently, the density measure falls (Saviotti, 2009).  
We often find in networks degree distributions that are not homogenous across the 
nodes. For instance, Saviotti (2009) shows for a sample of pharmaceutical firms that 
the tie distribution and strength are highly heterogeneous. If we have a look at the 
(dichotomized) degree distributions in the sample (Figure 16), we identify two 
peculiarities: First, the number of low degrees is high compared to a normal 
distribution. Second, the right tails of the curves are relatively fat, especially for the 
time windows 2000-2004 and 2001-2005. This indicates that there are relatively many 
technology classes with high degrees compared to a normal distribution. This first 
graphical analysis gets confirmed in Figure 17 which shows quantile - quantile plots 
(Q-Q-plots) of the network degree distributions against (theoretical) normal 
distributions and a simulated normal distribution against a normal distribution (bottom 
right) as a control. For the degree centralities to be normally distributed the points 
need to be positioned on the middle line. This is only the case for a simulated normal 
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distribution in the lower right but not for the empirical network degree centralities. The 
two lines which are parallel to the diagonal line represent the confidence bounds at a 
significance level of 5%. Obviously, the vast majority of points lies outside the 
boundaries. In particular, the graphics show that the distribution is right skewed. 
Besides this visual test for normal distribution, I ran a Shapiro-Wilk normality test 
(Shapiro and Wilk, 1965). The null hypothesis states that a sample (vector of metric 
values) is derived from a normally distributed population. From the test we get a p-
value which has to be compared to a chosen alpha level. If it is smaller than the alpha 
level, then the null hypothesis is rejected (i.e. we can conclude that the data do not 
come from a normally distributed population). For the tested degree distribution the p-
values are all very small (i.e. smaller than 0.05). Thus, the conclusion can be drawn 
that the degree distributions of the tested networks are not normally distributed.  
 
Figure 16: Degree distributions in the knowledge network (Source: own illustration).  
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Figure 17: Q-Q-Plot degree distribution (Source: own illustration). 
9. An Automotive Innovation Network 125 
 
Table A. 1 illustrates the full list of degree centrality measures for each IPC sub-class 
and in particular its relative position among all sub-classes in the sample separated by 
the five consecutive windows of analysis. I suggest that important knowledge fields, 
represented by IPC sub-classes, are not only reflected by increasing numbers of 
patents but also by an increasing relative importance reflected by growing rates of 
degree centrality. The empirical data show that for all five observation periods, the top 
two sub-classes remain the same with the sub-class B60R (vehicles, vehicle fittings or 
vehicle parts) on the first position for the window 1998-2002 and 2002-2006, and the 
sub-class H01L (semiconductor devices; electric solid state devices) being number one 
during the three windows in between.  
An important topic in the automotive industry remains the current shift towards e-
mobility and hybrid powertrains. German automotive firms have in the past been 
frequently criticized because of the alleged little efforts spent in the field of e-mobility 
and particular in hybrid technologies, whereas, Japanese manufacturers (in particular 
the Toyota group) forcefully advertized their hybrid cars. The question arises, if this 
criticism finds support by an analysis of the sample knowledge-base. Karl and Jäger 
(2011) identify IPC sub-classes that are related to e-mobility and hybrid technologies, 
such as batteries, electric engines, control units etc. (Table 5).  
Table 5: Important IPC sub-classes for e-mobility. 
Number IPC sub-class Technology 
1 H01M Battery 
2 B60L Propulsion 
3 B60K Propulsion unit 
4 H02J Supplying, distributing and storing of electric power and energy 
5 H02K Dynamo-electric machines 
6 G01R Measuring 
7 B60H Climate control 
8 B60W Control systems for hybrid vehicles 
9 B60R Vehicle fittings 
10 H02P Control or regulation of electric motor 
11 B60T Vehicle brake control systems 
12 H01R Cables 
13 H02M Apparatus for conversion (ac-dc etc.) 
14 F16H Gearing 
15 B62D Motor vehicles; trailers 
16 H01L Semiconductor devices 
17 F02D Controlling combustion engines 
18 H02G Installation of electric cables or line 
19 H05K Cooling 
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20 H02H Emergency protective circuit arrangements 
21 H01B Cables; Conductors; Insulators 
22 B60Q Signaling or lighting devices 
Source: own illustration based on Karl and Jäger (2011). 
Moreover, Karl and Jäger (2011) find for the years 2000-2006 a rather constant 
number of e-mobility (including hybrid technology) patent applications of German 
automotive firms and strongly rising application activities only in the years afterwards. 
The same result is found by a study of Stahlecker, Lay and Zanker (2010). If we have a 
look at the degree centralities of the respective e-mobility sub-classes (Table 6), we 
find confirmative results. The degree centrality measure informs about the frequency 
the respective knowledge is used in conjunction with other knowledge fields. Overall, 
knowledge covering e-mobility classes rank high relative to other knowledge fields. 
However, the dynamic is low, only the sub-classes B60T (braking) and H02P 
(electronic engine control) constantly improve their position. 
Table 6: Degree centralities of e-mobility sub-classes (left: degree centrality measure, right: position). 
B60R H01L H05K B60K H01M 
178 1 174 2 122 5 119 6 115 7 
166 2 179 1 118 7 121 5 120 6 
163 2 168 1 110 8 130 3 120 6 
158 2 160 1 109 6 123 4 107 8 
149 1 145 2 111 6 113 4 83 12 
B62D F16H F02D H02K B60T 
112 9 109 10 97 13 94 15 93 16 
112 9 103 10 99 12 97 13 94 15 
116 7 96 15 98 13 101 12 98 13 
108 7 87 15 92 12 91 13 93 11 
94 7 87 9 82 13 84 11 88 8 
H01R G01R B60H B60Q B60W 
80 24 76 28 70 33 70 33 56 43 
82 18 82 18 73 26 71 28 54 42 
80 21 81 20 72 27 67 32 51 46 
76 19 79 16 72 21 63 28 44 43 
64 26 77 16 67 24 62 28 39 45 
B60L H02J H02P H01B H02H 
50 49 49 50 48 51 44 55 43 56 
53 43 46 50 46 50 43 53 41 55 
52 45 43 53 46 50 48 48 40 56 
44 43 41 46 47 40 45 42 44 43 
35 49 42 42 45 39 39 45 42 42 
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H02M H02G 
37 59 27 68 
      
35 60 26 68 
      
39 57 26 70 
      
35 52 28 59 
      
33 51 26 58 
      
Source: own calculations. 
Besides the degree centrality, networks contain an additional piece of information, 
namely the tie strength. The analysis of the sample knowledge-base becomes enriched 
by taking the tie strength into account. Its analysis in a network view has the potential 
to extend our understanding of knowledge-base structures. Figure 18 shows that the 
order of the top ten nodes in terms of degree centrality is relatively stable. Same color 
means that the nodes belong to the same IPC class (3-digit) while the size of the nodes 
indicates their degree centrality. In period 2001-2005 the sub-class G06F (electric 
digital data processing) enters the top ten and in period 2002-2006 the sub-class B60T 
(vehicle brake control systems). Across all observations the strongest tie among the top 
ten nodes is the one between B60R (vehicle fittings) and the general sub-class B62D 
(motor vehicles; trailers). These fields of knowledge are most strongly related. The tie 
between H01L (semiconductor devices) and F02M (supplying combustion engines 
with combustible mixtures) is constantly getting weaker. Also the tie between H01L 
and H05K (cooling) is getting weaker. In contrast, the tie between H01L and G06F 
(electric digital data processing) is getting stronger in the last observation period. 
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Figure 18: Tie strength between IPC-classes (Source: own illustration). 
9.3.2 Test for Small-World Properties 
As illustrated in chapter 5.4, a widespread feature of networks is small-world 
characteristics with a short average path length and a pronounced tendency for the 
formation of densely interconnected cliques. To find out if this characteristic can also 
be found in the analyzed knowledge-network, I test the industry knowledge-bases in 
five consecutive periods for their propensity to exhibit small-world properties.  
Small-world networks are characterized by two features: (i) a high level of local 
clustering and (ii) a short average path length between network actors. To test for 
small-world characteristics, I draw on the Watts and Strogatz (1998) approach which 
compares the observed network path length (PL) and clustering coefficient (CC) with 
the respective properties of a random network with the same size and same number of 
ties. To quantify the comparison, the small-world quotient (Q) is applied. It is defined 
as the ratio of the (global) clustering coefficient (CC/CCr) divided by the ratio of the 
average path length (PL/PLr). The extension r refers to the respective value calculated 
from a random network. 
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Table 7: Small-world test. 
 
Knowledge 
Network 
1998-2002 
Knowledge 
Network 
1999-2003 
Knowledge 
Network 
2000-2004 
Knowledge 
Network 
2001-2005 
Knowledge 
Network 
2002-2006 
Nodes 
(largest 
component) 
459 (97%) 457 (98%) 447 (99%) 447 (97%) 447 (98%) 
Ties 5998 5955 5814 5309 4901 
CC 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.31 
PL 2.41 2.42 2.40 2.47 2.52 
 Random Random Random Random Random 
CCr 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 
PLr 2.16 2.16 2.15 2.21 2.27 
      
CC / CCr 5.50 5.50 5.33 6.40 6.20 
PL / PLr 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.11 
Q 4.93 4.91 4.78 5.73 5.58 
Source: own calculations. Note: CC stands for clustering coefficient and PL for the average path length. The 
extension r refers to the respective value calculated from a random network. 
The figures in Table 7 are calculated on the basis of the largest network component 
which encompasses for all observations at least 97% of the nodes which gives the 
knowledge network a rather cohesive character. Compared to simulated random 
networks with the same number of ties and nodes, the observed networks have all high 
clustering coefficients and average path lengths similar to random networks. This 
combination yields small-world quotients (Q) that are much greater than 1.0 which 
signifies that the networks can indeed be labeled as small-world networks. A small-
world network can be developed from a regular network by adding a number of 
shortcuts (cf. Figure 6). For a knowledge network based on the co-occurrence of IPC-
classes, this means that extra cluster ties are formed, i.e. ties between densely 
interconnected technology fields. Such new combinations between technology fields 
indicate a high potential for innovations. In line with this interpretation of the small 
world-characteristic, an increase in the small-world quotient (Q) signifies an increase 
in potential innovativeness of actors owing this technological knowledge-base. 
9.3.3 Tie Strength and Network Overlaps 
In social networks, ties can be strong, for instance when we collaborate with someone 
on a regular basis, or weak, if we meet someone only occasionally. This idea was taken 
up by Granovetter (1973) who investigates strong and weak ties in a professional 
context, suggesting that it is weak social ties which are most valuable in the search for 
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employment. In the context of innovation networks, participants benefit from their 
relational and structural embeddedness, i.e. from direct and indirect linkages to other 
network participants (chapter 2.1). While strong (direct) ties allow for the exchange of 
complex information and tacit knowledge due to the possibilities of further inquiries, 
weak ties, instead, enable the network actors to access entirely new knowledge. Weak 
ties connect actors to remote subgroups in the innovation network where – with a 
higher probability – new knowledge can be grasped (Granovetter, 1973; Granovetter, 
1983; Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000). From a slightly different angle we can 
also say that a strong tie network is conducive to the diffusion of existing knowledge. 
In addition, the transfer of tacit knowledge is accelerated in strong tie networks since 
the strong redundant ties are an indicator for the high level of trustworthiness in the 
network. On the other hand, weak tie networks are more beneficial for explorative 
tasks, i.e. the generation of new knowledge which is limited in dense networks in 
which redundant knowledge supersedes (Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000).  
Granovetter describes the strength of a tie by the following definition: “The strength of 
a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, 
the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” 
(Granovetter, 1973, p. 1361). Most people would probably intuitively agree on these 
characteristics to be applied in social interpersonal networks. However, the nodes I 
analyze in this chapter are knowledge-elements (IPC sub-classes) which I assume to be 
linked if they co-occur on the same patent. Thus, the strength of a tie must be 
evaluated by a different characteristic compared to an interpersonal network. To 
determine the strength of a tie in a knowledge network which illustrates the relatedness 
of knowledge, I suggest counting the number of co-occurrences of IPC sub-classes (4-
digit level) on all the patents in a firm or industry knowledge-base. I consider this an 
analogy to Granovetter’s “time commitment” reasoning. In this vein, I not only 
analyze the network of a single firm, but I scrutinize the characteristics of the sampled 
industry knowledge-base which consists of all patents of the 153 firms purposely 
selected as the sample of analysis.  
A central hypothesis of Granovetter’s (1973) theory is that the ego-networks of any 
two actors i and j have a strong tendency for overlapping if the tie between node i and j 
is a strong tie. That is, if two actors are connected by a strong tie they supposedly share 
other cooperation partners. Thereby, the dyadic tie structure gets linked into larger 
network configurations. According to Granovetter (1973), there are two mechanisms 
which are causal for the appearance of such overlapping structures: First, if we assume 
that node i is connected with j and with k, then the probability for the establishment of 
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a tie between j and k is a function of the tie strength between i and j. The higher the 
frequency of interaction and thus the tie strength between i and j is, the more often also 
j and k have the opportunity to meet which is conducive to the formation of a tie 
between j and k (Homan, 1951). The opportunity to meet is particularly elevated once 
there is not only a strong tie between i and j but also between i and k. Second, the more 
similar two (or more) individuals or organizations are in one or more characteristics, 
the stronger is the tie between them (homophily theory). Accordingly, if i and j and 
respectively i and k are connected by strong ties, then j and k are probably also similar, 
paving the way for the two actors to form a tie (Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: Overlapping ego networks (Source: own illustration). 
The suggestion that the degree of ego network overlap can be explained by the tie 
strength of social relations gets in a next step transferred to the patent network 
representing the knowledge-base of the analyzed automotive firms. I suggest that a tie 
between two IPC sub-classes (4-digit level) exists whenever two sub-classes co-occur 
on the same patent. The frequency of co-occurrence of patent classes on a patent 
reflects the strength of relationship between these knowledge fields as well as their 
distance (e.g. Schoen et al., 2012). For the mechanisms which are causal for the 
emergence of overlaps I make the following suggestions: First, if the patent sub-class i 
is similar, related or complementary and thus regularly co-occurs together with the 
sub-class j (and k), then there is a high probability that the knowledge reflected by the 
IPC sub-classes j and k is also similar, related or complementary and will hence be 
combined. Second, the more often the patent sub-classes i and j as well as i and k co-
occur on a patent, the higher is the probability that also j and k co-occur on a third 
patent or that the three together will occur on a fourth patent (Figure 20). The reason is 
that classes which are technologically-wise similar will often be called for in tandem 
by EPO examiners.  
i
j k
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Figure 20: Overlapping technology networks (Source: own illustration). 
Based on these considerations, I state the following hypothesis: The stronger the tie 
between two IPC sub-classes is, the higher is the probability that the ego networks of 
the two sub-classes overlap. The tie strength (s) is measured by the number two IPC 
sub-classes (i,j) (4-digit level) co-occur on a patent (p) in the sample. The result is a 
node-by-node matrix which includes the strength of ties among all pairs of actors 
(named STRENGTH): 
          ( 13 ) 
The overlap is operationalized by counting the number of IPC sub-classes both focal 
nodes (i,j) are linked to. These numbers are also arranged as a node-by-node matrix 
named OVERLAP. For the computation of the overlap the (symmetric) adjacency 
matrix of ties between IPC sub-classes is dichotomized in a first step which means that 
the information about the tie strength is discarded. This procedure results in a matrix 
called A. Subsequently, the matrix A gets multiplied by its transpose A’ which gives the 
OVERLAP matrix. Thereby, the number of times each pair of rows in matrix A has a 
“1” in the same column is counted. A “1” in the same column means that the two IPC 
sub-classes have a tie to the same third party IPC sub-class. Thus: 
              ( 14 ) 
In this way, I construct a model which is used for the hypothesis test. The variables in 
the model are matrices including information about the tie existence, strength and the 
degree of overlap. Thus, I test if the overlap (dependent variable) is correlated with the 
tie strength (independent variable) in a way that the overlap can be explained by tie 
strength (for this approach see Borgatti and Feld, 1994). A straightforward way to test 
Patent 3
Patent 1 Patent 2
Patent 4
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this interdependency could possibly be the application of OLS (Ordinary Least 
Square) regression or rather logistic regression for the case of binary data. However, as 
in the case of modeling innovation network evolution problems related to statistical 
methods arise:  
 First, we do not have random samples but we are dealing with an entire 
“population” which is the knowledge network as such. 
 Second, variables are probably not drawn from a normal distribution (see the 
skewed degree distributions). Without an assumption of a distribution of the 
“population” we do not know against what we can compare the test statistic. 
 Third, we are faced with the problem frequently occurring in networks, namely 
that observations (ties) are not independent, for instance due to the propensity to 
form closed triads causing trouble with autocorrelation. That is, observations 
within rows or columns in the matrices tend to be strongly correlated. Strong 
correlations across observations lead to errors which are correlated with each 
other. Consequently, standard errors get wrong. Typically correlations result in too 
small standard errors and thus too small p-values which imply a rejection of the 
null hypothesis stating that there is no positive relationship between the tie 
strength and the overlap. 
A possible way out is to explicitly model dependency which is done with the stochastic 
actor-based model for network dynamics (chapter 9.5). Another possible – and for the 
presented context more obvious option – is to work with a randomization or 
permutation method of a correlation test which can cope with the reported problems. 
This approach works as follows: The Pearson correlation between the matrices 
STRENGTH and OVERLAP is calculated. In order to check the significance of the 
correlation the following question is raised: How likely is it that we can get a 
correlation as high as the observed one just by chance? To answer this question the 
observation is compared against a distribution of correlations from which we know 
that the process which assigns values to the independent variable matrix is a random 
process (sampling). Based on this randomization procedure, which is actually a 
permutation process repeatedly shuffling the values of the original matrix, for each 
permutation a correlation is calculated resulting in a distribution of random correlation 
values. These randomized datasets constitute a sampling distribution which resembles 
the original dataset (automorphism to the original data on a variable). Now we can 
calculate a p-value which gives the proportion of permutated (random) correlations 
which are as large as the observed correlations: 
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 ( 15 ) 
With the permutated matrix a random estimation of the depended variable can be done. 
The share of coefficients is accounted which is as extreme as the coefficient computed 
from the observation. If it is located at an extreme high or low percentile (dependent 
on the chosen significance level) the null hypothesis will be rejected.  
The permutation as such is done with the so-called Quadratic Assignment Procedure 
(QAP) which is implemented in the Ucinet software (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 
2002) (for an overview see Hubert, 1987). QAP is a non-parametric method which 
mixes (only) the dependent variable data by a sequence of permutations. Dependence 
within rows and columns is conserved but the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables is resolved by random permutations of the rows and columns. 
Values sharing a row/column in the original data set share a row/column in the 
permuted data as QAP applies the same permutation for the rows as for the columns. 
After the permutation, we can expect that there is no relation whatsoever between the 
dependent and the independent variable anymore, which corresponds with the null 
hypothesis. One advantage of this method is that it does not require an assumption 
about the distribution of parameters. For the number of permutations a value as large 
as 5000 is chosen. In general, a high number of permutations improves the estimates of 
standard error and significance. Krackhardt (1987, 1998) shows that for the case of 
structural data the QAP method delivers better results for significance tests compared 
to OLS regressions.  
Table 8: Pearson correlation between tie strength and network overlap. 
 1998-2002 1999-2003 2000-2004 2001-2005 2002-2006 
Pearson 
correlation 
0.371 0.371 0.380 0.386 0.393 
p-value 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
Source: own calculations. 
For all network observations the Pearson correlation coefficient is greater than 0.37 
indicating that there is indeed a positive relationship between the tie strength and an 
overlap of ego networks (Table 8). Even though this is not a test for the direction of 
correlation or for causality, the theoretical considerations made before support the 
reasoning that the stronger the tie is the more the ego networks are overlapping. 
Moreover, the measured correlation is highly significant as p-values, i.e. the proportion 
of correlation generated by permutation that are as large as the observed correlation, is 
very low (< 0.02%).  
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To improve the validity of this result, Borgatti and Feld (1994) suggest conducting the 
same test with the non-overlap matrix, i.e. to control the non-overlap matrix with the 
strength matrix for correlation. Given a positive correlation between the overlap and 
the strength matrix, a negative correlation between the non-overlap and the strength 
matrix would be the strongest confirmation for the result calculated before. 
Contrariwise, a strong positive correlation between the non-overlap and the strength 
matrix would imply that strong ties most likely occur between nodes that have 
generally a high number of ties, i.e. their neighborhoods both overlap and do not 
overlap much. For the presented dataset correlations between the non-overlap and the 
strength matrix are positive but very small (around 0.04). This result takes me to the 
conclusion that there is indeed a tendency for nodes which have strong ties to have 
overlapping ego-networks. 
9.4 Descriptive Network Statistics 
In this subchapter, I report basic statistics which provide a first impression of the 
observed network evolution of the analyzed automotive innovation network. This 
impression is supported by a visual mapping of the network change. In addition, I 
control if the analyzed network exhibits small-world properties, a characteristic which 
is often found in “natural” networks that are not designed by virtue of a certain policy. 
9.4.1 Tie Evolution over Time 
Figure 21 and Table 9 indicate an increase in the number of established ties between 
the observation years 2005 and 2006 as well as between the years 2006 and 2007. This 
can to some extent be explained by an increased number of subsidized research 
projects as this policy instrument gained in importance over the years (Figure 22). The 
number of disrupted as well as the number of stable ties is faltering over the 
observation period. Figure 23 shows the resulting networks for the six observation 
points (December) 2002-2007 and their regional clustering. 
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Figure 21: Development of the analyzed automotive innovation network (2002-2007) (Source: own 
illustration). 
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Figure 22: Number of projects (Source: own calculation and illustration). 
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Figure 23: Geographical development of the automotive innovation network (Source: own 
illustration). 
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Table 9: Link development 2002-2007. 
Observation 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
2002  2003 11448         14 43 123 
2003  2004 11481         10 39 98 
2004  2005 11475         45 58 50 
2005  2006 11456         77 17 78 
2006  2007 11440         33 11 144 
Source: own calculations. Note: The table shows the tie development between observation points. 0 1 refers to 
established, ties, 1 0 to disrupted ties and 1 1 gives the number of stable ties. 
Table 10 shows that the density of the network is overall relatively low. It is slightly 
diminishing from 2002 to 2005 and then rising again to the final year 2007. Likewise, 
the average degree centrality which indicates the average number of established 
cooperative relations is decreasing in the first half and increasing again in the second 
half. This tendency is confirmed by the number of ties which have been formed in the 
network (Table 9). 
Table 10: Density measure 2002-2007. 
Observation 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Density 0.014 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.013 0.015 
Average 
Degree 
Centrality 
2.170 1.791 1.412 1.242 2.026 2.314 
Number of 
ties 
166 137 108 95 155 177 
Source: own calculations. 
9.4.2 Test for Small-World Properties 
A potential shortcoming of this network data is a possible political determination, i.e. 
networks are to some extent designed by political decisions to support certain key 
technologies that are considered as relevant for the improvement of the 
competitiveness of the national economy. This includes also granting schemes that 
disqualify certain firms and reduce the number of eligible firms. Innovation networks 
generated by policy instruments might differ from emerging networks without external 
stimulus and confine the interpretation of the results (Schön and Pyka, 2012). Because 
publicly funded networks (formally) dissolve per definition after the funding period, 
long lasting linkages for knowledge transfer and learning might not appear. 
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In many cases, self-organizing networks are characterized by small-world properties 
(Watts and Strogatz, 1998) which do not appear as frequently in networks created by 
policy instruments. For instance, small-world properties are found by Uzzi and Spiro 
(2005) for a network of Broadway musical artists, by Newman (2001b) for networks 
of scientific co-authoring in seven different scientific disciplines, by Fleming, King 
and Juda (2007) for patent collaboration networks, by Davis, Yoo and Baker (2003) for 
the network of US company directors and by Pyka, Gilbert and Ahrweiler (2007) for 
innovation networks in the biopharmaceutical industries.  
The identification of small-world attributes in the observed innovation networks in the 
automotive industry would weaken the objection towards publicly funded networks. 
The measurement of the required path length (PL) makes only sense in networks 
where all actors have at least one tie. Therefore, the largest component is extracted 
from the full network. If the small-world quotient is greater than 1.0, then the network 
can be designated as small-world network (cf. chapter 9.3.2). The reported statistics by 
Kogut and Walker (2001) indicate that the critical value of the small-world quotient Q 
is supposed to increase with rising numbers of nodes in the network. Table 11 shows 
that Q is in fact for all observed networks larger than 1.0. 
Table 11: Small-world test. 
 
Network 
2002 
Network 
2003 
Network 
2004 
Network 
2005 
Network 
2006 
Network 
2007 
Nodes 
(largest 
component) 
56 52 46 48 55 64 
Ties 166 137 108 95 155 177 
CC 0.38 0.42 0.44 0.32 0.45 0.44 
PL 2.42 2.55 2.70 2.85 2.73 2.70 
 Random Random Random Random Random Random 
CCr 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.09 
PLr 2.42 2.52 2.59 2.77 2.47 2.58 
       
CC / CCr 3.45 3.82 4.40 4.00 4.50 4.89 
PL / PLr 1.00 1.01 1.04 1.03 1.11 1.05 
Q 3.45 3.77 4.22 3.89 4.07 4.67 
Source: own calculations. Note: CC stands for clustering coefficient and PL for the average path length. The 
extension r refers to the respective value calculated from a random network. 
The concept of the small-world network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) was originally 
developed for one-mode networks such as friendship networks. The interpretation of 
the clustering coefficient (CC), which is required to calculate the small-world quotient 
9. An Automotive Innovation Network 143 
 
(Q), entails a possible pitfall in the case of a two-mode (affiliation) network which is 
rarely discussed. For instance, the ties of a two-mode network may be based on the 
participation and presumed interaction within a common (research-) project. 
Accordingly, there are two levels of possible nodes for the analysis, namely the level 
of projects and the level of actors within the projects. In order to analyze a two-mode 
network it gets usually transformed by projection into a one-mode network as most 
network measures are only defined for the one-mode case. By projecting a two-mode 
network into a one-mode network the information of the two-mode structure is lost.
12
 
As shown in Figure 24, a feature of projected networks is that all project members of 
the example form a fully linked clique. Since the global network is formed out of the 
cliques that are linked to each other by firms which participate in multiple projects, the 
projected one-mode network overstates the true level of clustering compared to a 
respective random network (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). Thus, there is a possible pitfall in 
the interpretation of network measures such as the clustering coefficient. 
 
Figure 24: Projection of a two-mode-network (Source: own illustration). 
The clustering coefficient (CC) is defined as the probability that a connected triplet of 
nodes is actually a triangle. That is, with the clustering coefficient we can measure the 
likelihood that two firms which have a common cooperation partner also cooperate 
among each other. Accordingly, the calculation of a clustering coefficient does not 
make sense for the case of a two-mode network as it is based on the enumeration of 
closed triangles in the network:  
    
                   
              
 ( 16 ) 
                                            
12 The information of the two-mode structure can however be used to endow the ties with weights. This can be 
based on the account of common nodes or rather a discounting procedure can be used to devaluate ties. This 
could for instance mean that ties in projects that include lots of firms get a lower weight than ties in projects that 
include only few firms. The logic behind is that in larger groups interaction will be less frequent than in smaller 
groups (see Newman (2001a) for the discounting approach). 
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The projected network contains more triangles compared to a typical network which is 
shaped by a similar tendency for triadic closure. Moreover, the projections may also 
lead to an artificially high density. Accordingly, the measured clustering coefficient 
can be a misleading indicator if it is not interpreted with care. It requires some kind of 
adjustment – at least mentally. To adjust the measure, the suggestion is made that the 
within-project clustering needs to be deducted. This is related to the observation that a 
value of the CC-ratio (measured CC / random CC) in the two-mode case of about 1.0 
signifies that the measured clustering in the network comes predominantly from within 
project clustering and only to a small extent from the ties linking projects. Once the 
CC-ratio grows larger than 1.0 the amount of inter-project clustering starts to grow. A 
further observation is that with rising CC- ratios it is the firms that previously already 
participated in the same project and had common third party ties which build the links 
between clusters (Newman, 2001b). In other words, the more a two-mode network 
gains the character of a small-world network, the more links between clusters are 
established which allows for a widespread distribution of knowledge nested in 
research projects throughout the network. 
In order to evaluate a clustering coefficient calculated for a one-mode projection of a 
two-mode innovation network, it is helpful to recapitulate the context in which the 
measure is applied. It serves as a subindicator for the small-worldness of an innovation 
network and the small-world character contributes to the knowledge diffusion process 
throughout the network (Cowan and Jonard, 2003; Cowan and Jonard, 2004). For the 
analyzed network, the CC-ratio is for all observation points considerably larger than 
1.0, ranging from 3.45 to 4.67. Furthermore, Table 12 indicates the percentage of firms 
for the six observation points which participated in more than one project (among 
those that participated at least in one project) thereby establishing inter-clique ties 
leading to “real” clustering. The share ranges from 43% to 53% which designates 
about half of the firms as inter-tie spanners.  
Table 12: Share of firms in multiple projects. 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
49 % 48 % 43 % 43 % 53 % 52 % 
Source: own calculations. 
In addition, the formation of triadic structures in actor-based networks can be related 
to a social cohesion effect (see the chapter on transitivity) and is a hypothesized 
property of the observed network. Müller, Buchmann and Kudic (2013) develop a 
simulation algorithm for network evolution which explicitly takes the tendency for 
transitive closure into account. Based on this algorithm, networks are simulated with 
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the same number of nodes and ties as in the case of the observed networks. The 
clustering coefficient of the simulated networks is significantly higher compared to 
random networks but somewhat lower compared to the observed networks. This brings 
me to the conclusion that the high clustering coefficient can partly be explained by the 
projection but partly also by real transitivity based on social interaction patterns. The 
analysis of two-mode networks became increasingly popular during the last years. 
New attempts have been made for capturing the degree of clustering more properly in 
such networks. Basically two different lines are followed: First, an adjustment of the 
measured clustering coefficient based on the distribution of clique spanning ties 
(Newman, Strogatz and Watts, 2001; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). Second, the development 
of an alternative clustering coefficient measure which can be applied to two-mode 
networks to avoid projection. 
9.5 A Stochastic Actor-Based Model for Network Evolution 
To model network evolution and to test hypotheses referring to its drivers, I apply a 
stochastic actor-based model for network dynamics (Snijders, 1996; Snijders, 2001; 
Snijders, 2005) suited for statistical inference analysis based on longitudinal network 
data. While this model belongs to the class of agent-based models (chapter 6.2), the 
notion actor-based or stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM) is used to avoid any 
misleading association, for instance with principal-agent theory. Actor orientation 
means that for each change in the network structure the perspective of the focal actor 
is taken whose tie is changing. The applied model has the advantage of capturing 
network evolution driven by a combination of effects (independent variables) 
simultaneously. The model allows for testing hypotheses about driving factors and for 
estimating parameters. Accordingly, stochastic actor-based models for network 
dynamics allow analyzing the process of innovation network evolution and 
disentangling in this complex process different independent variables. Contrariwise, 
standard regression models can hardly be applied to network data since the 
independence of observations (tie formation and dissolution) is a prerequisite, whereas 
tie dependency (endogeneity) is explicitly modeled in the applied approach. A further 
way to deal with endogeneity is to apply a permutation test, e.g. a QAP (Quadratic 
Assignment Procedure) test which calculates Pearson correlations between two 
matrices (cf. chapter 9.3.3). The SAOM could originally only be applied to directed 
networks. Only recently it has been extended in a way that we can use it for the 
analysis of undirected (innovation) networks, too (Snijders, 2008). The original 
intention was to model the evolution of networks in groups consisting of individuals 
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such as school classes, and a main interest was to discover sociological principles of 
network evolution. Economists and management focused researchers found that 
stochastic actor-based models are also suitable to capture the evolution of 
interorganizational and in particular interfirm networks. 
Other network models which could also qualify for an application to innovation 
networks, such as Bala and Goyal (2000) or Marsili, Vega-Redondo and Slanina 
(2004), are likewise of the agent-based type but they only take a single social theory 
into account. The widespread used application of scale-free networks (Barabasi and 
Albert, 1999) is limited because it considers only one explanatory variable, namely the 
uneven distribution of the actors’ degrees. The models of Watts and Strogatz (1998) or 
Barabasi and Albert (1999) are similarly restricted in their number of considered 
driving forces and do not model the dissolution of ties. To understand network 
dynamics, the exclusive focus on the emergence of the network ties is not sufficient. 
Of course, also the dissolution of network linkages shapes network evolution and 
provides information about preferences with regard to cooperation partner selection. 
Here we find the decisive advantage of the stochastic actor-based approach. This 
model explicitly considers formation and dissolution of network ties and allows for 
consulting a broad set of explanatory variables.  
9.5.1 Model Building Blocks 
Based on the first observation, the SAOM simulates with a stochastic process 
networks in the space of all possible networks with the aim to arrive at the structure of 
the second observation. There are in general a large number of possible networks 
which have the same number of nodes and ties. What we do not know is which 
processes lead to the formation of the observed structure. Consequently, the goal is to 
find a model that represents as accurate as possible the processes that shaped the 
observed network and to find parameters which make model statistics fit to the 
observed network statistics. If the modeled network and the observed network share 
many characteristics, we can conclude that the effects (independent variables) the 
model contains determined the evolution of the observed network. Also, the statistical 
significance of estimated parameters is controlled to see if a network configuration 
resulting from an effect is in the observed network included to an extent that is greater 
or smaller than what is expected to occur from a random process. The influence of a 
particular effect is defined by the value of its parameter. In cases where the parameter 
is large and positive, the corresponding configuration (e.g. the number of closed triads) 
appears more frequently than for low parameter values. For instance, high values of 
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the parameter that is related to triadic closure let us expect to observe a lot of closed 
triads. However, due to different scaling, comparisons in the magnitude between 
effects and especially between models are difficult. To have a single model definition, 
the number of effect parameters gets reduced to one parameter for each effect, e.g. the 
assumption is made that the parameters for triadic closure are the same for all closed 
triads in the network. 
In the SAOM, firms are modeled as organizations following decision rules, seeking to 
improve the value of a so-called objective function which reflects their preferences for 
particular partners and network structures. When an actor i gets the chance to change a 
tie, it will select the change which yields the highest increase in the objective function 
(plus a random term). That is, the objective function reflects the value an actor attaches 
to a certain network structure. The behavior of firms can be described by what Nelson 
and Winter (1982) call routines. In this understanding, firm activities are steered by 
rather persistent rules that express what a firm does in fields such as production, 
logistics, R&D etc. “Routines play the role that genes play in biological evolutionary 
theory” (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 14). They are heritable and selectable like genes. 
Routines are persistent but not static. The direction of change is led by a change 
routine that reflects a research processes and subsequent change of routines in an 
evolutionary economic model is comparable to mutation in evolutionary biology. The 
search process together with the selection mechanism, both are interaction factors 
changing firm characteristics in an adaptive manner. Such change processes take time. 
Accordingly, time is naturally an ingredient in a model that reflects adaptive routinized 
behavior. 
The basic network denotation applied with the SAOM is in line with regular social 
network analysis (e.g. Wasserman and Faust, 1994). A network is represented by an n 
* n adjacency matrix                 for m = 1,.., M with i and j ranging from 1 to 
g which is the number of network actors (nodes).        takes the value 0 if there is no 
link at point t from i to j or 1 if there is a tie from i to j at time t. The diagonal of the 
matrix takes the value 0,          for all i as it does not make any sense to a have a 
tie from an actor to itself. Changes in tie variables are the dependent variables in the 
model. As an example, Figure 25 shows the formation of a tie between actor B and C, 
and the respective change in the adjacency matrix. 
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Figure 25: Example of a change in tie variable (Source: own illustration). 
The SAOM is characterized by two important features: First, it is dynamic in the sense 
that the ties between the actors change over time and each firm can decide with whom 
to start or to cease collaboration (control of outgoing tie). This decision is made on the 
basis of actor characteristics (e.g. homophily) and on the existing respectively possibly 
realized network structure. The idea that not only individual covariates but also 
structural network characteristics play a role can be traced back to the concept of 
structural individualism (Udehn, 2002; Hedström, 2005). The emergence of structural 
effects signifies that ties between two actors (i,j) are highly depended on the existence 
of ties between other actors. Second, network ties are regarded as states, i.e. ties are 
rather persistent in time and do not represent short events only. Cooperation for 
innovation has necessarily a long term perspective to match knowledge-bases and tacit 
knowledge. Partnerships which are inclined for the long run are more stable as they 
allow for a matching of objectives (Dodgson, 1993). Projects listed in the 
“Förderkatalog” typically run for at least three years (often longer). 
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As an approximation, change in the network structure is interpreted as the result of a 
continuous-time Markov chain in the space of all possible networks, meaning that the 
momentary state of the network determines probabilistically its further evolution. Such 
models are adequately realistic and qualify for an implementation as a computer 
simulation for parameter estimation (Snijders, 2005). Simulating network evolution 
with empirical data requires at least two observations of the network (M   2) from 
which change is taking place between the observation points. A model extension to 
weighted ties is part of current research only such that at the current state of model 
development dichotomized adjacency matrices are used. 
9.5.2 Networks as States of a Markov Chain 
The aim is to capture and explain tie changes with a statistical model. Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques are suitable to conduct statistical analysis of 
network evolution implemented as a stochastic simulation model. Parameters are 
estimated by a MCMC implementation of the methods of moments applying a 
stochastic approximation algorithm. A set of initial parameters serves as a basis for a 
simulation of random networks. In a next step, parameter values are adjusted by 
comparing the simulated networks with the observation. These steps are repeated until 
the parameter values stabilize and are used for simulating networks that resemble the 
observation (Snijders, 2001). For the Markov process, χ is denoted as the arbitrary 
finite outcome space (all combinatorial possible adjacency matrices with the same 
number of nodes and ties). Network evolution is assumed to proceed as a stochastic 
process in the space of all possible networks. It is further assumed that (entire) 
networks are random variables (X) which have a probability distribution that is 
complex and cannot be approximated by a regular (e.g. normal) distribution. The 
actually observed network (x) is assumed to be drawn from the population of all 
possible networks that are simulated based on a model that includes the dependent 
variables which are tested for their significance as drivers of network evolution. The 
space of possible networks (the population) is huge. For cooperation networks, i.e. 
undirected networks, the number of possible networks with the same number of nodes 
can be calculated as follows: Each dyad between firms (i,j) can take the value 1 (if i 
and j cooperate) or 0 (if i and j do not cooperate) in the adjacency matrix resulting in 
two possible values. The number of possible dyads in a network is determined by the 
number of actors n and results in         . Dyads with values 0 and 1 can be 
combined in all possible ways which gives a totality of  
      
  distinguishable network 
structures. As an example, for a network which is composed of only n = 3 firms, 8 
different networks can be thought of (Figure 26). For larger numbers of actors, the 
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number of possible networks increases very rapidly. For the case of the analyzed 
automotive network with n = 153 firms, there are already        possible network 
structures limiting considerably the possibilities for analytic solutions. 
    
    
Figure 26: Possible network structures with three actors (Source: own illustration). 
At least two observations of the network structures need to be made at discrete points 
in time, but changes are assume to take place unobserved between two observation 
points and are hence modeled. This kind of analysis is also referred to as network 
panel analysis (see for the roots of this concept Holland and Leinhardt (1977), 
Wasserman (1980) and Leenders (1995)). Evolutionary change naturally involves 
processes taking place in time and the time parameter t is considered a continuous 
variable. The combination of continuous time in the model and discrete observation 
points seems to be most adequate for modeling tie emergence and dissolution between 
actors with ties that endogenously depend upon each other as the following example 
illustrates: We assume a group of three firms. In the beginning, at t = 0, there is no 
cooperation between them, thus they are fully isolated. At the next observation point, 
the three firms have started to cooperate among each other and have formed a closed 
triangle. The emergence of the triangular structure cannot be explained in a model with 
discrete time only since the triangle might just happen to be there at a certain 
observation point. The emergence as a step by step process can only be modeled with a 
continuous time approach.  
The number of observation points t1 to tM is an element in a continuous series of time 
points                         . The network of the first observation is not 
simulated but the observation is used as initial structure from which on the change to 
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the second observation is simulated. That is, the simulation seeks to grasp the change 
which happens unobserved between two consecutive observation points (Figure 27).  
 
Figure 27: Simulation of unobserved change (Source: own illustration). 
For a stochastic process            to be a Markov process the following condition 
has to be fulfilled: For any point in time     , the conditional distribution of future 
states             , given the present and the past             , is only a function 
of the present state       (Snijders, 2001). In other words, the current state of the 
network is the constraint for its further direction and dynamic of change. In this 
respect, the model is somewhat myopic since the earlier past has no direct effect on the 
future evolution. We can also speak of myopic stochastic optimization: All the 
information which drives the change process is incorporated in the current state. In 
order to make the model more “history friendly” and to remedy to some extent its 
myopic character, it is advisable to include covariates which represent relevant 
information of the past (Snijders, 1996). This could for instance be the age or 
cumulated size of an actor’s knowledge-base. 
The probability for any possible outcome of a stochastic process     for any pair of 
time points       is given by: 
 
                                 
                        
( 17 ) 
Since the aim is not only to demonstrate and make comprehensible which mechanisms 
are at work in a network but to estimate parameters for a model, a few data 
requirements have to be fulfilled. First, we need enough data in order to actually 
estimate parameters and to ensure a high goodness-of-fit level. Second, parsimony is 
desired, that is, the model should not include more details (variables) than what can be 
estimated from the empirical data (Hedström, 2005). Once we have collected enough 
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information about properties and interaction of actors, the model parameters can be 
estimated. To estimate the parameters, I use the SIENA program which applies the 
described Markov chain Monte Carlo implementation of the method of moments for 
parameter estimation (Snijders, 1996; Snijders, 2001).
13
 The MCMC estimations can 
be interpreted like the results of a logistic regression which means that we have to 
control for potentially relevant variables that could influence change processes in the 
network (Balland, De Vaan and Boschma, 2012). 
9.5.3 Model Specification 
The first step of the simulation concerns the decision about which actor gets the 
opportunity to change a tie (start or interrupt a cooperation) or to maintain it. We can 
either assign the same probability to each actor (same rate of change  ) or make this 
depended on covariates or network positions. The model which I develop in this 
dissertation is specified by a uniform rate function. Moreover, I assume that the rate 
function    is constant between    and     . At any point in time, only one actor can 
change a tie in the model, thus, ties cannot be changed simultaneously by collusion or 
by other forms of coordination. Actors react to change made in a previous time-step by 
another network actor (Holland and Leinhardt, 1977; Snijders, 2001). Accordingly, the 
network evolution process gets subdivided into the smallest possible components and 
encompasses in fact two subprocesses:  
 The first subprocess relates to the regularity an actor gets the chance to change a 
tie (       (rate function).  
 The second subprocess refers to changes of the tie status (objective function). 
The process of changing a tie variable is called a micro-step. The rate function       
for actor i determines how regularly the actor does a micro-step. The concept of a 
micro-step means that two consecutive network states only differ by just one tie 
variable. A larger change in the network structure from one observation to the next is 
assumed to accrue from a sequence of micro-steps. The probability for doing a 
particular step depends in turn on the objective function (18). Tie changes are 
determined by the objective function which expresses how a firm perceives the 
network and evaluates the different change options. Regarded from a different angle, 
                                            
13 The more common maximum likelihood estimation method has also become available. However, reported 
experience suggests that estimations do not deviate strongly from a method of moments estimation but the 
estimation process takes considerably longer (Ripley, Snijders and Preciado, 2010). 
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the objective function represents the preference distribution of an actor over the set χ 
of all possible networks. It models the attractiveness of a network state x for actor i. In 
particular, it is used to compare the attractiveness of different tie change options. For 
any possible state of the network, the objective function takes a certain value. The aim 
of each actor is to increase the value of the objective function. For higher values the 
probability increases that the actor opts for the respective network state. For instance, 
it is counted how many transitive triads are at a certain point in time in the network 
and how many will be there if the actor i does one of the possible micro steps. 
Formally, the objective function is a linear combination of a variety of weighted 
components which are called effects (independent variables). The exact configuration 
depends on the hypotheses which are derived from theory (cf. chapter 7) and its 
parameters are estimated from the collected data:  
     
               
 
           ( 18 ) 
The value of the objective function    for actor i depends on the current state ( 
   of 
the network, a potential future state (   as well as on actor attributes (   and dyadic 
attributes such as the different distance categories (  . The functions        are the 
effects (independent variables) that are based on previously explained theoretical 
considerations and represent the operationalized hypotheses. Weights    are the 
statistical parameters which have to be estimated. If    = 0, then the corresponding 
effect does not play a role in network evolution; if    > 0 there is higher probability of 
moving in the direction where the respective effect is higher. Effects depending on the 
network are structural or endogenous effects. Effects depending on external attributes 
are covariates or exogenous effects. Considering the arguments of the objective 
function, the greater the values of    are, the higher will be the product of the statistics 
             (e.g. number of triads) given a network  
       . If there is a 
preference for transitive structures, the firm will choose a step which maximizes the 
numbers of transitive triads (ceteris paribus the other effects). The choice probability 
for doing a possible micro-step is proportional to the exponential function of the 
objective function: 
         
            
    ( 19 ) 
The tie change routine reflects a myopic stochastic optimization rule. It is myopic 
because only the state of the network immediately after the micro-step is taken into 
account. When an actor i changes an outgoing tie             (it is assumed that it 
has full control over outgoing ties), it will opt for the change which yields the highest 
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increase in the value of the objective function (plus a random term). For a given 
network state x = X(t) the result of a change of a single tie variable     into  1 -     is 
denoted as x(i   ). For modeling the change a random variable U(j) needs to be 
considered which represents the unexplained or residual part of the attraction for i to j. 
   is in fact a set of random variables distributed symmetrically around 0 and 
independently generated for each new micro-step. As an optimization rule, each actor 
(who gets the chance to make a change) changes its tie variable with that actor j for 
whom the value of                  becomes largest (Snijders, 2001).  
9.5.4 Estimation of Parameters 
The model parameters cannot be calculated explicitly but they can be estimated from 
simulations. The core idea for the estimation is that we have to find values for the 
parameters    such that the expected value of the simulated statistics              
(summarized over i and m) equal the observed values of the empirical networks. The 
test statistics (    are hence effect counts. For instance, it is counted how many closed 
triads there are in a network. The target value for the simulation can consequently be 
expressed as: 
   
       
   
   
     
                    
 
   
 ( 20 ) 
In other words, the aim of the estimation is to fit the expected statistics to the observed 
statistics by simulating networks which fulfill this condition. This could for example 
mean that we search for a simulated network which has as many closed triads as the 
observed network. It is furthermore assumed that    is the distance between two 
networks observed at two consecutive observation points, that is      
          
         . With the simulation algorithm, which is actor-based and uses as its core 
element the objective function, the aim is to iteratively find a network where 
         
            , with    as the first point in time where the required 
condition holds. Based on this network, generated statistics are calculated: 
      
   
   
                     
 
   
 ( 21 ) 
The global aim is to find a vector    of parameter values for which the moment 
equation holds (method of moments), that is, the simulated and the observed vectors of 
parameters are equal: 
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    ( 22 ) 
Due to the complexity of the evolving network, the expected values cannot be 
calculated directly and are therefore taken from the simulation. The MCMC algorithm 
is used to approximate the solution of the moment equation (22) in a gradual 
procedure. To simulate a network which has the envisaged characteristics, a stochastic 
approximation method is used to approximate moment estimates (Robbins and Monro, 
1951). Expected values are approximated as the averages over a lot of simulated 
networks. Observed values (“target values”) are calculated from the empirical data set. 
For the test of a hypothesis, a test statistic and a distribution of the test statistic 
according to a null hypothesis are required. T-ratios
14
 are approximately normally 
distributed. Based on this, a p-value for the null hypothesis suggesting that the tested 
effect has no impact can be calculated (        ). In this way it becomes possible to 
find out which of the competing effects, formulated as hypotheses, are most probably 
present in the observed network evolution.  
In order to attain proper estimations, it is necessary to have a certain quantity of 
change between two consecutive observations. On the other side, too much change 
cannot be handled with the model. As mentioned before, the assumption here is that 
change in the network takes place in a gradual stepwise procedure rather than by 
sudden “shocks”. In other words, networks are regarded as states rather than short 
events. The degree of change between consecutive observation points needs to be large 
enough as tie changes provide the information which is required for estimating 
parameters of the objective function. Based on experience, there should not be less 
than 40 changes across all observation points (Snijders, Van de Bunt and Steglich, 
2010). More tie changes are welcome as they provide more information about the 
drivers as long as changes between observations happen only gradually. Thus, it is 
advisable for studying network evolution to have an idea about how much change is 
observed. To test for gradual change in the network, the Jaccard index (J) (Table 13) is 
calculated as an indicator (M11 = Number of stable links; M01 = Number of interrupted 
links; M10 = Number of formed links):  
   
   
           
 ( 23 ) 
                                            
14 T-ratios are given as 
  
      
 . With the assumption that t-ratios are approximately normally distributed the 
significance of effects can be tested (p-values). 
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Table 13: Jaccard index. 
Observation Jaccard Index 
2002  2003 0.683 
2003  2004 0.667 
2004  2005 0.327 
2005  2006 0.453 
2006  2007 0.766 
Source: own calculations. 
The value of the Jaccard index should ideally be higher than 0.3 (Snijders, Van de Bunt 
and Steglich, 2010). This is the case for all observations, making the observations a 
good basis for the simulation and parameter estimation. 
9.5.5 Assumptions about Tie Initiation and Dissolution 
For each tie there are two actors involved. Thus, there has to be an assumption to cope 
with the tie formation (and dissolution) process. We can indeed think of three possible 
tie establishment procedures: First, a tie could be established if either of the two actors 
wishes to establish it. This possibility is called unilateral imposition (disjunctive). 
Second, a tie to come into existence could require a mutual agreement (conjunctive). A 
third way to decide about the emergence of a tie is to calculate a net value, i.e. a 
positive net value will lead to a tie and the gained value for one actor may compensate 
a loss for another actor (compensatory). These three options need to be analyzed in 
tandem with the actor oriented or dyad oriented opportunity element of the rate 
function. For innovation networks, i.e. the case of undirected ties, three principal tie 
establishment procedures are plausible (Van de Bunt and Groenewegen, 2007): 
 One-sided initiative reciprocal confirmation model (actor oriented): An actor i is 
given the opportunity to change a tie variable    . A new tie to an actor j must be 
proposed and accepted by the potential partner. If the proposal gets denied, the tie 
will not be established.  
 Two-sided opportunity model (dyad oriented and conjunctive): Here, the tie will 
only be established if it is beneficial for both actors. A pair of actors i and j gets 
the opportunity to change their tie variable    , i.e., to start or terminate a 
cooperation or to keep-up the cooperation.  
 Pairwise compensatory (additive and disjunctive) forcing model (dyad oriented): 
The two actors i and j meet to discuss their tie variable. In this case it is sufficient 
that the tie is beneficial for one out of the two to become realized. Actors i and j 
meet and reconsider their tie based on the summed value of the objective function. 
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I opted for the “one-sided initiative reciprocal confirmation model”, which is probably 
closest to reality, in which one actor takes the initiative and the other one accepts the 
offer for cooperation or refuses it. 
9.6 Hypotheses and Operationalization of Concepts 
In order to obtain meaningful estimations, it is essential to select effects (independent 
variables) which reflect the hypothesized mechanisms. As the analyzed networks are 
undirected, I only operationalize effects which may have a significant impact in the 
context of undirected networks. There are other important effects which, however, 
only make sense in directed networks. For instance, reciprocity is a ubiquitous effect 
which is per definition only meaningful in directed networks. For the case of an 
undirected network, it is clear that if actor i cooperates with j, j also cooperates with i. 
For undirected networks, such as innovation networks, ego and alter effects cannot be 
differentiated. The ego effect controls if actors with higher values in a specific 
covariate select more partners. The alter effect measures if actors with higher values in 
a covariate are more often chosen as a collaboration partner. The similarity effect 
(homophily effect) is particularly important. It measures if ties are more often 
established between actors which have similar values in a covariate.  
Ideally, we have complete network data to estimate parameters for the model. 
However, when we analyze firm networks over a period of several years, there will be 
most probably firms entering the network only after the start of the observations and 
there will be firms leaving the network due to mergers, bankruptcy etc. before the end 
of the observations, leading to an unbalanced panel. There are several ways to 
accommodate for such actor changes in the network. One possibility is to insert so 
called structural zeros which specify that certain ties cannot emerge since the actors 
are absent. The most appropriate possibility, which I apply, is to introduce a 
composition change matrix. This matrix contains the information about the points in 
time when an actor joins or leaves the network (see Table A. 7 for details) (Snijders, 
2008).  
The core interest is to identify the determinants for the emergence and dissolution of 
ties in the observed network. From the firm’s perspective, I address the question 
concerning the guidelines that determine the decision to cooperate and to select a 
cooperation partner. Therefore, I test the relevance of the following factors for network 
evolution: absorptive capacity, technological distance, knowledge-base modularity, 
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geographical distance, transitivity and experience with cooperation. These factors have 
been discussed exhaustively in chapter 7 and are at this stage formulated as hypotheses 
and operationalized for parameter estimation and significance tests. 
9.6.1 Absorptive Capacity 
The formation of alliances is more interesting for firms which have high levels of 
absorptive capacity as they have better capabilities in evaluating, assimilating and 
exploiting external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Empirical studies confirm 
that firms with high absorptive capacity are more likely to initiate a cooperation 
(Giuliani and Bell, 2005; Boschma and ter Wal, 2007; Morrison, 2008). For explaining 
the probability to start or terminate a cooperation, a measure for the absorptive 
capacity should hence be taken into account. Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) 
suggest that R&D efforts are an important determinant of a firm’s absorptive capacity. 
That is, the absorptive capacity (vabsorpcai(t)) is a function of the R&D efforts which I 
approximate with patent data. 
Hypothesis H1: Consequently, I expect firms which have higher levels of absorptive 
capacity to also have a higher propensity to collaborate as they face more opportunities 
to benefit from external knowledge. 
The absorptive capacity (vabsorpca i(t)) is approximated by taking the natural logarithm of 
the number of patents (NbPatentsi(t:t-5)) a firm applied for in the five years prior to the 
observation point. Accordingly, absorptive capacities of actors increase with 
diminishing rates with the accumulated patenting activity. 
                                       ( 24 ) 
9.6.2 Technological Distance 
Hypothesis H2a suggests that firms whose knowledge-bases are more similar (small 
technological distance) are more inclined to cooperate. In other words, for effective 
learning, cooperating firms need similar knowledge-bases which reflect a common 
understanding of problems and increase the capacity to absorb each other’s knowledge 
(Colombo, 2003). On the other hand, invention and innovation can be understood as 
new combinations of existing knowledge which involves the combination of more 
dissimilar knowledge-bases. Accordingly, hypothesis H2b states that firms whose 
knowledge-bases are more dissimilar (large technological distance) are more inclined 
to cooperate. 
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For the calculation of distances between firms in the technological knowledge space, I 
apply the Euclidean distance measure (E)  based on a firm’s patent portfolio which 
encompasses all EPO patents filed not more than 5 years prior to the observation point. 
This approach of calculating a positional vector was developed by Jaffe (1986) and is 
for instance also applied by Yang, Phelps and Steensma (2010). It assumes that the 
distribution of a firm’s patents across the patent classes of the entire sample reflects the 
distribution of its technological knowledge. In a first step, a vector is calculated which 
places each firm in an N-dimensional vector space. The number of dimensions N 
results from the number of 3-digit IPC classes in which all firms filed patents (priority 
filling). The firm vector p is given by the relative share of patents a firm has in the N 
patent classes. For instance, if N was only two (e.g. B60 and B29) and a firm has 40% 
of its patents in class B60 and 60% in B29 the vector would be (p
B60
; p
B29
) = (0.4; 0.6). 
In a second step, differences between vectors representing distances in the technology 
space are calculated. Thus the technological distance (wtechdis ij) between two firms i 
and j is calculated as:  
                  
    
   
 
   
 ( 25 ) 
9.6.3 Knowledge-Base Modularity 
To analyze the decomposability of a firm’s knowledge-base, I consider it as a network 
of discrete knowledge elements that are linked by patents (affiliation or co-occurrence 
network). I further assume that a tie emerges between technology classes once they are 
mentioned on the same patent (Saviotti, 2009). This approach is in line with 
Yayavaram and Ahuja (2008, p. 334) who state that “the set of couplings or ties 
together with the strength of the ties constitute the structure of a firm’s knowledge 
base.” The connection of knowledge elements is not only dichotomous but varies in its 
intensity. For instance, two knowledge elements (IPC
15
 classes) A and B may appear 
ten times together on patents of a firm while the elements A and C may only appear 
once or twice together. Consequently, for the network representing the knowledge-base 
of a firm, the frequency of co-occurrences is used as weights for the ties.  
                                            
15 IPC means international patent classification. 
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As hypothesis 3, I propose that the propensity of two firms to cooperate rises with the 
degree of modularity of their knowledge-bases. As a measure for the degree of 
modularity of a knowledge-base, I calculate a slightly modified clustering coefficient 
which I call clustering indicator (ci). The first step in calculating the modularity of the 
knowledge-bases is to reconstruct the knowledge-base as a network. I take IPC sub-
classes (4-digit level) as nodes and add a tie between nodes whenever the subclasses 
co-occur on a patent (Saviotti, 2009). Doing this, I reconstruct the knowledge network 
from patents for each of the analyzed 153 firms in moving time windows each 
encompassing five years (1998-2002 to 2002-2006). By first neglecting the tie strength 
(dichotomization of the adjacency matrix), I calculate the clustering coefficient (cc) for 
each node of a firm’s knowledge-base network. The clustering coefficient (cci) for 
node (IPC sub-class) i with ki ties is defined in equation 26: 
 
    
  
         
 
 
( 26 ) 
The calculation includes ni, the number of ties between the ki neighbors of node i. The 
denominator represents the maximum number of ties which are possible between the ki 
neighbors of node i. In order to give weights to the IPC subclasses which appear more 
often in the patent portfolio, I calculate in equation (27) the share (rsci) of an IPC sub-
class (ci) relative to all IPC sub-classes in the portfolio such as:  
      
  
   
 ( 27 ) 
In a final step, the clustering indicator (cii) for each firm’s knowledge-base is 
calculated in equation (28) by multiplying the clustering coefficients cci  of each node 
with the relative shares of the IPC sub-classes (rscI) and summing them up to weighted 
clustering coefficients: 
                               ( 28 ) 
   
9.6.4 Geographical Distance 
From the theoretical arguments (chapter 7.5) it follows that co-located firms have a 
higher propensity to cooperate (hypotheses H4). Figure 28 shows the clustered 
geographical dispersion of German automotive firms (one red dot per firm based on 
the sample). Most firms are located in the south eastern, south western and western 
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regions of Germany close to Munich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt and in the Ruhr Area. In 
order to form a pairwise distance matrix, geographical distances between all pairs of 
actors (distij) have been retrieved by a specific search routine from the internet 
navigation service Google Maps
16
 and logarithmized with the natural logarithm: 
  17                      ( 29 ) 
 
Figure 28: Geographical positioning of analyzed automotive firms (Source: own illustration). 
                                            
16 To calculate distances, I used Google Refine and the Google Maps API with the following expression: 
"http://maps.googleapis.com/maps/api/directions/json?origin="+escape(cells["Origin"].value, 
"url")+"&destination="+escape(cells["Destination"].value, "url")+"&sensor=false", and to extract distances from 
the response: “with(value.parseJson().routes[0].legs[0].distance,pair,pair.text)”. 
17 For all dyadic covariates                     . 
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9.6.5 Transitivity 
Positive values for the transitivity effect signify that firms which share a common 
cooperation partner collaborate with a higher probability compared to firms which do 
not have a partner in common. Groups of strongly interconnected actors generally 
show a high level of mutual trust which is conducive for cooperation (Walker, Kogut 
and Shan, 1997; Buskens and Raub, 2002). In this regard, Reagans and McEvily 
(2003) demonstrate that strong social cohesion around a relationship  reinforces  the  
willingness  and  motivation  to  invest  time,  energy  and  effort  in  sharing 
knowledge with others. Trust in dense parts of the network facilitates intensive 
exchange of complex or sensitive knowledge (Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Accordingly, I 
state hypothesis H5: Firms sharing a common cooperation partner are more likely to 
collaborate compared to other actors which do not have a partner in common. 
Transitivity is measured by the number of closed triplets an actor is involved in
18
: 
           
   
    ( 30 ) 
9.6.6 Experience with Cooperation 
I state for hypothesis H6 that a large record of collaborative activities signals a larger 
attractiveness as well as preference for further collaboration. This reflects that from 
outside it is rather difficult to scan a firm’s valuable resources, in particular its 
knowledge-base. A firm which has been often involved in cooperative projects signals 
to be a valuable partner with a good reputation and established routines of 
collaboration. Cooperation capabilities are specific and not transferable resources 
which can enhance a firm’s ability to identify partners, initiate collaborations and 
manage the partnerships successfully (e.g. Makadok, 2001). Experienced firms have 
implemented collaboration management routines to coordinate the portfolio of 
different types of alliances (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002). Developing experience is 
time consuming because firms are forced to adapt internal routines (Powell, Koput and 
Smith-Doerr, 1996). However, it is worth the effort as it not only enables a firm to 
become effectively embedded in a formal innovation network but also paves the 
ground for likewise important informal collaboration (Pyka, 2000). With equation (31) 
I measure the experience of a firm (vexp i(t)) with the frequency of participation in 
subsidized R&D projects with partners (NbR&Dprojects i(t:1998)) both from within and 
                                            
18 X takes the value 1 if a tie between two actors is established and 0 if a tie is absent. 
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outside of the automotive sample starting with the year 1998 which is five years prior 
to the first observation.  
                                   ( 31 ) 
9.6.7 Control Variables 
I include three controls to the model, referring to a capacity, an experience and a cost 
effect. Larger firms can coordinate at the same time more cooperation partners than 
smaller firms. Accordingly, the model needs to control for firm size. For measuring 
size I distinguish three categories, namely large firms, medium sized firms and small 
firms. Threshold levels are applied for the number of employees and/or the annual 
turnover for the years 2002-2010 (e.g. Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). It also controls for 
inertia in large firms which makes a knowledge-base more rigid. The required 
information is taken from the companies’ websites and from excerpts of the 
commercial register (accessed via LexisNexis). Due to some missing data I apply the 
usual categorization (OECD, 2005): 
 Category 1 (Large): > 250 employees; turnover   50 Mio. € 
 Category 2 (Medium): 50-249 employees; turnover < 50 Mio. € 
 Category 3 (Small): 10-49 employees; turnover < 10 Mio. € 
The second control variable is the industry experience of firms. Older firms are more 
experienced and can manage a higher number of collaborative projects. To 
approximate experience I apply the natural logarithm of firm age. 
Finally, the density (degree) variable controls for the coordination costs of relations. It 
indicates why we do not observe fully connected networks in which each firm 
cooperates with all other firms and needs always to be included (Snijders, Van de Bunt 
and Steglich, 2010). It represents the balance of beneﬁts and costs of an arbitrary tie. 
Collaboration is a means to cope with the uncertainty in a technology field. At the 
same time it creates a new facet of uncertainty which refers to the decision and choice 
of becoming involved in joint projects with partners. Arbitrary refers to a tie with an 
actor which is not particularly appealing due to its network position and its 
characteristics. In reality, most networks have a rather low density which signifies that 
the costs for connecting to an arbitrary actor are higher than the benefits. In line with 
these theoretical considerations, very often we find a negative parameter value for this 
effect.  
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Density is approximated by the actors’ degree centralities: 
        
 
 ( 32 ) 
9.7 Estimation Results 
Model parameters have been estimated with the stochastic actor-based network model 
as implemented in the SIENA program based on the R platform (Ripley, Snijders and 
Preciado, 2010). SIENA estimates parameters    and the respective standard errors for 
the model. Simulation runs have been repeated 3000 times. A first parameter indicating 
the goodness-of-fit of the estimated model is the t-value of convergence: 
   
                                     
                          
 ( 33 ) 
It indicates the (average) deviation of observed network features (target values) from 
simulated features based on the estimated model. Convergence is excellent if the t-
value is smaller than 0.1, which I found for all variables of the estimated models 
(Balland, De Vaan and Boschma, 2012). To further improve the model-fit I tested for 
time heterogeneity in the data and added time dummies to the structural network 
effects (density and transitive triads) (cf. Figure B. 1). These dummies also capture 
potential business cycles effects on the network evolution. The rate parameters ρ 
(Table 14) indicate the estimated number of opportunities for change per actor between 
two observations. It increases between the observations three and four and falls back to 
a lower level between the observations five and six. It must be kept in mind that not all 
opportunities for change will lead to an actual change. A firm might simply prefer to 
keep the status quo. Accordingly, the average observed number of changes per firms is 
typically smaller than the estimated rate of unobserved change indicates. 
Table 14: Rate parameter estimates. 
Observation 
Rate parameters 
Model 1 
Rate parameters 
Model 2 
 Rate parameters 
Model 3 
2002  2003 2.29 2.37  2.15 
2003  2004 2.07 2.11  1.88 
2004  2005 9.58 10.18  8.03 
2005  2006 6.13 6.28  3.84 
2006  2007 1.61 1.63  1.37 
Source: own calculations. 
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Table 15: Effect parameter estimates. 
Variable 
Model 1 
Value (sd) 
(knowledge related 
effects) 
Model 2  
Value (sd) 
(all effects) 
 
Model 3  
Value (sd) 
(all effects & time 
dummies) 
Degree (density) 
(control) 
-2.0680*** 
(0.0483) 
-2.0835*** 
(0.0465) 
-2.1818*** 
(0.0636) 
Absorptive capacity       
0.2259*** 
(0.0284) 
0.1325*** 
(0.0353) 
0.1810*** 
(0.0402) 
Technological 
distance
19
                 
-0.5251** 
(0.2228) 
-0.5716*** 
(0.2212) 
-0.6586*** 
(0.2433) 
KB modularity                
0.2397 
(0.2449) 
0.1500 
(0.2335) 
0.1210 
(0.2799) 
Geographic distance             
-0.1390*** 
(0.0321) 
-0.1551*** 
(0.0346) 
Transitive triads                    
0.4049*** 
(0.0281) 
0.4072*** 
(0.0290) 
0.4777*** 
(0.0410) 
Cooperative 
experience        
 
0.0101*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0026 
(0.0026) 
Firm size 
(control)                              
 
0.1089 
(0.0969) 
0.1007 
(0.1118) 
Industry experience  
(control)          
 
0.0025 
(0.0425) 
-0.0349 
(0.0499) 
Source: own calculations. Significance levels: p<0.1*; p<0.05**, p<0.01***. 
Table 15 summarizes the resulting coefficient values for the models. Model 1 includes 
only the knowledge related variables together with the endogenous variable and the 
density control variable. Model 2 is based on the entire set of derived variables. Model 
3 is based on Model 2 complemented by time dummies. For the hypotheses tests, the 
null hypothesis H0 states that the respective covariate does not affect network change. 
In the simplest model (model 1), the effects are significant except the knowledge-base 
modularity effect. For the more complex models, significance does not change a lot. 
The additional covariates are significant except the capacity effect measured by firm 
size and industry experience. In model 3, the cooperative experience effect is either not 
significant. 
The estimated objective function for model 3 is: 
 
                                                       
                                       
                            
( 34 ) 
                                            
19 I also added a squared distance term to control for a curvilinear relationship. This, however, leads to 
insignificant results. 
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Hypothesis H1 deals with the positive effects of the absorptive capacity with respect to 
the propensity to collaborate. The estimations confirm that firms with broad absorptive 
capacities are likely to benefit more from cooperation and therefore more intensely 
engage in networks. Firms which have a larger knowledge-base have more incentives 
to cooperate as they are better capable of making use of the other firm’s knowledge-
base they get access to. 
For the technological distance I find a negative parameter value which suggests that 
there is a tendency for firms with similar knowledge-bases to cooperate (Hypothesis 
H2a). Furthermore, there are various ways of operationalizing the concept of 
technological distance (cf. Benner and Waldfogel, 2008) and this factor provides room 
for further investigation. 
The parameter for the knowledge-base modularity is positive but not significant. So, 
there is only weak indication that the structure of the knowledge-base is a determinant 
for the attractiveness of becoming a collaboration partner and for engaging in 
cooperation. The results do not confirm hypothesis H3 about the beneficial effects of a 
modular knowledge structure which facilitates recombinatorial research and with it 
possibilities to benefit from sharing knowledge in innovation networks. More research 
is required on this point. 
Hypothesis H4 indicates an inverse relationship between the propensity to cooperate 
and the geographical distance. The parameter for geographic distance is negative and 
highly significant. This indicates that ties emerge more frequently between firms that 
are located in relative geographical proximity compared to more distant firms. From 
this follows that geographical distance is an important factor in the automotive 
industry. 
Hypothesis H5 which suggests a high cliquishness among network partners is 
confirmed. This indicates a significant endogenous network effect leading to the 
formation of cohesive triadic subgroups caused by trusted partnerships. 
A further tested covariate is the experience in cooperation. The results confirm 
hypotheses H6 for model 2 suggesting that firms with more experience in cooperation 
are more open to participate in collaboration projects. However, the effect becomes 
insignificant once time dummies are added.  
Additionally, the results indicate that firm age has no significant influence on the 
handling of collaborative projects. The impact of firm size on collaboration is not 
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visible either. There is no clear effect supporting either small or large firms with 
respect to their collaboration activities. This is in fact a positive result for innovation 
policy makers since small and young firms do not seem to be restrained form 
participation in collaborative research projects. The effect for density is negative and 
highly significant which indicates that there are cooperation costs which inhibit firms 
to start too many collaborative projects. 
The correlations between estimates are used to check for collinearity between effects 
(cf. Table A. 3, Table A. and Table A. 5 ). Collinearity refers to possibly different 
combinations of parameter values representing the same data pattern, that is, the same 
values of the network statistics such as the number of triads. Near collinearity is 
reached if the correlations are very close to +1.0 or -1.0. This does however not mean 
that some of the tested effects should rather be neglected but that there is a trade-off 
between highly correlated effects. Eventually the selection of a model should be based 
on theoretical considerations, the questions at stake and experience. While this is often 
straightforward for covariate or dyadic effects, structural effects are less intuitive to be 
implemented but likewise important for a satisfying model-fit. The correlations 
between estimates are used to check for collinearity between effects. Near collinearity 
may hamper the proper parameter estimation which is reflected by large standard 
errors (Ripley, Snijders and Preciado, 2010). For the here presented case, correlations 
between parameters are overall rather low. The highest value is -0.589 for the 
correlation between the cooperative experience and the absorptive capacity effect. 
However, both effects are significant (in model 2) which means that both effects 
should remain in the model. The random noise is high but the signal is strong enough 
that it exceeds the noise. 
9.8 Conclusions 
Competitive pressure forces firms to continuously develop new ideas, invent new 
technologies and bring new products to the market in order to survive the destructive 
part of Schumpeterian innovation competition. This holds particularly for the 
automotive industry in Germany, challenged by firms from emerging markets which 
are able to offer their products for lower prices. In the competition for new 
technological solutions, competences and cutting-edge knowledge are success factors. 
New knowledge stimulates the emergence of new ideas that can be transformed into 
innovation. Such knowledge can partly be generated internally in the companies’ R&D 
laboratories. However, relying on internal knowledge generation is no longer 
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sufficient. Participation in innovation networks which allow for access to external 
knowledge, and applying innovation cooperation as a strategic tool to acquire 
necessary knowledge which cannot be developed in-house opens up rich opportunities 
to complement and recombine the own knowledge-base. Thus, knowledge becomes 
the most important source of competitive advantage. 
A first analytical aim of chapter 9 was to explore the structure of the automotive 
sample knowledge-base. I delineated a methodology which allows us analyzing a 
knowledge-base as a network of interrelated knowledge elements that are linked by 
patents. The network perspective makes it possible to have a deeper look into the 
knowledge structure of an organization or industry. The tie distribution shows a highly 
skewed picture which indicates that there are some knowledge elements which have a 
very large number of links providing them with the status of very important knowledge 
for the sample. A feature found in many networks, whether it be social, biological or 
physical networks, is a strong tendency for small-world properties. The positive results 
of the conducted small-world test shows that this feature can also be found in 
knowledge networks. Furthermore, the analysis of the importance of technologies over 
time provides an idea about technologies which become more or less important. 
Analyzing the e-mobility related knowledge confirms other studies by demonstrating 
that relatively little effort has been spent during the observation period to bring 
forward technologies for e-mobility. In a further step, the analysis was extended by the 
inclusion of the tie strength. Among the most central nodes in the sample we see only 
small fluctuations of the tie strength across the observations. Based on the data for tie 
strength, in analogy with Granovetter’s (1973) theory of “the strength of weak ties”, 
the hypothesis was derived that the ego networks of nodes that are linked by a strong 
tie have a strong tendency for overlapping due to knowledge relatedness as well as 
similarity features. A QAP correlation analysis shows that there is indeed a strong 
positive correlation between strong ties and network overlaps. 
Firms access knowledge via their network relations. For the network composed of 
publicly funded R&D projects in the German automotive industry, structural as well as 
individual and dyadic covariates are shown to be relevant drivers of evolutionary 
change. In particular, the following main results were obtained: The establishment of 
cliques plays an important role in the evolution of innovation networks and the 
formation of triadic structures can be widely observed. The factors emphasized in the 
literature such as geographical distance, technological distance and cooperation 
experience are confirmed and hence explain network evolution of the sample firms in 
the German automotive industry. Also, firms with high levels of absorptive capacity 
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tend to be more often involved in the investigated networks. The preference for 
modular knowledge-bases related to the automotive product architecture and 
manufacturing was not significant in the data. This needs further investigation since 
once R&D is increasingly shifted to suppliers and once the industry structures change 
their character from a strongly hierarchical architecture towards a more horizontal 
network organization, knowledge base structures might co-evolve. In fact, automotive 
suppliers are expected to gain even larger shares in the value chain during the next 
years. This tendency concerns production but also R&D. For R&D the share of the 
OEMs is expected to drop from 60 % in 2012 to only 47 % in 2025. Beneficiaries are 
suppliers and engineering service providers. This trend gets accelerated by the 
paradigmatic move in the power train towards electric engines (Oliver Wyman, 2012). 
In a nutshell, even though the OEMs have still the lead in product architecture design 
which requires sound knowledge across all relevant technologies, the trend clearly 
signifies that lower tier suppliers play a stronger role not only in production but 
particularly in R&D. 
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10. Discussion and Further Research Avenues 
Neo-Schumpeterian scholars suggest that we focus on the analysis of the knowledge-
bases of firms and their role for entrepreneurial activities and managerial decisions if 
we want to understand patterns of industry change. Thus, the knowledge-based view of 
the firm paves the ground for the analysis of innovation network evolution. 
Evolutionary theory is very rich and offers a broad variety of concepts which have the 
potential for being applied in an (innovation) economic framework. Competitive 
pressure forces firms to continuously develop new ideas, invent new technologies and 
bring new products to the market in order to prevail on the field of creative 
destruction. This holds for the automotive industry in Germany (but also elsewhere in 
Europe) that has become challenged by firms from emerging markets. New knowledge 
serves as a basis for new ideas that can be transformed into products at a later stage. 
This knowledge is partly generated internally. However, we have seen that a more 
promising approach than solely relying on own R&D is to use networks as strategic 
tools to gain access to a broader variety of sources of knowledge which offer a 
multitude of possibilities to complement and recombine a firm’s own knowledge-base.  
Networks are evolving structures in terms or emerging and dissolving ties over time. A 
core research question was: What are the drivers and mechanisms that determine the 
change process? I applied a stochastic actor-based model which simulates network 
evolution between observation periods, explicitly models endogenous tie dependency 
and allows for the estimation of model parameters. For the networks that have been 
reconstructed from publicly funded R&D projects in the German automotive industry, 
structural as well as individual and dyadic covariates are relevant drivers: The 
formation of triadic structures could be observed; spatial proximity between firms 
increases the propensity to cooperate as well as experience (model 2); firms with high 
levels of absorptive capacity tend to be more often involved in networks. Internal 
R&D has not become obsolete but is a prerequisite to benefit from sources of 
collective knowledge.  
This dissertation shows that evolutionary agent-based network models are valuable 
tools for improving our understanding about complex interaction structures of 
innovation networks. A particular feature is their ability to capture endogenous and 
exogenous driving forces simultaneously. Agent-based simulation models deliver new 
insights into network dynamics and have a great potential for even more sophisticated 
analyses in the future. They are used as a tool to disclose (plausible) causal 
relationships between firm strategy and the emerging network. The analysis of 
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network evolution serves as an instrument to test the empirical relevance of attachment 
and dissolution mechanisms which are implemented in the artificial world of an agent-
based simulation. On the other side, agent-based simulations can be used to develop 
additional hypotheses with respect to drivers of network evolution and to discover 
mechanisms which have not been theorized and tested yet. In this sense, the empirical 
research complements agent-based simulation models of an artificial world and vice 
versa. 
A currently emerging research field concerns the development of co-evolutionary 
models. Most conventional economic models have a static character while reality 
exhibits dynamic features. Static means that we seek to explain a phenomenon 
(dependent variable) by a number of hypothesized factors and controls (independent 
variables). For instance, the question is asked: Are more central actors in a network 
more successful? Typically, this is a question about the linearity of causes and effects. 
While it is acknowledged that there might be a reverse causality problem, reverse 
causality gets hardly simultaneously modeled. However, in reality the direction of 
causality is often not clear and may go in both ways at the same time. The presented 
automotive network model captures network change over time and explains the 
driving forces. This approach allows not only for modeling tie changes but also takes 
changes in actor properties into account. A further step would be to explain these 
changes in actor properties with changes in network structures, e.g. the size of a firm’s 
knowledge-base might be influenced by a firm’s degree of network centrality. 
Moreover, as a function of the degree of network embeddedness, the innovativeness of 
a firm (measured by the patent output) may change. Firms which have more ties are 
more central, have better access to knowledge and more learning opportunities which 
allow them to be more innovative, build a larger knowledge-base and apply for more 
patents. That is, co-evolutionary models attempt to capture both-way-effects 
simultaneously. Thus, we may find that centrality not only fosters innovative success 
but also that the most successful actors become more central. In other words, the actor 
properties shape the network but the network may also shape actor properties. 
Moreover, we can think of co-evolutionary effects with regard to two types of 
networks which exert mutual influence. For instance, the production network must not 
be necessarily the same as the innovation network, but they mutually determine to 
some extend their evolutionary pattern. In addition, selection of cooperation partners 
based on firm preferences was the underlying basic driving force in this study. That is, 
selection of partners shapes the network pattern, as – for instance – firms make 
decisions in accordance with the homophily principle and select partners that are 
similar (or dissimilar) in one or more characteristics. Alternatively, there could be 
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some co-evolutionary mechanism in place which stresses social influence. Firms may 
adapt their characteristics and match them with their partner’s characteristics (Friedkin 
and Johnsen, 1999). In the context of innovation networks, this effect might lead to 
changes in firm characteristics which in turn influence the selection pattern. As a 
consequence of the high level of uncertainty which is inherent to innovation processes, 
firms may adapt their R&D expenses to the level of expenses of their partners leading 
to overall similar expenses. Another possibility is that a firm reallocates its resources 
in a certain technology field, for instance to hybrid powertrains, because their partners 
do the same. Alternatively, firm might do benchmarking (best practice) with regard to 
R&D expenses. Consequently, they may adapt their R&D expenses to the levels of 
their best performing partners. Thus, actor-based models allow for enhancing our 
knowledge not only about the processes of variety creation and selection, but also 
about the co-evolution of the agents within a network.  
A couple of further questions may open interesting future research avenues: First, the 
hypothesized drivers have been tested for interfirm networks. It might be interesting to 
see if they are also valid for inventor networks or networks which involve research 
organizations. Second, the operationalisation of the tested effects could be subject to 
further inquiries. As for the case of the technological distance, there are sometimes 
various possibilities which may lead to diverging results. Third, other factors might be 
relevant but have not yet been tested such as the complementarity of knowledge-bases, 
the cultural distance between actors, which is particularly relevant for international 
cooperations, or institutional distances which matter in networks comprising public as 
well as private actors. Moreover, additional effects could be non-linear effects (non-
linear functions). Fourth, with regard to the model as such, more sophisticated 
goodness-of-fit tests are currently developed and can help to increase the fit of the 
observations with regard to certain parameters such as the degree distribution. The 
applied test for time heterogeneity is a first step in this direction. Fifth, while some 
network effects seem to have a universal character, e.g. transitivity, other effects are 
specific for a certain industry. Consequently, effects should be tested in more 
industries. Estimations might be particularly interesting in industries from which we 
expect diverging results. For instance, Buchmann et al. (2014) study differences in 
network drivers between the automotive and the laser industry. Sixth, while I observe 
small-world characteristics for both, the interfirm network and the knowledge network, 
the causalities for the emergence of small-world networks require further 
investigations. Is there a natural tendency or are there rather social or technological 
reasons for their emergence? 
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From the presented analysis, a number of implications for managers and public policy 
actors can be derived: Since cooperation is a vital tool to access sources of relevant 
knowledge, location matters in the sense that there is a preference for a selection of 
partners which are spatially co-located. Consequently, re-location or the opening of a 
subsidiary in a region where the respective knowledge is bound could be an option for 
a firm which seeks to gain access to a specific network or specific knowledge-base. 
Moreover, for strategic decisions that are related to innovation, location is a factor 
which should be taken into account. Access to networks of knowledge is neither 
frictionless nor free of costs. Indeed, it is a highly social process. The firm which 
wants to benefit from the process of collective knowledge generation has to bring 
something in. New knowledge, generated internally or absorbed from sources outside 
the network, serves as a ticket to enter a circle of firms and is expected to be shared 
with other firms in the network. Own research is also required to build up an 
absorptive capacity which allows a firm to understand and make use of the knowledge 
which is stored in the network. The identified preference to select partners that have a 
somewhat similar knowledge-base indicates that new knowledge should be related to 
the existing knowledge which makes it easier to be understood and processed. 
Reputation is reflected and valued by the experience and the propensity to form 
cohesive network subgroups (closed triads). The preference of firms to select more 
experienced firms shows that the cooperation track record matters. A longer list of 
cooperative projects demonstrates that a firm is a reliable partner, has developed 
cooperative capabilities and has a history of successful cooperation projects. The 
reputational effects of being a preferred partner gets amplified by the triadic structure 
which accelerates the flow and improves the quality of information about the 
reputation, and puts social pressure on the actors to behave well.  
Policy makers have often special groups of actors (SMEs, firms from less developed 
regions, public research institutes, etc.) in mind when they design and implement 
programs for public innovation support. The provision of public funds for cooperative 
R&D as well as the installation of innovation networks which are – at least in their 
infant phase – managed and promoted by public authorities is a policy tool which 
becomes increasingly used. For the evaluation of this policy tool, the question should 
be asked whether the network ties are actually formed between those organizations 
that are expected to form ties. Typically, large and established firms have more 
available resources to be informed about supported projects as well as the experience 
to successfully apply for funds, to lobby or to pay consultants. In contrast, small firms 
are typically the envisaged target of innovation support initiatives. If policies which 
contain such incentives have already been put in place, the depicted conceptual 
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framework helps to evaluate if such policies are effective in that they change the 
preference structures with regard to partner selection of networking firms. The analysis 
of the automotive network shows that firm size is not a significant factor for the 
cooperation partner selection. As such, the analyzed policy tool for innovation support 
can be regarded as non-discriminatory with regard to smaller firms. 
And to close the circle, we have seen that the complex interaction of actors shapes the 
character and properties of a network structure. In a similar vein, the complex 
interaction of ingredients determines the character and taste of nicely cooked dishes. 
Compared to interaction patterns in natural sciences, social networks are even more 
challenging to analyze since the behavior of actors changes over time in parallel with 
actor properties. In most cases, we will not be able to identify a clear-cut stable 
pattern. While there may be phases that are rather static, innovation from inside and 
outside creates new (disruptive) impetus for evolutionary change. This dissertation 
contributes to the understanding of network evolution. To fully understand the 
complexity of evolutionary network structures (if this will ever be possible), more 
studies on its drivers are necessary. 
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A. Appendix: Tables 
Table A. 1: IPC Degree centrality measures. 
1998-
2002   
1999-
2003   
2000-
2004   
2001-
2005   
2002-
2006   
IPC 
De-
gree 
Posi-
tion 
IPC 
De-
gree 
Posi-
tion 
IPC 
De-
gree 
Posi-
tion 
IPC 
De-
gree 
Posi-
tion 
IPC 
De-
gree 
Posi-
tion 
B60R 178 1 H01L 179 1 H01L 168 1 H01L 160 1 B60R 149 1 
H01L 174 2 B60R 166 2 B60R 163 2 B60R 158 2 H01L 145 2 
G01N 129 3 B29C 131 3 B60K 130 3 G01N 126 3 G01N 114 3 
B29C 126 4 G01N 128 4 G01N 128 4 B60K 123 4 B60K 113 4 
H05K 122 5 B60K 121 5 B29C 125 5 B29C 121 5 B29C 112 5 
B60K 119 6 H01M 120 6 H01M 120 6 H05K 109 6 H05K 111 6 
H01M 115 7 H05K 118 7 B62D 116 7 B62D 108 7 B62D 94 7 
F02M 113 8 F02M 113 8 H05K 110 8 H01M 107 8 B60T 88 8 
B62D 112 9 B62D 112 9 F02M 109 9 G06F 98 9 F02M 87 9 
F16H 109 10 F16H 103 10 G05B 104 10 F02M 97 10 F16H 87 9 
G05B 109 10 G05B 102 11 G06F 102 11 B60T 93 11 G06F 85 10 
B01D 105 11 F02D 99 12 H02K 101 12 F02D 92 12 H02K 84 11 
G06F 98 12 B01D 97 13 B60T 98 13 G05B 91 13 F16C 83 12 
F02D 97 13 H02K 97 13 F02D 98 13 H02K 91 13 H01M 83 12 
G01D 96 14 G01D 96 14 G01D 97 14 G01D 89 14 F02D 82 13 
H02K 94 15 G06F 96 14 F16H 96 15 F16H 87 15 G01D 80 14 
B60T 93 16 B60T 94 15 F16J 93 16 B01D 79 16 G05B 79 15 
G02B 93 16 B01J 92 16 B01D 90 17 B32B 79 16 B32B 77 16 
B01J 92 17 B32B 88 17 F16F 86 18 F16C 79 16 G01R 77 16 
F16J 90 18 F16J 88 17 B32B 82 19 G01R 79 16 B23K 76 17 
B32B 88 19 F16F 82 18 F16C 81 20 F16J 78 17 G01S 76 17 
F16C 87 20 G01R 82 18 G01R 81 20 B23K 77 18 B01D 75 18 
G01B 86 21 G02B 82 18 G01S 81 20 G01S 77 18 F01D 75 18 
C04B 82 22 H01R 82 18 B01J 80 21 F16F 76 19 F16F 75 18 
F01N 81 23 F01N 80 19 H01R 80 21 H01R 76 19 H05B 72 19 
H04N 81 23 F16C 80 19 G06K 78 22 F16D 75 20 F16D 71 20 
C23C 80 24 G01B 80 19 G01B 77 23 H05B 75 20 C23C 70 21 
H01R 80 24 F16K 79 20 C23C 75 24 B60H 72 21 F16J 70 21 
B60S 79 25 H04B 79 20 G02B 75 24 F01N 72 21 F16B 69 22 
F16D 79 25 G01S 78 21 H05B 75 24 B01J 71 22 G02B 69 22 
F16K 78 26 H01H 78 21 B23K 74 25 C23C 71 22 G07C 69 22 
H04B 78 26 B60S 77 22 F01N 74 25 B60N 68 23 F01N 68 23 
F16B 77 27 C04B 77 22 F16B 74 25 F02B 68 23 B60H 67 24 
F16F 77 27 C23C 77 22 H01H 74 25 G02B 68 23 H04L 67 24 
G01P 77 27 F16D 77 22 F16D 73 26 G01B 67 24 G05D 65 25 
G01S 77 27 B23K 76 23 G01P 73 26 F16B 66 25 F16L 64 26 
G06K 77 27 G06K 76 23 B60H 72 27 G01P 66 25 H01F 64 26 
G01R 76 28 H04N 76 23 C04B 72 27 G05D 66 25 H01R 64 26 
B23K 74 29 H05B 76 23 H04B 71 28 G07C 66 25 B23P 63 27 
H01H 74 29 G01P 75 24 F16K 70 29 G06K 65 26 B01J 62 28 
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G01M 73 30 F16B 74 25 B60S 69 30 H04B 65 26 B60N 62 28 
H05B 72 31 H04L 74 25 C01B 69 30 C04B 64 27 B60Q 62 28 
H04L 71 32 B60H 73 26 G05D 69 30 F01D 64 27 C04B 62 28 
B60H 70 33 G01M 72 27 G07C 68 31 F16K 64 27 F02B 62 28 
B60Q 70 33 B60Q 71 28 B60N 67 32 H01F 64 27 G06K 62 28 
G01L 69 34 G05D 70 29 B60Q 67 32 H04L 64 27 F16K 61 29 
G07C 66 35 G01L 68 30 G01L 67 32 B60Q 63 28 H04B 61 29 
G08G 65 36 C01B 67 31 G01M 67 32 F16L 62 29 G01C 60 30 
C01B 64 37 G08G 66 32 H04L 67 32 H01H 62 29 G01P 60 30 
F02B 63 38 G07C 65 33 G08G 66 33 A61B 61 30 G01B 58 31 
G05D 63 38 H01F 65 33 F02B 64 34 B23P 61 30 A61B 57 32 
A61B 62 39 F02B 64 34 H01F 64 34 G08G 61 30 G01L 56 33 
B23P 62 39 A61B 63 35 F16L 63 35 B60S 59 31 G01M 56 33 
B60N 62 39 B23P 63 35 H04N 62 36 G01L 59 31 H01H 56 33 
H03K 62 39 B60N 61 36 A61B 61 37 H04N 59 31 G08G 55 34 
G08C 60 40 F16L 59 37 F01D 61 37 C01B 58 32 B21D 51 35 
H01F 60 40 H04M 58 38 G01C 59 38 G01C 58 32 B60J 49 36 
B60J 59 41 G08C 57 39 B23P 58 39 B60G 55 33 B60G 47 37 
G01C 59 41 F28F 56 40 B60G 57 40 G06T 54 34 C01B 47 37 
H04M 59 41 B60G 55 41 G06T 57 40 H03K 54 34 H03K 47 37 
G06T 57 42 B60J 55 41 B60J 56 41 B21D 53 35 H04N 47 37 
B60W 56 43 G01C 55 41 F28F 56 41 B60J 51 36 B60S 46 38 
H04Q 56 43 G06T 55 41 C09K 55 42 C09K 51 36 C09K 46 38 
F16L 54 44 H03K 55 41 G08C 54 43 G01M 51 36 F28F 45 39 
B60G 53 45 B60W 54 42 F15B 53 44 F15B 50 37 H02P 45 39 
E05B 53 45 B60L 53 43 B21D 52 45 F28F 49 38 F21V 44 40 
C22C 52 46 C08J 53 43 B60L 52 45 H01J 48 39 F28D 44 40 
F15B 52 46 F01D 53 43 H03K 52 45 H02P 47 40 H04M 44 40 
F28F 52 46 H03M 53 43 H04M 52 45 F21V 46 41 B23Q 43 41 
B21D 51 47 B21D 52 44 B60C 51 46 H04M 46 41 F15B 43 41 
C08J 51 47 C09K 51 45 B60W 51 46 B60C 45 42 G06T 43 41 
C08L 51 47 F15B 51 45 F28D 51 46 F01P 45 42 G08B 42 42 
H01Q 51 47 H01J 51 45 H01J 51 46 F28D 45 42 H02H 42 42 
B29L 50 48 H01Q 51 45 F04D 49 47 G01F 45 42 H02J 42 42 
B60L 50 49 H04Q 50 46 H03M 49 47 H01B 45 42 B60C 41 43 
G08B 50 49 B29L 49 47 F01P 48 48 B60L 44 43 E05B 41 43 
C09K 49 50 B60C 48 48 F21V 48 48 B60W 44 43 H01J 41 43 
H01J 49 50 B05D 47 49 H01B 48 48 H02H 44 43 C08L 40 44 
H02J 49 50 C22C 47 49 B05D 47 49 C08L 43 44 F02C 40 44 
H03M 49 50 E05B 47 49 G01F 46 50 C22C 43 44 B05D 39 45 
H02P 48 51 G08B 47 49 H01Q 46 50 F04B 43 44 B60W 39 45 
D04H 47 52 H03H 47 49 H02P 46 50 F04D 43 44 C09D 39 45 
F01D 47 52 B24B 46 50 E05B 45 51 G08B 43 44 F01L 39 45 
G10K 47 52 D04H 46 50 G08B 45 51 G08C 42 45 F01P 39 45 
B05D 46 53 F01P 46 50 C08J 44 52 B23Q 41 46 H01B 39 45 
B22D 46 53 G09F 46 50 C08L 44 52 F02C 41 46 B24B 38 46 
G06Q 46 53 H02J 46 50 C09D 44 52 H02J 41 46 E05F 38 46 
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G11B 46 53 H02P 46 50 F01L 44 52 B01F 40 47 G01F 38 46 
H03H 46 53 F04D 45 51 H03H 44 52 E05B 40 47 F04B 37 47 
B60C 45 54 G06Q 45 51 H04Q 44 52 H03M 40 47 F04D 37 47 
F01P 45 54 B65G 44 52 B24B 43 53 B05D 39 48 G09F 37 47 
F02C 45 54 B23Q 43 53 B29L 43 53 G09F 39 48 B01F 36 48 
F04D 45 54 C08K 43 53 C22C 43 53 B24B 38 49 H03M 36 48 
G02F 45 54 C08L 43 53 G09F 43 53 F01L 38 49 B23D 35 49 
B24B 44 55 C09D 43 53 H02J 43 53 G01K 37 50 B60L 35 49 
C08K 44 55 F04B 43 53 B23Q 42 54 B22D 36 51 B65G 35 49 
G01K 44 55 F28D 43 53 B65D 42 54 C08J 36 51 C08J 35 49 
H01B 44 55 G01F 43 53 C08K 42 54 C08K 36 51 G08C 35 49 
B23Q 43 56 H01B 43 53 G06Q 42 54 B25J 35 52 C08K 34 50 
F28D 43 56 B22D 42 54 B65G 41 55 B29L 35 52 C22C 34 50 
G03F 43 56 G01K 42 54 F02C 41 55 C09D 35 52 G01H 33 51 
G09F 43 56 G10L 42 54 F04B 41 55 G01H 35 52 G01J 33 51 
H02H 43 56 G11B 42 54 G01K 40 56 H01Q 35 52 G01K 33 51 
B65D 42 57 F01L 41 55 H02H 40 56 H02M 35 52 H02M 33 51 
F04B 42 57 F21V 41 55 B01F 39 57 B65G 34 53 C21D 32 52 
G01F 42 57 G03F 41 55 H02M 39 57 E05F 34 53 F21S 32 52 
H01G 42 57 H01G 41 55 B22D 38 58 F02F 33 54 G10L 32 52 
B65G 41 58 H02H 41 55 D04H 38 58 F02N 33 54 B25B 31 53 
C09D 41 58 B29D 40 56 G10K 38 58 F02P 33 54 B25F 31 53 
F01L 41 58 B65D 40 56 G10L 38 58 F21S 33 54 B25J 31 53 
F02F 41 58 F02C 40 56 B29D 37 59 G01J 33 54 B65D 31 53 
F02P 41 58 B01F 39 57 F01M 37 59 G06Q 33 54 F01M 31 53 
B29D 39 59 C08G 39 57 F21S 37 59 B22F 32 55 G06Q 30 54 
B29K 39 59 F02P 39 57 F02F 36 60 B29D 32 55 H04Q 30 54 
C08G 39 59 G10K 39 57 F02N 36 60 G10K 32 55 F02N 29 55 
G10L 39 59 F02F 38 58 F02P 36 60 G10L 32 55 H01Q 29 55 
F21V 37 59 H01C 38 58 G01J 36 60 H04Q 32 55 H04W 29 55 
H02M 37 59 C21D 37 59 C21D 35 61 B65D 31 56 C25D 28 56 
G03B 36 60 G02F 37 59 D06M 35 61 C21D 31 56 F02P 28 56 
H01C 36 60 B29K 35 60 G02F 35 61 D06M 31 56 H04R 28 56 
E05F 35 61 E05F 35 60 G03F 35 61 F01M 31 56 B22D 27 57 
F25B 35 61 F21S 35 60 C08G 34 62 F25B 30 57 F02F 27 57 
G05G 35 61 F25B 35 60 H01G 34 62 G02F 30 57 G02F 27 57 
G11C 35 61 H02M 35 60 B22F 33 63 H03H 30 57 G10K 27 57 
B25J 34 62 B22F 34 61 B25J 33 63 H04W 30 57 H03H 27 57 
C08F 34 62 F01M 34 61 E05F 33 63 C25D 29 58 B23B 26 58 
C21D 34 62 H02N 34 61 F24F 33 63 G03B 29 58 H02G 26 58 
F02N 34 62 F02N 33 62 G01H 33 63 H04R 29 58 B21K 25 59 
H02N 34 62 F24F 33 62 G03B 32 64 B21K 28 59 B29D 25 59 
H04R 34 62 G03B 33 62 F25B 31 65 B25F 28 59 F25B 25 59 
B01F 33 63 H04W 33 62 G11B 31 65 D04H 28 59 G03B 25 59 
B22F 33 63 G01H 32 63 H04W 31 65 G11C 28 59 G09G 25 59 
B81B 33 63 C25D 31 64 G05G 30 66 H01G 28 59 B21C 24 60 
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F01M 33 63 D06M 31 64 H04R 30 66 H02G 28 59 B22F 24 60 
G01V 33 63 G01J 31 64 B25F 29 67 B29K 27 60 B41M 24 60 
F21S 32 64 G09G 31 64 B81B 29 67 G01V 27 60 D06M 24 60 
F24F 32 64 B25J 30 65 C25D 29 67 B23D 26 61 F23Q 24 60 
G09B 32 64 B61D 30 65 G09G 29 67 B25B 26 61 G01V 24 60 
B65B 30 65 B61L 30 65 G11C 29 67 B61D 26 61 B05B 23 61 
F01K 30 65 G05G 30 65 B21K 28 68 F23D 26 61 B21J 23 61 
G01H 30 65 G11C 30 65 B23B 28 68 F23Q 26 61 C08G 23 61 
G01J 30 65 H04R 30 65 G01V 28 68 F24F 26 61 D04H 23 61 
G09G 30 65 B81B 28 66 H01C 28 68 G05G 25 62 B29K 22 62 
H04W 30 65 C09J 28 66 H02N 28 68 G11B 25 62 F23D 22 62 
A61L 29 66 F23D 28 66 B29K 27 69 B21C 24 63 G11C 22 62 
B61D 29 66 A61L 27 67 B61D 27 69 B23B 24 63 H01C 22 62 
B81C 29 66 B08B 27 67 F01K 27 69 B65B 24 63 H01G 22 62 
H04J 29 66 B21K 27 67 F23M 27 69 B81B 24 63 B08B 21 63 
A41D 28 67 B25F 27 67 B21C 26 70 F01K 24 63 B81B 21 63 
B21K 28 67 B65B 27 67 B25B 26 70 F23M 24 63 C09J 21 63 
B28B 28 67 G01V 27 67 F23D 26 70 G09G 24 63 F16G 21 63 
B61L 28 67 G09B 27 67 H02G 26 70 H03F 24 63 F24F 21 63 
C09J 28 67 H03F 27 67 A61L 25 71 C08G 23 64 F27D 21 63 
C25D 28 67 H03L 27 67 B08B 25 71 F27D 23 64 G11B 21 63 
D06M 28 67 A41D 26 68 B61L 25 71 G01G 23 64 B60B 20 64 
B08B 27 68 B21C 26 68 B65H 25 71 H03G 23 64 B61D 20 64 
C03C 27 68 C08F 26 68 F21Y 25 71 A61L 22 65 C22B 20 64 
F23D 27 68 F01K 26 68 H03F 25 71 B41M 22 65 F23R 20 64 
H02G 27 68 H02G 26 68 H04J 25 71 C09J 22 65 F25D 20 64 
B65H 26 69 H04H 26 68 B65B 24 72 C22F 22 65 G01G 20 64 
D01F 26 69 H04J 26 68 C09J 24 72 D06N 22 65 H03G 20 64 
H03F 26 69 F21Y 25 69 G01G 24 72 H01C 22 65 B29L 19 65 
H03L 26 69 G01G 25 69 B28B 23 73 B08B 21 66 B61L 19 65 
H04H 26 69 B21B 24 70 B41M 23 73 D03D 21 66 F23N 19 65 
B21B 25 70 B81C 23 71 C03C 23 73 F21Y 21 66 G05G 19 65 
B29B 25 70 D03D 23 71 C22B 23 73 H02N 21 66 H01S 19 65 
B21C 24 71 F04C 23 71 C23F 23 73 H04J 21 66 A61F 18 66 
F21Y 24 71 F23K 23 71 D06N 23 73 A41D 20 67 C03C 18 66 
B25F 23 72 H03G 23 71 F27D 23 73 F17C 20 67 C22F 18 66 
F04C 23 72 B23B 22 72 A41D 22 74 G09B 20 67 F04C 18 66 
F23M 23 72 B25B 22 72 B05B 22 74 H03L 20 67 F23M 18 66 
H03G 23 72 B28B 22 72 B23D 22 74 H04H 20 67 G09B 18 66 
H03J 23 72 B29B 22 72 F17C 22 74 B01L 19 68 H03F 18 66 
C03B 22 73 B65H 22 72 F23Q 22 74 B05B 19 68 A41D 17 67 
F23C 22 73 C03C 22 72 H03G 22 74 B28B 19 68 A61N 17 67 
F23K 22 73 F17C 22 72 H03J 22 74 B60B 19 68 B01L 17 67 
G01G 22 73 F23Q 22 72 H03L 22 74 B61L 19 68 B65B 17 67 
G05F 22 73 F27D 22 72 C22F 21 75 B62J 19 68 B65H 17 67 
G07F 22 73 G07F 22 72 D03D 21 75 B65H 19 68 F17C 17 67 
H01T 22 73 H05H 22 72 F04C 21 75 E06B 19 68 F21Y 17 67 
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B05B 21 74 B01L 21 73 F25D 21 75 F21W 19 68 H04H 17 67 
B23B 21 74 B05B 21 73 G07B 21 75 F23R 19 68 H05G 17 67 
F02G 21 74 B22C 21 73 G07F 21 75 H05G 19 68 B81C 16 68 
H01P 21 74 B23D 21 73 H04H 21 75 B21B 18 69 C23F 16 68 
H05H 21 74 D01F 21 73 B21B 20 76 B21J 18 69 C30B 16 68 
A47C 20 75 F02G 21 73 G09B 20 76 B23C 18 69 D03D 16 68 
B22C 20 75 F21W 21 73 B01L 19 77 B81C 18 69 F16M 16 68 
B63H 20 75 F23M 21 73 B21H 19 77 C23F 18 69 F16N 16 68 
F21W 20 75 H03J 21 73 B29B 19 77 F23N 18 69 F16P 16 68 
F23N 20 75 B63H 20 74 B62J 19 77 F25D 18 69 F21K 16 68 
F23Q 20 75 C03B 20 74 B63H 19 77 G01T 18 69 F23C 16 68 
G06N 20 75 C22F 20 74 B81C 19 77 G03F 18 69 G05F 16 68 
B21J 19 76 F23C 20 74 F21W 19 77 H01S 18 69 G21K 16 68 
D06N 19 76 F25D 20 74 G01T 19 77 H05H 18 69 A47B 15 69 
G01T 19 76 G06N 20 74 G05F 19 77 A47L 17 70 B21B 15 69 
G07B 19 76 H01T 20 74 G06N 19 77 C02F 17 70 B60P 15 69 
G21K 19 76 B03B 19 75 H05G 19 77 C03B 17 70 B63B 15 69 
B01B 18 77 B41M 19 75 B03B 18 78 C03C 17 70 C02F 15 69 
B09B 18 77 B60B 19 75 B22C 18 78 C22B 17 70 C25F 15 69 
B21H 18 77 C23F 19 75 B63G 18 78 C30B 17 70 E05C 15 69 
B60B 18 77 D06N 19 75 C03B 18 78 F04C 17 70 E06B 15 69 
B63G 18 77 G05F 19 75 C25F 18 78 F16M 17 70 F01K 15 69 
C02F 18 77 G07B 19 75 C30B 18 78 F21K 17 70 F24D 15 69 
E01F 18 77 B01B 18 76 F23N 18 78 G05F 17 70 G01T 15 69 
F25D 18 77 B09B 18 76 H01T 18 78 G21K 17 70 H01P 15 69 
B01L 17 78 B21H 18 76 H05H 18 78 H01P 17 70 H03L 15 69 
B67D 17 78 B26D 18 76 B09B 17 79 H03J 17 70 H04J 15 69 
C22F 17 78 B44C 18 76 B21J 17 79 B21H 16 71 A47L 14 70 
C23F 17 78 B63B 18 76 B23C 17 79 B24C 16 71 A61L 14 70 
E06B 17 78 B63G 18 76 B60B 17 79 B60P 16 71 B24C 14 70 
H03B 17 78 G01T 18 76 B64D 17 79 B63H 16 71 B29B 14 70 
A61M 16 79 H01P 18 76 C02F 17 79 B64D 16 71 B44C 14 70 
B03B 16 79 B21J 17 77 D01F 17 79 C23G 16 71 B67D 14 70 
B07C 16 79 B64D 17 77 E06B 17 79 C25F 16 71 D06N 14 70 
B42D 16 79 C30B 17 77 F02G 17 79 F02G 16 71 F24H 14 70 
B44C 16 79 F01B 17 77 F21K 17 79 F16G 16 71 G07B 14 70 
B63B 16 79 F23N 17 77 F23R 17 79 F23C 16 71 G07F 14 70 
C07B 16 79 F23R 17 77 G21K 17 79 G07B 16 71 H03J 14 70 
C12M 16 79 F24H 17 77 H01P 17 79 D01F 15 72 H05H 14 70 
C12N 16 79 G21K 17 77 B01B 16 80 F16N 15 72 B05C 13 71 
F16G 16 79 A47C 16 78 B24C 16 80 G07F 15 72 B23C 13 71 
F23J 16 79 A61M 16 78 B44C 16 80 H01T 15 72 B62J 13 71 
F24H 16 79 C12N 16 78 B60P 16 80 A01D 14 73 C07D 13 71 
F27D 16 79 H03B 16 78 B63B 16 80 A61F 14 73 C07F 13 71 
H04S 16 79 H05G 16 78 C07D 16 80 A61N 14 73 F01B 13 71 
B05C 15 80 A47L 15 79 C23G 16 80 B26D 14 73 F21W 13 71 
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B06B 15 80 B60P 15 79 F16G 16 80 B67D 14 73 F27B 13 71 
B25B 15 80 C02F 15 79 F16M 16 80 C08F 14 73 G04B 13 71 
B64D 15 80 C12M 15 79 F16N 16 80 F01B 14 73 H01K 13 71 
D03D 15 80 C22B 15 79 F23K 16 80 F16P 14 73 H03B 13 71 
F01B 15 80 E06B 15 79 H03B 16 80 F24D 14 73 B21H 12 72 
F23L 15 80 F23L 15 79 A01B 15 81 F27B 14 73 B23H 12 72 
F23R 15 80 B05C 14 80 A47C 15 81 G01W 14 73 B25D 12 72 
H03D 15 80 B82B 14 80 A47L 15 81 H03B 14 73 B25H 12 72 
H05G 15 80 C25B 14 80 B26D 15 81 B05C 13 74 B27B 12 72 
A47L 14 81 C40B 14 80 B67D 15 81 B24D 13 74 B28B 12 72 
B23D 14 81 F16G 14 80 C12N 15 81 B62K 13 74 C23G 12 72 
B26D 14 81 F21K 14 80 C40B 15 81 C07D 13 74 C25B 12 72 
B61F 14 81 G06G 14 80 F01B 15 81 C25B 13 74 E04B 12 72 
B82B 14 81 H01S 14 80 F23C 15 81 E05C 13 74 E05D 12 72 
C07D 14 81 H03D 14 80 B66F 14 82 E05D 13 74 F02G 12 72 
C30B 14 81 A01B 13 81 B82B 14 82 F24H 13 74 G01W 12 72 
E04F 14 81 B07C 13 81 C08F 14 82 A47C 12 75 G03F 12 72 
F17C 14 81 B67D 13 81 C12M 14 82 A61H 12 75 G12B 12 72 
F23G 14 81 C07B 13 81 E01F 14 82 A61K 12 75 H02N 12 72 
F42B 14 81 C07D 13 81 F16P 14 82 B01B 12 75 H04S 12 72 
A01B 13 82 C07F 13 81 F23L 14 82 B25H 12 75 A01D 11 73 
A47B 13 82 C10L 13 81 G01W 14 82 B27B 12 75 B24D 11 73 
D04B 13 82 C25F 13 81 G06G 14 82 B63B 12 75 B26B 11 73 
F01C 13 82 E01F 13 81 H01S 14 82 B63J 12 75 B26D 11 73 
F16M 13 82 E04F 13 81 A61F 13 83 C07F 12 75 B62K 11 73 
H01S 13 82 F16P 13 81 A61M 13 83 H04S 12 75 B63H 11 73 
B03C 12 83 F42B 13 81 B05C 13 83 A61J 11 76 C03B 11 73 
B07B 12 83 H04S 13 81 B25H 13 83 A61M 11 76 C08F 11 73 
B23C 12 83 A47B 12 82 B27B 13 83 B07C 11 76 C12Q 11 73 
B60P 12 83 A61K 12 82 C07B 13 83 B22C 11 76 F03D 11 73 
B61C 12 83 B03C 12 82 C25B 13 83 B25D 11 76 A47C 10 74 
B66F 12 83 B23C 12 82 F24H 13 83 B29B 11 76 A61J 10 74 
C07F 12 83 B24C 12 82 F27B 13 83 B44C 11 76 B26F 10 74 
C10L 12 83 B27B 12 82 H01K 13 83 B61F 11 76 B27G 10 74 
C23G 12 83 B61K 12 82 A01D 12 84 B64C 11 76 B41F 10 74 
C40B 12 83 B66F 12 82 A61N 12 84 B66F 11 76 B61F 10 74 
F16P 12 83 C12Q 12 82 B03C 12 84 F23L 11 76 C40B 10 74 
F21K 12 83 C23G 12 82 B24D 12 84 F24J 11 76 F01C 10 74 
G06G 12 83 F16M 12 82 C10L 12 84 G06N 11 76 H01T 10 74 
G09C 12 83 F24J 12 82 C12Q 12 84 H01K 11 76 H03D 10 74 
A61F 11 84 F27B 12 82 E05C 12 84 C25C 10 77 A43B 9 75 
A61J 11 84 A61F 11 83 E05D 12 84 C40B 10 77 A61M 9 75 
A61K 11 84 A61J 11 83 F01C 12 84 E04B 10 77 B01B 9 75 
B25H 11 84 B06B 11 83 H04S 12 84 E21B 10 77 B30B 9 75 
B41M 11 84 B24D 11 83 A61J 11 85 G06G 10 77 B60D 9 75 
B61K 11 84 B42D 11 83 A61K 11 85 H03D 10 77 B64C 9 75 
C07C 11 84 B60D 11 83 B07C 11 85 A61G 9 78 C25C 9 75 
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C22B 11 84 B61F 11 83 B25D 11 85 B03D 9 78 E04H 9 75 
E05D 11 84 B64C 11 83 C09C 11 85 B09B 9 78 E21B 9 75 
F03D 11 84 C09C 11 83 F03D 11 85 B30B 9 78 F15D 9 75 
F15D 11 84 E05D 11 83 F24D 11 85 B60D 9 78 F22B 9 75 
F22B 11 84 F15D 11 83 H03D 11 85 B64F 9 78 F23K 9 75 
H03C 11 84 F22B 11 83 A61H 10 86 C12Q 9 78 F24J 9 75 
A61H 10 85 F23G 11 83 B07B 10 86 F01C 9 78 H02B 9 75 
A61N 10 85 F23J 11 83 B60D 10 86 F04F 9 78 B07C 8 76 
B60D 10 85 F24D 11 83 B61F 10 86 G04G 9 78 B22C 8 76 
B62J 10 85 G09C 11 83 B62K 10 86 G12B 9 78 B60M 8 76 
B63J 10 85 H01K 11 83 B63J 10 86 A43B 8 79 B61C 8 76 
C09C 10 85 H04K 11 83 B64C 10 86 A47B 8 79 B64F 8 76 
C10M 10 85 A43B 10 84 C25C 10 86 B03B 8 79 B66F 8 76 
C12Q 10 85 A61H 10 84 E04B 10 86 B06B 8 79 B68G 8 76 
E05C 10 85 A61N 10 84 E04F 10 86 B23H 8 79 C01C 8 76 
F24J 10 85 B07B 10 84 G09C 10 86 B41F 8 79 C21B 8 76 
F41H 10 85 B25D 10 84 H02B 10 86 B61C 8 79 E02F 8 76 
G01W 10 85 B44F 10 84 H05F 10 86 B67B 8 79 F02K 8 76 
G03G 10 85 B62K 10 84 B02C 9 87 B68G 8 79 F23L 8 76 
H05F 10 85 B63J 10 84 B03D 9 87 B82B 8 79 G06N 8 76 
B02C 9 86 C07C 10 84 B06B 9 87 C01C 8 79 A44B 7 77 
B24C 9 86 C10M 10 84 B26F 9 87 C11D 8 79 B06B 7 77 
B24D 9 86 H05F 10 84 B30B 9 87 D04B 8 79 B25G 7 77 
B27B 9 86 A01D 9 85 B42D 9 87 F02K 8 79 B62B 7 77 
B28D 9 86 B02C 9 85 B64F 9 87 F03D 8 79 B63G 7 77 
B30B 9 86 B30B 9 85 E04H 9 87 F15D 8 79 B63J 7 77 
B44F 9 86 B60M 9 85 E21B 9 87 F22B 8 79 C07C 7 77 
B64C 9 86 B61C 9 85 F02K 9 87 F23K 8 79 D21F 7 77 
C09B 9 86 B62J 9 85 F04F 9 87 H02B 8 79 G06G 7 77 
C25F 9 86 C11D 9 85 G12B 9 87 H05F 8 79 A61C 6 78 
E02F 9 86 C25C 9 85 A43B 8 88 B23F 7 80 A61G 6 78 
E04B 9 86 E04B 9 85 A47B 8 88 B25G 7 80 A61H 6 78 
E04C 9 86 E04H 9 85 B23H 8 88 B26F 7 80 A61K 6 78 
E21B 9 86 E05C 9 85 B44F 8 88 B28D 7 80 B27C 6 78 
F16N 9 86 E21B 9 85 B60M 8 88 B63G 7 80 B27D 6 78 
F27B 9 86 F01C 9 85 B61C 8 88 C07C 7 80 B28D 6 78 
G12B 9 86 F02K 9 85 B61K 8 88 C12M 7 80 B61K 6 78 
H02B 9 86 F03D 9 85 B67B 8 88 C12N 7 80 B64D 6 78 
H04K 9 86 F16N 9 85 C07H 8 88 D06C 7 80 C01G 6 78 
A61P 8 87 G01W 9 85 C11D 8 88 D21F 7 80 C11D 6 78 
B41N 8 87 G04G 9 85 D04B 8 88 E02F 7 80 D01F 6 78 
B62K 8 87 G12B 9 85 E02F 8 88 E04F 7 80 D04B 6 78 
B66C 8 87 A61P 8 86 F15D 8 88 F23G 7 80 D06C 6 78 
B67B 8 87 B03D 8 86 F22B 8 88 A01B 6 81 D21C 6 78 
C07H 8 87 B41N 8 86 F23J 8 88 A44B 6 81 D21H 6 78 
F02K 8 87 B67B 8 86 F24J 8 88 A61C 6 81 E03F 6 78 
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F03B 8 87 C07H 8 86 G04G 8 88 B27C 6 81 F03G 6 78 
G04G 8 87 D04B 8 86 H03C 8 88 B27G 6 81 F04F 6 78 
G07G 8 87 D06H 8 86 A45C 7 89 B60M 6 81 G07D 6 78 
A43B 7 88 E02F 8 86 A61G 7 89 B62M 6 81 A01G 5 79 
A47G 7 88 F03B 8 86 B23F 7 89 C01G 6 81 A47G 5 79 
A61G 7 88 F04F 8 86 B25G 7 89 C07B 6 81 B03D 5 79 
B25D 7 88 H03C 8 86 B26B 7 89 C09B 6 81 B41J 5 79 
B27N 7 88 A44B 7 87 B28D 7 89 C10L 6 81 B42D 5 79 
C25B 7 88 A45C 7 87 B41F 7 89 D02G 6 81 B62M 5 79 
E04H 7 88 A61G 7 87 B68G 7 89 D21C 6 81 B66C 5 79 
F03G 7 88 B25H 7 87 C07C 7 89 D21H 6 81 C09C 5 79 
F04F 7 88 B26F 7 87 C07F 7 89 E01F 6 81 C14C 5 79 
F15C 7 88 B28D 7 87 D06C 7 89 E03F 6 81 C21C 5 79 
F28C 7 88 B64F 7 87 D06F 7 89 E04H 6 81 D06F 5 79 
G03C 7 88 B66C 7 87 F23G 7 89 G07D 6 81 D21G 5 79 
G03H 7 88 D06C 7 87 F28C 7 89 G09C 6 81 E01F 5 79 
G04B 7 88 D06F 7 87 G03C 7 89 A63B 5 82 G03H 5 79 
G04F 7 88 F03G 7 87 G03H 7 89 B41J 5 82 A01B 4 80 
H01K 7 88 F28C 7 87 A44B 6 90 B42D 5 82 A62C 4 80 
A41F 6 89 G03C 7 87 B27C 6 90 B66C 5 82 B03B 4 80 
A44B 6 89 G03H 7 87 B27G 6 90 C09C 5 82 B03C 4 80 
A45C 6 89 G07G 7 87 B41J 6 90 C14C 5 82 B04B 4 80 
A63B 6 89 H02B 7 87 B62H 6 90 C21B 5 82 B21F 4 80 
B27G 6 89 A41F 6 88 B66C 6 90 C21C 5 82 B23F 4 80 
B41J 6 89 A47G 6 88 C09B 6 90 F42B 5 82 B28C 4 80 
B60M 6 89 B26B 6 88 D06B 6 90 G03H 5 82 B61B 4 80 
B62H 6 89 B27G 6 88 F03B 6 90 G04B 5 82 B66B 4 80 
C01C 6 89 B41J 6 88 F42B 6 90 A47G 4 83 C06B 4 80 
C01F 6 89 B62H 6 88 G03G 6 90 A61P 4 83 C06C 4 80 
D06B 6 89 C01F 6 88 G07D 6 90 A63F 4 83 C07B 4 80 
D06F 6 89 C09B 6 88 A61C 5 91 B03C 4 83 C09B 4 80 
D07B 6 89 D06B 6 88 B21F 5 91 B04B 4 83 C10M 4 80 
F24D 6 89 F41H 6 88 B28C 5 91 B21F 4 83 C12M 4 80 
A01D 5 90 G03G 6 88 C01C 5 91 B26B 4 83 D02G 4 80 
A23G 5 90 G07D 6 88 C10M 5 91 B28C 4 83 D06H 4 80 
A61C 5 90 A61C 5 89 C14C 5 91 B61K 4 83 D07B 4 80 
B04B 5 90 B04B 5 89 C21B 5 91 B62B 4 83 D21B 4 80 
B26B 5 90 B41F 5 89 D05C 5 91 C06B 4 83 E01B 4 80 
B26F 5 90 B61B 5 89 D21C 5 91 C06C 4 83 E04C 4 80 
B61B 5 90 B61J 5 89 D21F 5 91 D06F 4 83 E04F 4 80 
B61J 5 90 B66B 5 89 G01Q 5 91 D06H 4 83 E04G 4 80 
B62B 5 90 C01C 5 89 G04B 5 91 D07B 4 83 F03C 4 80 
B64F 5 90 C10G 5 89 H04K 5 91 D21B 4 83 F17D 4 80 
B66B 5 90 C21B 5 89 A47G 4 92 E01B 4 83 F24C 4 80 
B67C 5 90 D04D 5 89 A61P 4 92 E01C 4 83 F28C 4 80 
C01G 5 90 D05C 5 89 A63B 4 92 E04C 4 83 F41H 4 80 
C10B 5 90 D21C 5 89 B04B 4 92 E04G 4 83 F42B 4 80 
Appendix: Tables  183 
 
 
C10G 5 90 D21F 5 89 B04C 4 92 F03C 4 83 G03C 4 80 
D02G 5 90 F15C 5 89 B27N 4 92 F15C 4 83 G03D 4 80 
D04D 5 90 G01Q 5 89 B41N 4 92 F17D 4 83 A43C 3 81 
D05B 5 90 G04B 5 89 B61B 4 92 F23J 4 83 A45C 3 81 
D05C 5 90 A42B 4 90 C01F 4 92 F28C 4 83 A63B 3 81 
D06C 5 90 A44C 4 90 C01G 4 92 F41H 4 83 A63F 3 81 
D06H 5 90 A63B 4 90 C06B 4 92 G03C 4 83 B04C 3 81 
G01Q 5 90 B04C 4 90 C06C 4 92 G03D 4 83 B09B 3 81 
A42B 4 91 B23H 4 90 C09G 4 92 G04F 4 83 B21L 3 81 
A44C 4 91 B27N 4 90 C12R 4 92 H03C 4 83 B41N 3 81 
B03D 4 91 B61G 4 90 D02G 4 92 A43C 3 84 B61G 3 81 
B04C 4 91 B67C 4 90 D06H 4 92 A45C 3 84 B82B 3 81 
B23F 4 91 C01G 4 90 D21B 4 92 A62B 3 84 C06D 3 81 
B41F 4 91 C06B 4 90 E01B 4 92 A62C 3 84 C10L 3 81 
B61G 4 91 C06C 4 90 E01C 4 92 B04C 3 84 C12N 3 81 
B62M 4 91 C06D 4 90 E04G 4 92 B27D 3 84 E02D 3 81 
C06B 4 91 C09G 4 90 F03C 4 92 B31B 3 84 E06C 3 81 
C06C 4 91 C12R 4 90 F15C 4 92 B31F 3 84 F03B 3 81 
C06D 4 91 D02G 4 90 F17D 4 92 B41N 3 84 F15C 3 81 
C09G 4 91 D21B 4 90 F41H 4 92 B44F 3 84 F23G 3 81 
C12R 4 91 E01C 4 90 G03D 4 92 B61B 3 84 F23J 3 81 
D21G 4 91 E04G 4 90 G04F 4 92 B61G 3 84 G04F 3 81 
E01C 4 91 F17D 4 90 A43C 3 93 B66B 3 84 G04G 3 81 
E04G 4 91 F26B 4 90 A62B 3 93 B67C 3 84 G07G 3 81 
F17D 4 91 G03D 4 90 A62C 3 93 C06D 3 84 G09C 3 81 
F24C 4 91 A23G 3 91 A63F 3 93 C10G 3 84 H03C 3 81 
G03D 4 91 A43C 3 91 B27D 3 93 C10K 3 84 H04K 3 81 
G06M 4 91 A62B 3 91 B31B 3 93 D01D 3 84 A01M 2 82 
A62B 3 92 A62C 3 91 B31F 3 93 D21G 3 84 A41F 2 82 
B21F 3 92 B21F 3 91 B61G 3 93 E02D 3 84 A46B 2 82 
B23H 3 92 B23F 3 91 B61H 3 93 E06C 3 84 A47F 2 82 
B25G 3 92 B25G 3 91 B62B 3 93 F03B 3 84 A62B 2 82 
B31B 3 92 B27D 3 91 B66B 3 93 F03G 3 84 A63C 2 82 
B31F 3 92 B31B 3 91 B67C 3 93 F24C 3 84 B02C 2 82 
B44D 3 92 B31F 3 91 C06D 3 93 F26B 3 84 B42F 2 82 
B61H 3 92 B44D 3 91 C10G 3 93 G01Q 3 84 B62H 2 82 
C05F 3 92 B61H 3 91 C10K 3 93 G04D 3 84 B62L 2 82 
C10K 3 92 B62B 3 91 D01D 3 93 G07G 3 84 C01F 2 82 
C11D 3 92 B68G 3 91 D05B 3 93 H04K 3 84 C05F 2 82 
C14B 3 92 C05F 3 91 D06J 3 93 A01G 2 85 C08C 2 82 
D04C 3 92 C10K 3 91 E04C 3 93 A41F 2 85 C09G 2 82 
D06J 3 92 D06J 3 91 F03G 3 93 A46B 2 85 C10G 2 82 
E02B 3 92 E01B 3 91 F24C 3 93 A63C 2 85 D04C 2 82 
F03C 3 92 E04C 3 91 F26B 3 93 A63G 2 85 E02B 2 82 
F26B 3 92 G02C 3 91 G04D 3 93 B02C 2 85 E03B 2 82 
G02C 3 92 G04D 3 91 G07G 3 93 B42F 2 85 E04D 2 82 
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G04C 3 92 A21C 2 92 A41F 2 94 B44B 2 85 F22D 2 82 
G04D 3 92 A23L 2 92 A46B 2 94 B62H 2 85 F26B 2 82 
G07D 3 92 A63C 2 92 A63C 2 94 B62L 2 85 F28B 2 82 
A21C 2 93 A63G 2 92 A63G 2 94 C01F 2 85 F42D 2 82 
A23L 2 93 B27C 2 92 B42F 2 94 C05F 2 85 G03G 2 82 
A63C 2 93 B28C 2 92 B44B 2 94 C09G 2 85 G06D 2 82 
A63G 2 93 B31D 2 92 B62L 2 94 D05C 2 85 A01N 1 83 
B28C 2 93 B42F 2 92 B62M 2 94 E01H 2 85 A22B 1 83 
B31D 2 93 B44B 2 92 C05F 2 94 E02B 2 85 A22C 1 83 
B42F 2 93 D01D 2 92 C21C 2 94 E04D 2 85 A23G 1 83 
B44B 2 93 D05B 2 92 D07B 2 94 F25C 2 85 A61D 1 83 
B68G 2 93 D21H 2 92 D21H 2 94 F28B 2 85 A61P 1 83 
C25C 2 93 E01H 2 92 E01H 2 94 F42D 2 85 A63G 1 83 
D01D 2 93 E02B 2 92 E02B 2 94 G03G 2 85 B31B 1 83 
D21H 2 93 F03C 2 92 E04D 2 94 G06D 2 85 B43K 1 83 
E01H 2 93 F24C 2 92 F25C 2 94 A01M 1 86 B44D 1 83 
F16S 2 93 F25C 2 92 F28B 2 94 A01N 1 86 B44F 1 83 
F22D 2 93 F28B 2 92 G06J 2 94 A23G 1 86 B61H 1 83 
F25C 2 93 F42D 2 92 G10H 2 94 A61D 1 86 B63C 1 83 
F28B 2 93 G06J 2 92 G21D 2 94 B07B 1 86 B64G 1 83 
F42C 2 93 G10H 2 92 A01G 1 95 B27N 1 86 B65F 1 83 
F42D 2 93 G21D 2 92 A01M 1 95 B43K 1 86 B67B 1 83 
G06J 2 93 A01G 1 93 A01N 1 95 B61H 1 86 B67C 1 83 
G10H 2 93 A01N 1 93 A47H 1 95 B63C 1 86 C07K 1 83 
G21D 2 93 A43D 1 93 A47J 1 95 B64G 1 86 C10N 1 83 
A01G 1 94 A45F 1 93 A61D 1 95 B65F 1 86 C23D 1 83 
A43D 1 94 A47H 1 93 B31D 1 95 C07K 1 86 D01D 1 83 
A45F 1 94 A47J 1 93 B43K 1 95 C08C 1 86 D05B 1 83 
A47D 1 94 A47K 1 93 B64G 1 95 C10M 1 86 D05C 1 83 
A47H 1 94 A61D 1 93 B65C 1 95 D05B 1 86 D06B 1 83 
A47J 1 94 A63F 1 93 B65F 1 95 D06B 1 86 D06P 1 83 
A47K 1 94 B62L 1 93 C07K 1 95 D06P 1 86 E21C 1 83 
A61D 1 94 B62M 1 93 D06P 1 95 E21C 1 86 F16T 1 83 
A62C 1 94 B64G 1 93 D21G 1 95 F16T 1 86 F21L 1 83 
A63F 1 94 B65C 1 93 F16T 1 95 F42C 1 86 G06M 1 83 
B27C 1 94 B65F 1 93 F41A 1 95 G06M 1 86 G10H 1 83 
B27D 1 94 B66D 1 93 F42C 1 95 G10H 1 86 G21C 1 83 
B62L 1 94 C07K 1 93 F42D 1 95 G21C 1 86 A42B 0 84 
B65C 1 94 C10N 1 93 A42B 0 96 A22B 0 87 A47K 0 84 
B65F 1 94 D06P 1 93 A44C 0 96 A42B 0 87 A63H 0 84 
B66D 1 94 D07B 1 93 A45F 0 96 A45F 0 87 B27N 0 84 
C07K 1 94 D21G 1 93 F28G 0 96 A63H 0 87 B60V 0 84 
C10N 1 94 E05G 1 93 
   
B60V 0 87 B66D 0 84 
D06P 1 94 F16T 1 93 
   
B65C 0 87 D01H 0 84 
D21F 1 94 F22G 1 93 
   
B66D 0 87 E01C 0 84 
E01B 1 94 F41A 1 93 
   
D01H 0 87 F22G 0 84 
E01D 1 94 F42C 1 93 
   
D04C 0 87 
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E03B 1 94 G04F 1 93 
         
E03F 1 94 A46B 0 94 
         
E05G 1 94 B60F 0 94 
         
F22G 1 94 C10J 0 94 
         
F41A 1 94 C21C 0 94 
         
A01C 0 95 E03F 0 94 
         
A46B 0 95 E04D 0 94 
         
B60F 0 95 F28G 0 94 
         
C10J 0 95 
            
C21C 0 95 
            
D21C 0 95 
            
E04D 0 95 
            
F28G 0 95 
            
G21C 0 95 
            
Source: own calculations. 
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Table A. 2: Sample firms 
No. Firm No. Firm 
1 ACTech GmbH 78 
Lear Corporation Electrical and Electronics GmbH 
& Co. KG 
2 Adam Opel AG 79 LEONI AG 
3 
ADC Automotive Distance Control 
Systems GmbH 
80 Leoni Kabel Holding GmbH & Co. KG 
4 AKsys GmbH 81 Lucas Varity GmbH 
5 Alutec Metallwaren GmbH & Co. KG 82 MAHLE GmbH 
6 AMI Doduco GmbH 83 MAHLE International GmbH 
7 Astyx GmbH 84 Mann + Hummel GmbH 
8 ATMEL Automotive GmbH 85 Marquardt GmbH 
9 AUDI Aktiengesellschaft 86 Menzolit-Fibron GmbH 
10 AVL Deutschland GmbH 87 Meteor Gummiwerke K.H. Bädje GmbH & Co. KG 
11 
Bayerische Motoren Werke 
Aktiengesellschaft 
88 Metzeler Schaum GmbH 
12 BBS International GmbH 89 Micronas GmbH 
13 Behr GmbH & Co. KG 90 Muhr und Bender KG 
14 Behr-Hella Thermocontrol GmbH 91 Neosid Pemetzrieder GmbH & Co. KG 
15 Benteler Automobiltechnik GmbH 92 NOVEM Car Interior Design GmbH 
16 Wilhelm Böllhoff GmbH & Co. KG 93 odelo GmbH 
17 Brose Fahrzeugteile GmbH & Co. KG 94 Oechsler Aktiengesellschaft 
18 Car Trim GmbH 95 Optrex Europe GmbH 
19 Freudenberg Gruppe 96 OSRAM GmbH 
20 ZF Electronics GmbH 97 OSRAM Opto Semiconductors GmbH 
21 Conti Temic microelectronic GmbH 98 paragon Aktiengesellschaft 
22 Continental AG 99 PEIKER acustic GmbH & Co. KG 
23 Continental Automotive GmbH 100 Philips Technologie GmbH 
24 Continental Teves AG & Co. oHG 101 Pierburg GmbH 
25 ContiTech Vibration Control GmbH 102 Pilkington Automotive Deutschland GmbH 
26 Daimler AG 103 Ploucquet Textiles Zittau GmbH 
27 DEUTZ Aktiengesellschaft 104 Progress-Werk Oberkirch Aktiengesellschaft 
28 
Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche  
Aktiengesellschaft 
105 REHAU AG + Co 
29 EDAG GmbH & Co. KGaA 106 REINZ-Dichtungs-GmbH 
30 
Entwicklungsgesellschaft für Akustik 
(EFA) mit beschränkter Haftung 
107 Reum GmbH & Co. Betriebs KG 
31 ELMOS Semiconductor AG 108 Robert Bosch GmbH 
32 ElringKlinger AG 109 Robert Seuffer GmbH & Co. KG 
33 
EMITEC Gesellschaft für 
Emissionstechnologie mbH 
110 Schaeffler Holding GmbH & Co. KG 
34 EPCOS AG 111 Schunk Kohlenstofftechnik GmbH 
35 
ERAS Gesellschaft für Entwicklung und 
Realisation Adaptiver Systeme mbH 
112 SEMIKRON International GmbH 
36 Erhard & Söhne GmbH 113 Sensitec GmbH 
37 
ESG Elektroniksystem- und Logistik- 
Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
114 SFC Energy AG 
38 Faurecia Abgastechnik GmbH 115 SGL Carbon GmbH 
39 Faurecia Innenraum Systeme GmbH 116 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 
40 Federal-Mogul Burscheid GmbH 117 Siemens VDO Automotive AG 
41 FEV Motorentechnik GmbH 118 
Sitronic Gesellschaft für elektrotechnische Aus 
rüstung mbH. & Co. KG 
42 Flabeg GmbH & Co. KG 119 Stankiewicz Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
43 Fludicon GmbH 120 Strähle + Hess GmbH 
44 Ford-Werke GmbH 121 Texas Instruments Deutschland GmbH 
45 Gardner Denver Thomas GmbH 122 
ThyssenKrupp Fahrzeugguss GmbH / Thyssen 
Krupp Automotive AG 
46 Georg Fischer Automobilguss GmbH 123 ThyssenKrupp Bilstein Suspension GmbH 
47 
GETRAG Getriebe- und Zahnradfabrik  
Hermann Hagenmeyer GmbH & Cie KG 
124 ThyssenKrupp Drauz Nothelfer GmbH 
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48 GRAMMER AG 125 ThyssenKrupp Umformtechnik GmbH 
49 Grohmann Engineering GmbH 126 TI Automotive 
50 
Harman Becker Automotive Systems 
(Becker Division) GmbH 
127 Ticona GmbH 
51 
HARTING Automotive GmbH & Co. 
KG 
128 TMD Friction 
52 HBPO GmbH 129 TRW Airbag Systems GmbH 
53 Hella KGaA Hueck & Co. 130 TRW Deutschland GmbH 
54 Honda Research Institute Europe GmbH 131 TRW Automotive Safety Systems GmbH 
55 Honeywell Bremsbelag GmbH 132 Tyco Electronics AMP GmbH 
56 Huf Hülsbeck & Fürst GmbH & Co. KG 133 Umicore AG & Co. KG 
57 Huf Tools GmbH Velbert 134 UST Umweltsensortechnik GmbH 
58 Hydro Aluminium Deutschland GmbH 135 VERITAS AG 
59 
IAV GmbH Ingenieurgesellschaft Auto 
und Verkehr 
136 Vibracoustic GmbH & Co. KG 
60 IBEO Automobile Sensor GmbH 137 Volkswagen AG 
61 IFA - Technologies GmbH 138 WABCO GmbH 
62 I. G. Bauerhin GmbH 139 Walter Söhner GmbH & Co. KG 
63 imk automotive GmbH 140 Webasto AG 
64 Infineon Technologies AG 141 Westfalia Presstechnik GmbH & Co. KG 
65 ISE Automotive GmbH 142 W.E.T. Automotive Systems Aktiengesellschaft 
66 J. Eberspächer GmbH & Co. KG 143 Wilhelm Manz GmbH & Co. KG 
67 Jacob Composite GmbH 144 WKW Erbslöh Automotive GmbH 
68 Jenoptik Optical Systems GmbH 145 W. L. Gore & Associates GmbH 
69 Jenoptik Polymer Systems GmbH 146 XCELLSIS AG 
70 Johann Borgers GmbH & Co. KG 147 ZF Friedrichshafen AG 
71 
Johnson Controls Hybrid and Recycling 
GmbH 
148 ZF Lemförder GmbH 
72 Johnson Controls Headliner GmbH 149 ZF Lenksysteme GmbH 
73 Karosseriewerke Dresden GmbH 150 
ContiTech AG (incl. ContiTech Luftfedersysteme 
GmbH, ContiTech Profile GmbH, ContiTech 
Schlauch GmbH, ContiTech Vibration Control 
GmbH) 
74 Kathrein-Werke KG 151 odelo LED GmbH 
75 KEIPER GmbH & Co. KG 152 Polytec Automotive GmbH & Co. KG 
76 KraussMaffei Technologies GmbH 153 Polytec Interior GmbH 
77 Langendorf Textil GmbH & Co. KG 
  
Source: own illustration.  
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Table A. 6: Full model elements. 
6 Observations 
153 Actors 
1 Dependent network variable 
1 Constant actor covariate 
4 Exogenous changing actor covariates 
1 Constant dyadic covariates 
1 Exogenous changing dyadic covariates 
1 File with times of composition change 
Source: own calculations. 
Table A. 7: Composition changes for node set actors. 
Actor 130 Leaves network at time 3 
Actor 146 Leaves network at time 1 
Actor 151 Joins network at time 2 
Actor 152 Joins network at time 2 
Actor 153 Joins network at time 3 
Source: own calculations. 
Table A. 8: Information about covariates (full model). 
  
Minimum Maximum Mean 
SIZE 
 
1.0 3.0 1.333 
GEO_DISTANCE 
 
0 6.8 5.613 
TECH_DISTANCE 
   
0.675 
ABSORPTIVE_CAPACITY Period 1 0 8.8 3.020 
 
Period 2 0 8.8 3.116 
 
Period 3 0 8.7 3.167 
 
Period 4 0 8.7 3.213 
 
Period 5 0 8.7 3.138 
 
Overall 
  
3.131 
KB_MODULARITY Period 1 0 1 0.354 
 
Period 2 0 1 0.370 
 
Period 3 0 1 0.363 
 
Period 4 0 1 0.344 
 
Period 5 0 1 0.306 
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Overall 
  
0.347 
COOP_EXPERIENCE Period 1 0 96 4.327 
 
Period 2 0 105 4.765 
 
Period 3 0 113 5.176 
 
Period 4 0 125 5.987 
 
Period 5 0 129 6.712 
 
Overall 
  
5.393 
IND_EXPERIENCE Period 1 0 6.1 3.578 
 
Period 2 0.7 6.1 3.647 
 
Period 3 0 6.1 3.653 
 
Period 4 0 6.1 3.685 
 
Period 5 0.7 6.1 3.737 
 
Overall 
  
3.660 
Source: own calculations. 
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B. Appendix: Figures 
 
Figure B. 1: Test for time heterogeneity (small p values indicate time heterogeneity in the data) 
(Source: own calculations). 
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C. Appendix: R-code 
# *** LOGISTIC MAP *** 
 
library(compiler) 
 
logistic.map <- function(r, x, N, M){ 
# r: bifurcation parameter 
# x: initial value 
# N: number of iterations 
# M: number of iteration points to be returned 
z <- 1:N 
z[1] <- x 
  for(i in c(1:(N-1))){ 
    z[i+1] <- r *z[i]  * (1 - z[i]) 
  } 
# Return the last M iterations  
z[c((N-M):N)] 
} 
 
logistic.map <- cmpfun(logistic.map)  
my.r <- seq(2.7, 4, by=0.001) 
N <- 2000; M <- 1000; start.x <- 0.1 
orbit <- sapply(my.r, logistic.map,  x=start.x, N=N, M=M) 
Orbit <- as.vector(orbit) 
r <- sort(rep(my.r, (M+1))) 
plot(Orbit ~ r, pch=".", axes = F, col=rgb(0,0,0,0.05)) 
axis(side = 1, at = c(2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 3.9, 4.0, 3.57, 3.83)) 
axis(side = 2, at = c(seq(0, 1, by=0.1))) 
 
 
# *** MODULARITY INDICATOR *** 
 
library (PCIT) 
 
# Load patent database 
patents = read.delim("patents.txt", header=TRUE) 
 
# Define lists and start loop 
ci.98 <- list() 
ci.99 <- list() 
ci.00 <- list() 
ci.01 <- list() 
ci.02 <- list() 
ci <- list(ci.98, ci.99, ci.00, ci.01, ci.02) 
y.start <- 1998 
y.end <- 2002 
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b <- 1 
while (y.end <= 2006) {  
# Select IPC sub-classes for relevant years and create 
adjacency # matrices 
    x <- list() 
    i <- 1 
    while (i <= 153) { 
a <- subset (patents , ID == i & 
Prio_Year >= y.start & Prio_Year <= 
y.end, select = c(Appln_id, 
IPC.4.DIGIT)) 
       aT = as.matrix( table (droplevels(a)))  
       aM = t(aT) %*% aT 
       diag (aM) <- 0 
       x [[i]] = assign (paste ("p", i, sep =""), 
aM) 
       i <- i + 1 
       } 
 
 
# Replace tie strength values by "1" to calculate the 
clustering  #coefficients 
    j <- 1 
    while (j <= 153) { 
       if (length(x[[j]]) > 0) { 
 
       i <- 1 
       while (i <= max(x[[j]])) { 
x[[j]][  
x[[j]]  
%in%  i  ] 
<-  1 
           i <- i + 1 
           } 
           } 
       j <- j + 1 
       } 
    
# Calculation of clustering coefficients 
    cc <- list () 
    i <- 1 
    while (i <= 153) { 
       c <- localClusteringCoefficient(x[[i]]) 
       cc [[i]] <- c 
       i <- i + 1 
       } 
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# Read patent data to calculate relative shares of IPC sub-
classes # in the patent portfolio 
    rp <- list() 
    i <- 1 
    while (i <= 153) { 
a <- subset (patents , ID == i & 
Prio_Year >= y.start & Prio_Year <= 
y.end, select = c(Appln_id, 
IPC.4.DIGIT)) 
h <- as.matrix (table (droplevels (a 
[,2]))) 
       sum (h) 
       rh <- h / sum (h) 
       rp [[i]] <- rh 
       i <- i + 1 
       } 
 
    # Calculation of the modularity indicators (mci) 
    
    i <- 1     
    while (i <= 153) { 
       cii <- cc [[i]] * rp [[i]] 
       ci [[b]] [i] <- sum (cii, na.rm = TRUE) 
        
       i <- i + 1 
       }     
    y.start <- y.start + 1 
    y.end <- y.end + 1 
    b <- b + 1 
    } 
 
mci <- cbind (unlist(ci[[1]]), unlist(ci [[2]]), unlist(ci [[3]]), unlist(ci [[4]]), unlist(ci 
[[5]])) 
 
 
 
 
# *** STOCHASTIC ACTOR-BASED MODEL FOR NETWORK EVOLUTION *** 
 
 
library(RSiena) 
library (dplyr) 
 
# Read in IDs of relevant actors 
id <- read.delim("id.txt", header=TRUE) 
Appendix: R-code  197 
 
 
 
# Construct networks from projects (bipartite data) 
netzwerk_02 <- read.delim ("n02.txt", header = TRUE) 
netzwerk_03 <- read.delim ("n03.txt", header = TRUE) 
netzwerk_04 <- read.delim ("n04.txt", header = TRUE) 
netzwerk_05 <- read.delim ("n05.txt", header = TRUE) 
netzwerk_06 <- read.delim ("n06.txt", header = TRUE) 
netzwerk_07 <- read.delim ("n07.txt", header = TRUE) 
 
netzwerk_2002 <- netzwerk_02 %>% 
  filter (Nummer.Akteur %in% as.numeric(id[,1]) ) %>% 
  select (Nummer.Akteur, Projektnummer) %>% 
  table () %>% 
  as.matrix() 
 
netzwerk_2003 <- netzwerk_03 %>% 
  filter (Nummer.Akteur %in% as.numeric(id[,1]) ) %>% 
  select (Nummer.Akteur, Projektnummer) %>% 
  table () %>% 
  as.matrix() 
 
netzwerk_2004 <- netzwerk_04 %>% 
  filter (Nummer.Akteur %in% as.numeric(id[,1]) ) %>% 
  select (Nummer.Akteur, Projektnummer) %>% 
  table () %>% 
  as.matrix() 
 
netzwerk_2005 <- netzwerk_05 %>% 
  filter (Nummer.Akteur %in% as.numeric(id[,1]) ) %>% 
  select (Nummer.Akteur, Projektnummer) %>% 
  table () %>% 
  as.matrix() 
 
netzwerk_2006 <- netzwerk_06 %>% 
  filter (Nummer.Akteur %in% as.numeric(id[,1]) ) %>% 
  select (Nummer.Akteur, Projektnummer) %>% 
  table () %>% 
  as.matrix() 
 
netzwerk_2007 <- netzwerk_07 %>% 
  filter (Nummer.Akteur %in% as.numeric(id[,1]) ) %>% 
  select (Nummer.Akteur, Projektnummer) %>% 
  table () %>% 
  as.matrix() 
 
net_2002 <- netzwerk_2002 %*% t(netzwerk_2002) 
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net_2003 <- netzwerk_2003 %*% t(netzwerk_2003) 
net_2004 <- netzwerk_2004 %*% t(netzwerk_2004) 
net_2005 <- netzwerk_2005 %*% t(netzwerk_2005) 
net_2006 <- netzwerk_2006 %*% t(netzwerk_2006) 
net_2007 <- netzwerk_2007 %*% t(netzwerk_2007) 
 
net_2002 <- ifelse (net_2002 > 0, 1, net_2002) 
net_2003 <- ifelse (net_2003 > 0, 1, net_2003) 
net_2004 <- ifelse (net_2004 > 0, 1, net_2004) 
net_2005 <- ifelse (net_2005 > 0, 1, net_2005) 
net_2006 <- ifelse (net_2006 > 0, 1, net_2006) 
net_2007 <- ifelse (net_2007 > 0, 1, net_2007) 
 
m <- matrix ( ,0, nrow = length(id [,1]), ncol = length(id [,1])) 
rownames (m) <- id [,1] 
colnames(m)<- id [,1] 
m[is.na(m)] <- 0 
match1 <- match(rownames(net_2002), rownames(m)) 
match2<- match(colnames(net_2002), colnames(m)) 
m2 <- m 
m2[match1,match2] <- net_2002 
 
match1 <- match(rownames(net_2003), rownames(m)) 
match2<- match(colnames(net_2003), colnames(m)) 
m3 <- m 
m3[match1,match2] <- net_2003 
 
match1 <- match(rownames(net_2004), rownames(m)) 
match2<- match(colnames(net_2004), colnames(m)) 
m4 <- m 
m4[match1,match2] <- net_2004 
 
match1 <- match(rownames(net_2005), rownames(m)) 
match2<- match(colnames(net_2005), colnames(m)) 
m5 <- m 
m5[match1,match2] <- net_2005 
 
match1 <- match(rownames(net_2006), rownames(m)) 
match2<- match(colnames(net_2006), colnames(m)) 
m6 <- m 
m6[match1,match2] <- net_2006 
 
match1 <- match(rownames(net_2007), rownames(m)) 
match2<- match(colnames(net_2007), colnames(m)) 
m7 <- m 
m7[match1,match2] <- net_2007 
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# Read in adjacency matrices 
madjazenz.1 <- m2 
madjazenz.2 <- m3 
madjazenz.3 <- m4 
madjazenz.4 <- m5 
madjazenz.5 <- m6 
madjazenz.6 <- m7 
 
# 1 Read in data for the absorptive capacity 
absorp = read.delim("1_absortptive capacity.txt", header=TRUE) 
 
# 2 Read in data for the technological distance 
techdis.1 = read.delim("2_techdis2.txt", header=TRUE) 
techdis.2 = read.delim("2_techdis3.txt", header=TRUE) 
techdis.3 = read.delim("2_techdis4.txt", header=TRUE) 
techdis.4 = read.delim("2_techdis5.txt", header=TRUE) 
techdis.5 = read.delim("2_techdis6.txt", header=TRUE) 
 
# 3 Read in data of the geographic distance 
geo =  read.delim("3_geodis.txt", header=TRUE) 
 
# 4 Read in data of the cooperation experience 
experience = read.delim("4_experience.txt", header=TRUE) 
 
# 5 Read in data of the size 
size = read.delim("5_size.txt", header=TRUE) 
 
# 6 Read in data of the industry experience 
indexperience = read.delim("6_ind_experience.txt", header=TRUE) 
 
# Transform data into matrices 
 
# 1 
mabsorp <- as.matrix(absorp) 
 
# 2 
mtechdis.1 <- as.matrix(techdis.1) 
mtechdis.2 <- as.matrix(techdis.2) 
mtechdis.3 <- as.matrix(techdis.3) 
mtechdis.4 <- as.matrix(techdis.4) 
mtechdis.5 <- as.matrix(techdis.5) 
 
# 3 
mgeo <- as.matrix(geo) 
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# 4 
mexperience <- as.matrix(experience) 
 
# 5 
msize <- size 
 
# 6 
mindexperience <- as.matrix(indexperience) 
 
# identify dependent variable of the model 
cooperation <- sienaNet( array( c( madjazenz.1, madjazenz.2, madjazenz.3, 
madjazenz.4, madjazenz.5, madjazenz.6 ), dim = c( 153, 153, 6 ) ) ) 
 
# identify independent variables (covariates) of the model 
TECH_DISTANCE <- varDyadCovar(array( c( mtechdis.1, mtechdis.2, mtechdis.3, 
mtechdis.4, mtechdis.5), dim = c( 153, 153, 5 ) ) ) 
GEO_DISTANCE <-  coDyadCovar (mgeo) 
ABSORPTIVE_CAPACITY <- varCovar (mabsorp) 
 
COOP_EXPERIENCE <- varCovar(mexperience) 
 
IND_EXPERIENCE <- varCovar (mindexperience) 
 
KB_MODULARITY <- varCovar (mci) 
 
SIZE <- coCovar(msize[,1]) 
 
 
# Create composition change matrix 
compositionchange <- sienaCompositionChangeFromFile("composition change.prn") 
 
 
########### Model 0 (Base model) ############### 
 
# Combine data for the analysis 
mydata  <-  sienaDataCreate (cooperation) 
 
# Create effects structure and include effects 
myeff <- getEffects(mydata) 
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, density)  
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, transTriads)  
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# Estimation of parameters  
mymodel.0  <- sienaModelCreate(projname = "final", modelType = 3, nsub=5, 
n3=3000) 
print01Report(  mydata,  myeff,  modelname  =  "descriptive"  ) 
ans.0  <- siena07( mymodel.0, data = mydata, effects = myeff, returnDeps=TRUE) 
 
 
########### Model 1 (includes knowledge related effects) ############### 
 
# Combine data for the analysis 
mydata <- sienaDataCreate (cooperation, TECH_DISTANCE, 
ABSORPTIVE_CAPACITY, KB_MODULARITY, compositionchange) 
 
# Create effects structure (inkl. time dummies for density and transitive triads) 
myeff <- getEffects(mydata) 
 
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, density)  
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, transTriads)  
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, altX, interaction1 = "ABSORPTIVE_CAPACITY" ) 
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, X, interaction1  = "TECH_DISTANCE" ) 
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, altX, interaction1 = "KB_MODULARITY" ) 
 
 
# Estimation of parameters 
mymodel.1 <- sienaModelCreate(projname = "final", modelType = 3, nsub=5, 
n3=3000) 
print01Report(mydata,  myeff, modelname  = "descriptive"  ) 
ans.1  <-  siena07(mymodel.1, data = mydata, effects = myeff) 
 
 
 
########### Model 2 (includes all effects) ############### 
 
# Combine data for the analysis 
mydata  <- sienaDataCreate (cooperation, TECH_DISTANCE, 
ABSORPTIVE_CAPACITY, 
KB_MODULARITY,GEO_DISTANCE,COOP_EXPERIENCE,IND_EXPERIENCE, 
SIZE, compositionchange) 
 
# Create effects structure 
myeff <- getEffects(mydata) 
 
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, density)  
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, transTriads)  
myeff  <- includeEffects(myeff, altX, interaction1 = "ABSORPTIVE_CAPACITY" ) 
myeff  <- includeEffects(myeff, X, interaction1 = "TECH_DISTANCE" ) 
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myeff  <- includeEffects(myeff, altX, interaction1 = "KB_MODULARITY" ) 
myeff  <- includeEffects(myeff, X, interaction1 = "GEO_DISTANCE") 
myeff  <- includeEffects(myeff, altX, interaction1 = "COOP_EXPERIENCE" ) 
myeff  <- includeEffects(myeff, altX, interaction1 = "IND_EXPERIENCE")  
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, altX, interaction1 = "SIZE" ) 
 
 
# Estimation of parameters 
mymodel.2 <- sienaModelCreate(projname = "final", modelType = 3, nsub=5, 
n3=3000) 
ans.2 <- siena07( mymodel.2, data = mydata, effects = myeff, returnDeps=TRUE) 
 
# Conduct a test for time heterogeneity and plot results 
tt2  <- sienaTimeTest(ans.2) 
summary (tt2) 
plot(tt2, effects=1:9) 
 
########### Model 3 (includes all effects and time dummies) ############### 
 
# Combine data for the analysis 
mydata  <- sienaDataCreate (cooperation, TECH_DISTANCE, 
ABSORPTIVE_CAPACITY, 
KB_MODULARITY,GEO_DISTANCE,COOP_EXPERIENCE,IND_EXPERIENCE, 
SIZE, compositionchange) 
 
# Create effects structure 
myeff <- getEffects(mydata) 
 
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, density)  
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, transTriads)  
myeff  <- includeEffects(myeff, altX, interaction1 = "ABSORPTIVE_CAPACITY" ) 
myeff  <- includeEffects(myeff, X, interaction1 = "TECH_DISTANCE" ) 
myeff  <- includeEffects(myeff, altX, interaction1 = "KB_MODULARITY" ) 
myeff  <- includeEffects(myeff, X, interaction1 = "GEO_DISTANCE") 
myeff  <- includeEffects(myeff, altX, interaction1 = "COOP_EXPERIENCE" ) 
myeff  <- includeEffects(myeff, altX, interaction1 = "IND_EXPERIENCE")  
myeff <- includeEffects(myeff, altX, interaction1 = "SIZE" ) 
myeff <- includeTimeDummy(myeff, density, timeDummy = "all")  
myeff <- includeTimeDummy(myeff, transTriads, timeDummy = "all") 
 
 
# Estimation of parameters 
mymodel.3 <- sienaModelCreate(projname = "final", modelType = 3, nsub=5, 
n3=3000) 
ans.3 <- siena07( mymodel.3, data = mydata, effects = myeff, returnDeps=TRUE) 
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#### *** TEST FOR NORMAL DISTRIBUTION *** 
 
# Histogram / Density-function of degree distribution and normal distribution overlay 
h1 <- hist (deg1, breaks = 25, main = "Degree distribution of period 1998-2002", xlab 
= "Degree", freq = FALSE) 
# lines (density(deg1)) 
x <- seq(0, 200, 0.1) 
curve(dnorm(x, mean = mean(deg1),sd = sd(deg1)), add = T) 
 
# Shapiro-Test for normal distribution 
shapiro.test (deg1) 
 
 # QQ-Plots 
library (qualityTools) 
 
qqPlot(deg1, "normal", main = "Q-Q-Plot of period 1998-2002", xlab = "Quantiles for 
degrees 1998-2002",ylab = "Quantiles from normal distribution", cex.lab=1.5 ) 
 
 
# *** ARC-DIAGRAM *** 
 
library(arcdiagram) 
 
adjazenz.1 = as.matrix(read.delim("matrix_98_02.txt", header=TRUE)) 
mode(adjazenz.1) <- "numeric" #bug 
attributes.1 = as.matrix(read.delim("attributes_98_02.txt", header=FALSE)) 
p <- unique(sort(degree(graph_com.1),decreasing=TRUE)) 
(sort(degree(graph_com.1),decreasing=TRUE)) 
graph.1 <- delete.vertices(graph_com.1, V(graph_com.1)[ degree(graph_com.1) < p 
[[10]]]) 
 
# get edgelist 
edgelist = get.edgelist(graph.1) 
 
# get edges value 
weight = E(graph.1)$weight 
 
# get vertex labels 
vlabels = V(graph.1)$name 
  
# get vertex sections 
vsections = V(graph.1)$sections 
 
 # get vertex fill color 
vfill = V(graph.1)$fill 
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# get vertex border color 
vborders = V(graph.1)$border 
 
 # get vertex degree 
degrees = degree (graph_com.1, vlabels) 
 
# data frame with vgroups, degree, vlabels and ind 
x = data.frame(vsections, degrees, vlabels, ind=1:vcount(graph.1)) 
 
 # arranging by vsections and degrees 
y = arrange(x,desc(degrees), vlabels) 
 
# get ordering 'ind' 
new_ord = y$ind 
 
# plot arc diagram 
arcplot(edgelist, ordering=new_ord, labels=vlabels, cex.labels=0.8, 
show.nodes=TRUE, col.nodes=vfill, bg.nodes=vborders, 
cex.nodes = degrees/15, pch.nodes=21, 
lwd.nodes = 2, line=-0.5, 
col.arcs = hsv(0, 0, 0.2, 0.25), lwd.arcs = weight-50) 
 
 
# *** MAP OF AUTOMOTIVE FIRMS *** 
 
library (maptools) 
library(ggmap) 
library (sp) 
library (rgdal) 
 
read.csv("firm_map.csv",sep=";", header=T) -> firms 
xx <- as.numeric(firms [,3])/1000000 
yy <- as.numeric(firms [,4])/1000000 
tt <- data.frame(cbind (xx , yy)) 
auto <- qmap ("Germany", zoom = 6, source = "stamen", maptype = "toner", 
base_layer = ggplot (aes(x = yy, y = xx), data = tt)) + geom_point(size = 3, colour = 
"red", alpha = 0.4) 
auto 
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